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- G-2 PERIODIC REPORT -

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 :Auth: CG VI Corps:
 :Initials: JIL :
 :Date: 2 Jan 1945:
 :.....:

No 140

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 010001A
 TO : 012400A
 HQ VI CORPS
 020800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front line. No change except in Task Force Hudelson zone where enemy's furthest penetrations reached Q-763465 -- Q-806433 -- BAERENTHAL (Q-8441) -- Q-880426.

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

361 VG Div. Contact with all three Regts of the 256 VG Div in the EGUELSHARDT -- OBERSTEINBACH area confirms the shift of this Div from its former sector on the Corps E flank as reported by PWs. This Div is believed to be spearheading the current attack.

559 VG Div. Of especial interest is the contact made yesterday with the II Bn, 1127 GR (559 VG Div) in the vic of EGUELSHARDT (Q-8246), a recent arrival from the XX Corps zone where it was in immediate reserve for some time. Although no other elements of this Div have been identified, they may be responsible for the penetration E of BITCHE.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD


a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Patrol repulsed at KEMBS (A-8598), ILE NAPOLEON (V-7408) and THANN (V-5312). II Corps harassing arty fire on front zone towns and some patrol clashes. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 281 as of 012400A).

XX Corps. 100th Div: Enemy continued aggressive. Pincer attack from E and W on hill vic Q-7749 drove friendly Bn from positions. Estimated Bn infiltrated vic Q-7646 but another infiltration vic RIMLING (Q-6565) was mopped up. Forty to fifty enemy reported vic Q-7646 and four tanks carrying Inf at MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942). Situation on right flank indefinite. 44th Div: Pressure slackened somewhat during afternoon. Estimated Bn was driven from woods vic Q-6055. Later three attempted crossings BLIES River vic Q-5559 succeeded in getting one Co across at 012400A. Friendly arty however prevented that unit from further advance. Attack by estimated Bn of Inf supported by 10 tanks vic Q-6355 repulsed. 103d Div: Sector generally quiet. 106th Cav Gp: Estimated 200 enemy with some towed guns in woods Q-3371. Pressure on LUDWILLER (Q-3370) contained. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 281 as of 012400A).

VI Corps. A strong attack launched by the enemy against the Corps W flank succeeded in overrunning our forces defending the area between BITCHE and BANNSTEIN (Q-8344) and by the close of the period the enemy's leading elements were reported to have reached vic Q-8142. Initially, hvy fighting developed in the area SE of BITCHE shortly after midnight, but before daybreak the offensive had spread across the front as far E as OBERSTEINBACH (Q-9548). Successfully employing infiltration tactics, the enemy reached BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) which he captured late in the afternoon despite the strong resistance offered by Task Force Hudelson CP in that town. Further attempts of infiltrations E of NEUNHOFFEN (Q-9146) were successfully repulsed. Only a limited amount of armor was employed although PWs reported a large tank concentration in the BITCHE area. Arty activity in support of the attack was light and scattered and several reports of horse-drawn arty on the move indicate that possibly the bulk of the enemy's arty was not yet in position. Hostile a/c

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supported the enemy offensive by strafing front lines. From identifications it was evident that the enemy had moved the 256 VG Div from the sector on the Corps E flank to the NEUNHOFFEN area and PWs stated that the Div was attacking on a 10 km front. Also at least elements of the 559 Div participated in this attack as one Regt of this Div was identified E of BITCHE. Also identified were elements of the 361 VGD which has been in this area for some time.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Enemy employed his armor in offensive action against the left flank of the Corps zone, attacking in multiple columns down the BITCHE -- PHILIPPSBOURG, BITCHE -- DAMBACH and BITCHE -- OBERSTEINBACH road nets. At least 10 and possibly 20 tanks and SPs were employed in this action. A concentration of 8 tanks operated in the NEUNHOFFEN area throughout the period, five to six tanks were observed moving SE from BITCHE at 1420A and several enemy half-tracks were observed at Q-955486 and Q-955586. Activity along the remainder of the Corps front was negligible.

(2) Arty. In the left portion of the Corps zone, enemy arty rendered very little support to advancing Inf. The difficulties of terrain and supporting infiltration tactics probably account for the enemy's holding his arty in reserve for the present. BAERENTHAL was shelled by one 88mm gun at mid-day and troops attempting to re-enter the town during the night were subjected to concentrated fire. The communication center of DAMBACH (Q-9242) was harassed while a medium caliber gun firing from the NW placed 45 rds in OBERSTEINBACH. Elsewhere in the Corps zone shelling was very light and scattered with slight emphasis in the WISSEMBOURG area. The largest mission of the period occurred at 2035A when 50 rds of harassing fire fell on forward positions N of SCHLEITHA (R-2243). Several columns of horse-drawn arty were observed during the period apparently enroute positions where they could support the attack.

(3) Aviation. At 0858A, several ME-109s and 1 JU-88 entered the Corps area and strafed front line units of the 79th Div. These a/c were engaged by heavy and light AA and the JU-88 was shot down and crashed vic R-228365. At 1130A, 2 ME-109s entered the Corps area vic MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7943) on a recon mission. At 1530A, 4 FW-190s, also on recon, were engaged by our AA vic NIEDERSOULTZBACH (Q-8027).

(4) Inf.

Task Force Hudelson. As presaged by the increased activity and movement on the Corps W flank throughout the preceding period, the enemy launched a two pronged attack in the area SE of BITCHE at the start of the period. Just after midnight the enemy attacked at Q-810483 and Q-830460 without arty or mortar preparation. The main effort was made by the eastern column but heavy pressure continued on the W. Before daybreak fighting subsided somewhat but a short time later, apparently after the enemy had regrouped, a strong attack developed in the vic of BANNSTEIN (Q-8344) which ultimately succeeded in breaching our positions in that area. Another attack employing an estimated two Cos further E vic Q-880460 was stopped at 0630A. During the morning the situation became obscure on our extreme W flank and at 0930A two Cos were observed moving SW unopposed vic Q-8144. By noon the enemy had reached the northern outskirts of BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) and placed the Task Force CP under SA fire and by late afternoon the enemy had forced our units to withdraw and were in possession of the town. Between 1100A and 1500A an estimated Regt of Inf was reported marching S along the road vic Q-854455. An air OP observed an estimated 500 personnel marching SW vic Q-813427 at 1515A and at the same time a patrol was reported at Q-805405.

45th Inf Div. At the beginning of the period enemy patrols became aggressive vic NEUNHOFFEN and considerable activity was observed along the NEUNHOFFEN -- DAMBACH (Q-9244) road with squad size groups entering the buildings in NEUNHOFFEN. This activity culminated in an attack on our positions vic Q-9146 at 0515A and although the enemy employed an



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
estimated Bn in this effort our troops halted the enemy without loss of ground after our arty had inflicted many casualties. PWs captured in this action reported that this attack was only a prelude to the main effort which was to get under way at noon. This may have been the enemy's intention as shortly after 0800A, a column of 200 foot troops were observed marching SE vic Q-912470 and at the same time 17 horse-drawn carts entered the woods at Q-915467. This and other general activity indicated a build-up of a strong force in this area, however, our air (24 fighter bombers) covered NEUNHOFFEN with bombs and a short time later some enemy movement was observed leaving the town to the W. This general exodus continued and at mid-afternoon a considerable number of foot troops were observed leaving NEUNHOFFEN. At 1235A, approx 100 personnel left the town vic Q-905468 and between 1400A and 1430A from 100 to 300 men were observed leaving the town to the N. Further to the N the enemy suffered many casualties while attempting to infiltrate in the area SW of OBERSTEINBACH. However, tactics of this type continued throughout the remainder of the period and an unknown number of enemy finally succeeded in reaching DAMBACH late in the evening. Our troops initiated a counteroffensive and forced the enemy to withdraw and their further efforts to infiltrate back into the town under cover of darkness were successfully blocked. During the afternoon the enemy resisted our attack on BAERENTHAL with heavy MG fire from the town and from vic Q-8142. The enemy continued to maintain very heavy pressure in this area and after dark an estimated 70 men infiltrated behind our lines vic Q-8643. The remainder of the Div front was relatively quiet but at noon a 10-man enemy patrol overran an arty OP on the high ground vic R-037523 and at 1245A, approx 50 enemy were observed at R-045605. At 1715A, our troops were engaged in a fire fight with an estimated Co at Q-942475.

79th Inf Div. Enemy activity was negligible and this is probably accounted for by the identification of the 256 Div on the Corps W flank which means the SIEGFRIED Line in the Div zone formerly under command of the 256 Div is now only defended by ad hoc units and the Volkssturm. The fact that the enemy did not initiate either a holding action or diversionary attack may indicate that these units are not capable of offensive action. During the morning, our patrol located an enemy outpost at R-350446 and later in the day two enemy were taken under fire as they approached our outpost at R-238452. Small enemy groups vic R-210525 and R-226526 were fired on by our arty with good results. After dark a group of 15 enemy were observed in OBER OTTERBACH (R-1752) and an 18-man patrol was engaged vic R-315365 at 2130A.

RHINE River front. In the TF Herren area our search for possible paratroopers was made with negative results. However, in the TF Linden zone, a man identified by the FBI as a German paratrooper was apprehended in GAMBSHEIM (R-1010) and is being investigated at this time. Some SA and MG fire from E of the RHINE harassed our forward positions in the TF Linden area during the afternoon.

(5) Motor movement. There was an increase in motor movement on our immediate front but Tac/R observed only minor MT movement in the enemy rear areas with the exception of a 2-mile long column of vehicles with 50 to 100 yard interval moving W from LANDAU at 1035A. One convoy of 15 MT was observed moving W from BITCHE at Q-765507 while another movement of 10 arty pieces and 15 horse-drawn vehicles was seen moving SW into BITCHE from vic Q-800545. Scattered MT totalling 25 plus, some towing trailers, were observed moving W on road along RR from Q-8975 to ZWELBRUCKEN (Q-7475). One movement of 30 MT with trailers was observed heading W NE of PIRMASSENS vic Q-9866. E of the RHINE 15 scattered MT were seen going both ways between STUTTGART (S-9521) and KARLSRUHE (R-5047) but otherwise traffic was very light.

(6) RR movement. Rail traffic increased over the previous period, the most important movements of which were: a train moving S vic Q-7854 hauling 60-70 tanks early in the morning. Between KAISERSLAUTERN and WORMS



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(M-4515), 9 trains totalling 220 cars were observed during the day. One 12-car train and 6 flat cars loaded with tanks and a 23-car train was hauling 15 tanks. Direction of these movements unobserved.

(7) River traffic. One Tac/R mission flown observed 5 ships 150 ft long with steam up S of MAINZ vic M-4344 and 75 ships averaging 75 ft long docked S of MAINZ (M-3855).

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

TF Hudelson Not reported

Total PWs captured by TF Hudelson in FRANCE: 13

<u>45th Inf Div</u>	9 fr I Bn 481 GR
	1 fr 2 Co 256 AT Bn
	2 fr 1 Co 456 GR
	1 fr RHQ Co 952 GR
	40 fr 2 Co 456 GR
	2 fr Hq I Bn 456 GR
	<u>55</u>

Total PWs captured by 45th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 14,422

<u>79th Inf Div</u>	1 Alsatian deserter
	2 Italian laborers
	<u>3</u>

Total PWs captured by 79th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,114

TF Harris No PWs taken during period

TF Herren No PWs taken during period

Total PWs captured by TF Herren in FRANCE: 5

TF Linden No PWs taken during period

<u>14th Armd Div</u>	1 fr 7 Co 951 GR
	1 fr 3 Btry 257 AR
	1 fr 3 Co 477 GR (Regt "C")
	2 evacuated through medical channels
	<u>5</u>

Total PWs captured by 14 AD in FRANCE and GERMANY: 800

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 012400A: 63

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 58,102

b. There are several reports which indicate that enemy agents in US uniforms with US equipment are attempting to cause panic in rear areas by spreading rumors of enemy breakthrough. All persons who make reports of this nature will be immediately apprehended and held in protective custody and Div or Corps G-2s notified of circumstances.

c. Enemy Methods. According to PW reports, the enemy has captured several US vehicles including jeeps, half-tracks and either tanks or TDs and is making immediate use of them in current operations. Two enemy soldiers were killed while riding in a jeep with US markings unchanged. All personnel should be warned to be alert for the probable use of our vehicles by the enemy.



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c. 17 SS PG Div. A seemingly well-informed PW from the 37 SS PGR (17 SS PG Div) gives the following account of his Div's strength, equipment and mission. He states that both the 37 and 38 SS PGRs are up to full T/O strength, each of them still having 3 Bns. In the area in which his Div operated he claims to have seen 15-150mm Assault Guns (Grizzly Bears?), 9 Royal Tigers and 3 Panthers. He said the Div's mission was to breakthrough to ROHRBACH (Q-3425), the 37 SS PGR being followed by the 38 SS PGR and that the principal object of their attack was to divert forces from the EIFEL salient. He further mentioned the existence of a well rested Inf Div located at Q-5874. PW confirms what has been suspected for some time, namely, that the 17 SS PG Div was undergoing a "cover-refit" designed to make it available for vigorous offensive action within a comparatively short time while some of its elements remained in contact in the line. This inevitably raises the question of a similar "cover-refitting" of the 25 PG Div and the 21 Pz Div from which only token elements have been in contact for several weeks, all contact having been lost with the latter about 10 days ago. According to PW's statements the thrust against the 44th Inf Div (US) was a large-scale undertaking with far-reaching objectives.


4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

- a. To continue the attack to the SE to drive a wedge between VI and XV Corps followed by an envelopment of VI Corps S flank.
- b. To continue the attack to the SW to envelop XV Corps from the E.
- c. To continue his attack to the S with a view of controlling the main passes of the VOSGES and isolating VI Corps E of the VOSGES.

Capability a is favored.

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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 141

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 020001A
TO : 022400A
HQ VI CORPS
030800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. Enemy front lines run generally: LEMBERG (Q-7445) -- Q-7538 -- Q-8139 -- Q-8744 -- DAMBACH (Q-9244) -- then E with no change.

b. Units in contact. For identifications see Par 3a below

951 GR (361 VG Div). A PW taken 1 Jan claims that he belonged to the Co, 951 GR (361 VG Div). The II Bn, 951 GR is said to have moved from FISCHACH (Q-9854) about 23 Dec following which they were engaged on a field problem until about 30 Dec when the entire Bn, about 300 strong, moved to EPPENBRUNN (Q-8757), having been ordered to attack just before midnight 31 Dec. The result of the II Bn, 951 GR confirms statements recently made by a PW from the 361 Field Repl Bn that a considerable number of replacements have come to the Div during the last two weeks. Thus the 361 VG Div, now displaced slightly westward, appears once more to be functioning with three rejuvenated Regts.

6 SS Mountain Div (6 SS GEBIRGSDIVISION NORD). Five PWs taken at Q-875428 from 3 Co, 6 SS Mountain Signal Bn, state that their Div came from NORWAY and DENMARK. It arrived in the EGUELSHARDT - STURZELBRONN area about 1 Jan. PWs state that individual units of both the 11 and 12 Regts are in scattered bivouac areas in that vicinity. PWs state that they were part of a special Signal Det sent from GERMANY to contact a Bn commanded by one Captain BUCHSTELLER (probably a Bn of the 12 SS Mtn Regt) in EGUELSHARDT (Q-8246). Divisional commander is given as Brigadier General (GENERALMAJOR) PRENNER, CO of the 12 SS Mtn Regt as Colonel SCHNEIDER. The 6 SS Mtn Div is thought to have two three-battalion Mountain Inf Regts and its combat effectives are estimated to reach about 6000.

435 VG Div. A PW taken in BERG (R-3443) told a curious story of a new 435 VG Div of five Bns in unnumbered Regts to which he claimed to belong. He could not provide sufficient details about the new formation to clearly identify it. PW stated, among other things, that his (II) Bn CO was Captain KROESCHWALD. This Captain KROESCHWALD sounds too much like the Captain GROESCHWALD who commands the I Bn, 476 GR (256 VG Div) until recently committed in the vic of PW's capture to lend much credibility to his account of a new formation which was reported to have assumed responsibility of the area below KARLSRUHE E of the RHINE.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First French Army. I Corps: NTR. II Corps: Day quiet. Light enemy arty reaction. (Source: First French Army Isum 224 as of 022400A).

AV Corps. 100th Div: Attack vic Q-6556 by estimated Co supported by five tanks repulsed by 1200A. 10-15 tanks harassed friendly forward elements Q-7456 throughout the day. RIMLING (Q-6555) heavily shelled. An unestimated number of tanks observed moving GUIDERKIRCH (Q-6656) to ERSCHING (Q-6557) and troops reported displacing from vic UTWEILER (Q-6858) to PEPPENKUM (Q-6760). Considerable traffic of armor and MT on the road between UTWEILER and EPPING-URBACH (Q-6957). Attack in undetermined size on vic Q-7448 initially successful but the advance reported stopped at end of period. Attack vic Q-7547 of 100-150 Inf and supported by 5-7 tanks forced slight withdrawal but ground

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
retaken later without opposition. Another attack at 1900A in the same vic was repulsed. Enemy reported digging in all along front at end of period. 44th Div: Attack Q-6354 at 1145A by estimated Bn of Inf supported by 8 tanks broken up. Assembly of estimated four Bns in woods Q-6056 dispersed by friendly attack. At 1930A, attack of undetermined strength at Q-6254 dispersed. Another attack supported by 5 tanks in same vic at 2400A repulsed. 103d Div: No aggressive action. 106th Cav Gp: Strong resistance to friendly attempt to force enemy across SAAR River. Otherwise, no aggressive enemy action. (Source: XV Corps Isum as of 032400A).

VI Corps. Enemy activity continued to be centered on the Corps left flank where the enemy attempted to further exploit his initial gains in the BITCHE -- DAMBACH (Q-9244) salient. Strong pressure consisting of both attack and infiltration was exerted throughout the period in the SARREINSBERG (Q-7442), REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037), BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) areas, however, the enemy failed to establish any appreciable gains. The attack still lacked the coordination of a full scale offensive but it appeared to be a major effort. The identification of elements of the 6 SS Mtn Div would further substantiate this. Although the exact intentions of the enemy are still somewhat obscure, this drive to the S and the probing along the roads SE and SW would indicate an attempt to find a soft spot in our positions with a view of throwing in strong armored elements. This is substantiated not only by the considerable amount of armor reported in the area and not yet committed, but also by a recently captured document (by the 45th Div) which shows the capture of REIPERTSWILLER as an immediate objective. The enemy apparently considers the REIPERTSWILLER area as a key to the relatively open ground and good road net below INGWILLER (Q-8130) on which he could use his armor for rapid exploitation. The enemy's arty continued to be light with a few moderate concentrations reported.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Enemy armored activity again showed an increase on the left flank of the Corps zone where the enemy continued his offensive action. The considerable amount of armored activity involved indicates that more than the normal reinforcing tank support is involved in the enemy's attack, suggesting the commitment of the 21 Pz Div. During the period, an unknown number of tanks were observed moving S on the BITCHE -- LEMBURG road, 10 to 12 tanks were observed moving in vic Q-745459, 6 tanks with Inf entered BAERENTHAL at 0800A, enemy armor and Inf columns were observed moving S along roads at Q-803391 and Q-788394, some tanks at Q-788176 at 1700A and scattered reports of one and two tanks constituted the actions of enemy armor. An estimated 25 tanks, some of which had American markings, were also reported in vic of WILDENGUTH. This would indicate that the enemy was either using some of our tanks which he has captured or has marked his own. During the period, 5 enemy tanks were destroyed and 6 tanks and one armored vehicle were damaged by our air.

(2) Arty. The arty assigned to support the enemy's offensive remains unorganized, however truck and horse-drawn arty were observed on the roads with Inf troops SW and SE of MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942) indicating that arty was moving up to support the attack. The lack of arty fire from these batteries is believed due to the changing nature of the situation and vigilance of our bombers in not allowing them to reach positions in fighting condition. In the extreme left of the Corps zone shelling was mostly from SPs and tanks. During the morning, an estimated 90 rds of medium caliber were placed in OBERSTEINBACH (Q-9748) while the southern part of BAERENTHAL was intermittently shelled at midday. The NEUNHOFFEN -- OBERSTEINBACH and PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8743) areas were lightly shelled during the afternoon with heaviest fire in the latter town at dark. Medium caliber guns interdicted the bridge in WISSEMBOURG with one rd every fifteen minutes during the day. During the night, shelling was very light; harassing fire fell in REIPERTSWILLER.



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
(3) Aviation. At 0950A, one FW-190 on rcn at an altitude from 600 to 200 ft was engaged by LAA. Plane flew from vic R-0945 to vic R-2543. At 1030A, approx nine enemy a/c were in the area (5 Me-109s and 4 FW-190s) flying singly or in pairs. Strafing was reported vic WINGEN (Q-7345) and vic LANGEN-SCULTZBACH (R-0043). Both HAA and LAA engaged planes with one Me-109 reported destroyed crashing vic WILDENGUTH (Q-7737) and one FW-190 probably destroyed. At 1119A, 15 Me-109s were reported vic LEMBACH (R-0545) flying W and it is believed these enemy a/c were after friendly planes in that area at the time. About the same time, seven FW-190s flew a rcn mission between STRASBOURG (W-0198) and SUNDHEIM (W-0605) and were engaged. At 1155A, three Me-109s and one P-51 with American markings were reported to have strafed vic NEEWILLER (R-2738).

(4) Inf

45th Inf Div (Including TF Hudelson). Throughout the period, the enemy attempted to press his initial successes on the Div left flank while virtually no enemy activity was reported on the right flank. On the E shoulder of his salient the enemy maintained active patrolling throughout the day. Early in the morning, 6 to 8 enemy attempted to infiltrate vic Q-932461 and a 15-man enemy patrol was repulsed in the same area a little later. During the afternoon, the enemy's infiltration tactics continued along the high ground vic Q-928463 and vic OBERSTEINBACH engaging our troops in SA fire fight until after dark. In the morning, the enemy launched an estimated two Co attack from vic Q-8744 which continued throughout the morning and forced our troops to make some withdrawal. SE of BAERENTHAL, the enemy continued to exert strong pressure along the road, launching two attacks by an estimated 200-300 enemy supported by armor. These attacks were contained but close contact and hvy pressure continued throughout the period. Only light resistance, however, was offered to our troops advancing along the road NW out of PHILIPPSBOURG in the afternoon where several PWs were reported taken, although an estimated 400 enemy were reported in vic Q-8443. Hvy pressure developed in the REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) -- WILDENGUTH area during the day. In the morning, the enemy pushed a two Co attack from the N down the two parallel roads running into REIPERTSWILLER vic Q-801371 and Q-789380. The attack was stopped but our troops pushing up the same road as far as the 39 Northing during the afternoon were forced to make some withdrawal because of the hvy resistance offered by the enemy. At WILDENGUTH an estimated Co of enemy attacked unsuccessfully a road block and moderate resistance continued throughout the period. Late in the period, the enemy apparently infiltrated into the vic of REIPERTSWILLER since fire was reported in the town during the night. The enemy maintained his pressure in the western part of the sector with estimated Co attacking SW from Q-250-25 vic SARREINSBERG throughout the afternoon. This attack failed to gain ground, however close contact continued during the period. The enemy also succeeded in infiltrating to vic Q-725398 where he set up a strong defended road block supported by two tanks which cut the road between two of our Bns. Throughout the day, considerable enemy movement was reported on the roads and trails in the MOUTERHOUSE area, consisting of Inf, tanks, MT, and horse-drawn arty. The principal flow of this traffic was to the S and SW in the direction of REIPERTSWILLER, SARREINSBERG and MIESENTHAL (Q-7140).

79th Inf Div. Enemy was generally quiet throughout the period. At 0615A, a 10-12 man enemy patrol which had apparently come from E of the RHINE was engaged vic BERG (R-3442). Enemy MG fire was reported vic R-18651C during the afternoon and some enemy activity was heard vic R-336407 after dark.

RHINE River Area. Enemy ground activity was negligible. One shot from a sniper was reported in the outskirts of BISCHWILLER (R-0818).



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(5) Motor Movement. Considerable motor movement in conjunction with armor, horse-drawn arty and Inf continued on the immediate front in the pocket created by the enemy between BITCHE and DAMBACH, however Tac/R observed only light movement in the enemy rear areas. Approx 15 scattered vehicles moving generally E from PIRMASENS (Q-9067) and BITCHE (Q-7750) area and an additional 14 vehicles moving S in direction of NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-6083) were observed. Ground observers reported some MT movement in the vic R-136095 early in the period and some vehicular activity in OBER OTTERBACH (R-1752) just after dark.

(6) Rail Movement. Tac/R reported much less rail movement than in the past few days although activity was centered in the LANDAU (R-2856) area where approx 110 RR cars were observed but the direction of movement was not indicated. Traffic continued between WORMS (M-4515) and KAISERSLAUTERN (R-0294) but on a lighter scale than previously observed. One 30 car train was observed quite near the front on a secondary line in the vic of DAHN (R-0261). From the movements observed it would appear the shift of major units in this area have been completed and that the day's activity was generally concerned with supply and local readjustments.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties.

TF Hudelson

Total PWs captured by TF Hudelson in FRANCE: 13

45th Inf Div

15 fr Hq Co I Bn 476 GR	6 fr 1 Co 256 Eng Bn
12 fr 1 Co 476 GR	1 fr 1 Co 456 GR
27 fr 2 Co 476 GR	1 fr 1 Co 481 GR
8 fr 3 Co 476 GR	1 fr 7 Co Regt XII/1
3 fr 4 Co 476 GR	1 fr Hq Co II Bn Regt XII/1
3 fr 6 Co 476 GR	10 PW Labor Group (from FTI)
5 fr 14 Co 476 GR	93

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 14,315

79th Inf Div

1 fr II Bn 435 VG Div (?)
1 fr 812 AA Bn
1 deserter
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Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,117

TF Herren

Total PWs captured by TF Herren in FRANCE: 5


14th Armd Div

2 fr 1 Co 361 Eng Bn
7 evacuated through medical channels
9 (PWs for period ending 022400A Jan)

12 captured 30 Dec and evacuated to Army Cage without interrogation or record due to bombing of Div Cage on that date.

150 captured on 1 Jan and turned over to 45th Div.
162 (PWs not previously reported)

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 971



S E C R E T

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 022400A: 267
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 58,369

b. More about Horses:

(1) Interrogation of the local peasantry threw some light on the whereabouts of German Arty horses, when the battery is in position. It seems it is the general custom to put the horses in the barns and stables of the nearest village, turning out the civilian stock if necessary, and compelling the unwilling host to feed them out of his own supplies.

(2) The PW interrogators brought out some more information. If the battery is in position at the edge of the woods, the horses are taken back to the center of the woods and kept under cover. If natural overhead cover is insufficient a "lean-to" of branches is erected to conceal them. When the guns are in the open and village barns are not available, the horses are taken back about 2 kilometers and placed in ravines or sunken roads and concealed from both ground and air observation. If necessary, and time permitting, slit trenches and overhead cover are provided.

(3) Many people have some qualms about shooting up horses but observers should keep in mind that these are not "Man's Noblest Friends" but enemy prime movers and should be destroyed!

(Source: XX Corps Artillery Counterbattery Reports No 130 & 131)

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 140.

Langevin
LANGEVIN
G-2



Copy No. 67

S E C R E T

.....
: S E C R E T :
:Auth: CG VI Corps:
:Initials: QJQ :
:Date: 4 Jan 1945 :
:.....:

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 142

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 030001A
TO : 032400A
HQ VI CORPS
040800A JAN 45

ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. See Overlay, Incl No 1.
- b. Units in contact. See Overlay and for identifications, par 3a below.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD


a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Generally quiet with some harassing arty fire on MITTELWIHR (V-6950) and ORREY (V-5747). (Source: Seventh Army Isum 285 as of 032400A).

XV Corps. 100th Div: Hvy pressure vic GOETZENBRUCH (Q-7442) by estimated Bn supported by tanks was contained by friendly counterattack. Attacks vic Q-7350 by estimated Co and vic Q-7543 by estimated Bn repulsed. Moderate arty and rocket fire fell on PETIT REDERCHING (Q-6851), SIERSTAHL (Q-7149), LAMBACH (Q-7243), LEMBERG (Q-7345) and ST LOUIS (Q-7243). 44th Div: Estimated two Bns supported by 10 tanks or SP guns reached ACHEN (Q-5949) and GROS REDECHING (Q-6252) but were driven back and original line was restored. Attack vic Q-5957 by estimated Co repulsed but followed by hvy arty concentration that vic and SW of BLIESBRUCKEN woods Q-5856. Hvy traffic observed from REICHEIM (Q-596) to BLIESBRUCKEN (Q-5958) and BEBLESHEIM (Q-5863) to HABKIRCHEN (Q-5659). 103d Div: Generally quiet. Only light opposition against friendly patrols to LIXING (Q-4662), RILCHINGEN (Q-5059) and OETING (Q-4064). 106th Cav Gp: Attempted attack by 80 enemy from GIESLAUTERN (Q-3471) towards LUDWEILER (Q-3269) broken up by friendly arty. Road vic SCHAFHAUSEN (Q-3273) under arty and mortar fire. Two patrols vic Q-3467 and Q-3370 repulsed. French 2 DB: Enemy driven from ACHEN and GROS REDECHING in 44th Div sector. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 285 as of 032400A).

VI Corps. The enemy's offensive continued with increased pressure but succeeded in making only minor gains. From all indications the main effort continued at the southernmost part of the salient where strong forces of the 361 Div exerted hvy pressure on REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) from the N, NW and W. However, this attack was stopped and late in the afternoon the enemy was observed digging in on the high ground N of REIPERTSWILLER. Apparently the enemy was awaiting reinforcements of the 12 SS Mtn Regt which according to PW's statement was destined to arrive in that vic at the end of the period. Hvy pressure also continued on both the eastern and western shoulders of the enemy's penetration and a Regt size attack launched during the afternoon made some progress and a few snipers and tanks reached the outskirts of PHILIPPSBOURG. On the western shoulder, elements of the 257 Div launched an attack to the W on the SARREINSBERG (Q-7441) -- MEISENIHAL (Q-7140) axis. This effort ran head on into our counteroffensive and hvy fighting continued in this area for the remainder of the period. Elsewhere on the Corps front activity was negligible except for enemy patrols which were immediately dispatched to locate our new positions. Arty fire was negligible except in the towns of PHILIPPSBOURG and REIPERTSWILLER.

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S E C R E T

b. Operations of component elements


(1) Armor. Hvy overcast precluded the observation of any armored movement in the enemy's rear areas and this accounts for the decreased number of reports of tanks operating on our W flank. However, armor was again committed in direct support of Inf on a minor scale. Two of the four tanks which supported the attack on PHILIPPSBOURG were destroyed and one tank was knocked out while supporting the offensive on REIPERTSWILLER from the NW. During the afternoon, a single tank was observed in the BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG road. The lack of identification of armored units would seem to indicate that the enemy is holding his armor until a break-through has been made either to the E or W flank where terrain is more favorable for the employment of armor.

(2) Arty. Enemy arty continues to remain light in spite of PW statements that ammunition was adequate. PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) was heavily shelled by light caliber guns during the morning and lightly harassed during the closing hours of the period. SP guns sporadically harassed REIPERTSWILLER during the afternoon. No shelling was reported elsewhere in the Corps zone.

(3) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy offensive continued to exert increasing pressure throughout the period across the entire salient on the Div W flank. This offensive apparently consisted of three separate but coordinated zones of action. On the extreme W flank the 466 and 457 GRs attacked to the W in the SARREINSBERG -- KOHINHUTTE (Q-7433) area and according to PW's statements had the mission of capturing MEISENTHAL (Q-7140) and then flanking to the NW. Early in the period, one small group of enemy infiltrated and set up a road block at the RJ vic Q-726398. However, the main enemy effort on the SARREINSBERG -- MEISENTHAL axis did not develop until daylight and thus coincided with our counteroffensive. This resulted in very hvy fighting throughout the remainder of the period and our troops reported that although they had not gained any ground, the enemy attack was effectively stopped. Hvy pressure was also exerted at the southernmost portion of the salient where the enemy employed a considerable portion of the 361 VG Div in a multiple pronged attack in an effort to seize REIPERTSWILLER. Pressure was also maintained in this area throughout the period by three separate columns. One attack was made from the N along the road leading S into REIPERTSWILLER and another was launched from the NW while the third was made due W in an effort to dislodge our troops in WILDENGUTH (Q-7837). In addition, an estimated Co infiltrated and took up positions on the high ground SW of REIPERTSWILLER. These attacks all bogged down and late in the afternoon the enemy was observed digging in on the high ground between Q-790382 and Q-805-375. A PW from the 953 GR captured while trying to enter our lines stated that he was to guide the 12 SS Mtn Regt into an assembly area vic Q-7837. Apparently this Regt was intended to attack WIMMENAU (Q-7634) and then assist the 953 GR by an attack on REIPERTSWILLER from the SW. According to captured map, another attack is to be made on WINGEN (Q-7335) from the NE and the uncommitted 11 SS Mtn Regt may be employed in this effort. Late in the period an undetermined number of enemy infiltrated to the outskirts of WINGEN. On the northeastern section of the salient, the enemy kept close contact during the morning in the BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG area and in the afternoon launched an offensive towards PHILIPPSBOURG with the 476 GR and some armor support. This attack overran some of our positions and a few snipers and two or three tanks reached the town late in the evening. During the day, the remainder of the Div front was inactive except for a four-man patrol which was apparently attempting to locate our new front line but was destroyed when it reached Q-977440. However, after dark considerable activity was heard in DAMBACH (Q-9244).

79th Inf Div and RHINE River Front. The enemy lost no time in checking on our changed dispositions as at 1000A, two men were observed in WISSEMBOURG vic the bridge site at R-158486 and later in the day a 12-man patrol was taken under TD fire as they moved N on the road from MOTHEREN (R-3037). S along the RHINE enemy activity was negligible.



S E C R E T

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

1 fr Hq II Bn 456 GR	2 fr 5 Co 481 GR
4 fr 7 Co 456 GR	26 fr 256 Fus Co
7 fr RHQ Co 476 GR	8 fr 3 Co 457 GR
1 fr Hq I Bn 476 GR	1 fr 1 Co 952 GR
4 fr 1 Co 476 GR	3 fr 5 Co 951 GR
2 fr 2 Co 476 GR	1 fr 8 Co 951 GR
2 fr 3 Co 476 GR	1 fr 7 Co 953 GR
9 fr 4 Co 476 GR	5 fr 3 Co 6 Sig Bn (6 SS Mtn Div)
1 fr 5 Co 476 GR	3 fr "OPPEL" AT Co
11 fr 7 Co 476 GR	5 Russian forced labor
3 fr 14 Co 476 GR	5 Alsatian deserters
1 fr 4 Co 481 GR	<u>107</u>

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 14,62

79th Inf Div 4 Misc deserters

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,123

14th Armd Div 12 Misc deserters

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 983

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 032400A: 123
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 58,492


4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 140.

Dixon
DIXON
Asst G-2

2 Incls

- 1 - Overlay
- 2 - Sunrise, Sunset Table



R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

ENCLOSURE NO 2
to
REPORT NO 142

4 January 1945

SUNRISE, SUNSET TABLES

JANUARY 1945

1. This table is based upon STRASBOURG and all times mentioned are "A" time.
2. Daylight is approx one hour before sunrise, darkness one hour after sunset.
3. CORRECTION TABLE:


(1) EPINAL	- Plus 5 Minutes	(5) HAGUENAU	- Plus 1 Minute
(2) VESOUL	- Plus 5 Minutes	(6) MULHOUSE	- Minus 1 Minute
(3) SAARBRUCKEN	- Plus 5 Minutes	(7) KARLSRUHE	- Minus 2 Minutes
(4) SAVERNE	- Plus 2 Minutes	(8) STUTTGART	- Minus 5 Minutes

DATE	SUNRISE	SUNSET	MOONRISE	MOONSET	PHASE
January 1	0820	1646	1947	1026	Full Moon
2	0820	1647	2052	1057	
3	0820	1649	2157	1123	
4	0819	1649	2300	1146	
5	0819	1650		1206	Last Quarter
6	0819	1651	0003	1226	
7	0819	1652	0106	1246	
8	0819	1653	0210	1307	
9	0819	1654	0315	1338	
10	0818	1655	0422	1401	
11	0818	1656	0528	1437	
12	0817	1658	0635	1521	New Moon
13	0817	1659	0737	1616	
14	0816	1701	****	****	
15	0815	1702	0917	1835	
16	0815	1704	0955	1952	
17	0814	1705	1026	2111	
18	0813	1707	1054	2230	
19	0812	1708	1120	2347	
20	0811	1710	1144		First Quarter
21	0810	1711	1209	0104	
22	0809	1713	1237	0220	
23	0808	1714	1310	0335	
24	0807	1716	1348	0447	
25	0806	1717	1434	0553	
26	0805	1718	1527	0653	
27	0804	1720	1627	0742	Full Moon
28	0803	1722	1731	0823	
29	0802	1723	1829	0857	
30	0801	1725	1944	0920	
31	0759	1727	2047	0949	

**** Indicates that moon is too close to sun for observation.

- 1 -

R E S T R I C T E D



SECRET

Copy No 39

: : : : :
 : SECRET :
 :Auth: CG VI Corps:
 :Initials: JH:
 :Date: 5 Jan 1945 :
 : : : : :

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 143

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 040001A
 TO : 042400A
 HQ VI CORPS
 050800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front line. No change.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

951 GR (361 VG Div). PWs taken from the 5 and 8 Cos and Bn Hq of the 951 GR at Q-7634 agree that their Regt has no I Bn and that the II Bn, also known as Battle Group STAEMMLE, is attached to the 953 GR. At the beginning of the current attack the II Bn, 951 GR had a combat strength of about 180 but it suffered heavy losses in the recent fighting, its present strength probably not exceeding half that number. One of these PWs, an officer, believed that the current attack against Seventh Army troops is a maneuver to relieve pressure on units attacking the First American Army, the axis of the attack being NE-SW.

6 SS Mountain Div. PWs taken from the 3 Co (vic PHILIPPSBOURG) of the 6 SS Signal Bn and from the 6 Co, 12 SS Mountain Regt "MICHAEL GEISMYER" give us additional details of the organization and movement of that Div. According to them the Div comprises about 70% VOLKSDEUTSCHE, among whom there are said to be many MAGYARS, and 30% REICHSDEUTSCHE. The Div left FINLAND in November, traveling via NORWAY and DENMARK, leaving the latter country 24 Dec. During its withdrawal through northern FINLAND and NORWAY the Div evidently suffered many losses for the first six companies of the 12 SS Mountain Regt arrived in this area with an average strength of 50-60. The Div's 11 and 12 SS Mountain Regts each has three six-company Bns plus a 19th regimental Co. Each Bn has four rifle Cos, the 5 Co being the heavy weapons Co and the 6 Co the Hq Co the latter having an Engr and a Rcn platoon. The divisional Signal Bn has a telephone, a radio and a Hq Co. The Div's arty regt is reported to have three Bns of arty, two of which are equipped with light mountain (Pack) howitzers.


506 SS PG Bn. PWs taken at Q-7636 from the 1, 3 and 4 Cos of the 506 SS PG Bn claim that this Bn has been attached to the 6 SS Mountain Div since the Div was in FINLAND. The Bn is said to comprise 5 Cos, each about 80 strong, four of which are rifle Cos and one of which is a hvy Co, normally equipped with 6-50mm AT guns. It is not clear from preliminary interrogation how this unit functions although its organization and equipment indicate an employment in a reconnaissance or assault role.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First French Army. Raid supported with arty on KEMBS (A-8399) and infiltrations SW of that town repulsed. Repeated attacks estimated Co vic V-5445 repulsed. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 287 as of 042400A).

XV Corps. 100th Div: Attack of unknown strength vic Q-7454 repulsed. Strong resistance to friendly attack vic Q-7443 during afternoon. Arty fire intense throughout sector. 44th Div: ACHEN (Q-5949) and GROS REDERCHING (Q-6253) cleared against moderate resistance. Enemy holds positions NE and NW of GROS REDERCHING, also BELLEVUE FARM (Q-6254) and BRANDELFINGERHOF FARM (Q-6154). Infiltration attempted vic Q-5856 repulsed. 103d Div: No aggressive action reported. Undetermined number of SP guns sighted moving from FORBACH (Q-3965) to GRAUPINGEN (Q-4062). 106th Cav Gp: Enemy continues to dig in. Vehicles and tanks of undetermined number heard moving vic Q-3176. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 287 as of 042400A).



S E C R E T

VI Corps. The Corps W flank continued to be subjected to strong enemy pressure throughout the period while activity increased on the 79th Div front. No major thrust was made by the enemy on the left flank during the day and it appeared that he was continuing to probe the nose and shoulders of his REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8036) salient in search of a soft spot through which to pour his attack for exploitation of his initial success. The character of the German offensive remained piecemeal and poorly planned with lack of communications among forward elements, however it is believed that the enemy continued to reinforce his troops in the area. On the right flank small enemy groups were actively reconnoitering the recently evacuated area between the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines and more thorough and aggressive reconnaissance may be expected to increase throughout this area. Shelling from enemy guns was very light on the Corps front but it increased slightly over previous period. No identified hostile a/c appeared over the area during the period.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Fifteen to twenty tanks were active on the left flank of the Corps zone indicating a partial commitment of armor in support of Inf forces attacking in this sector with concentrations noted E of MEISENTHAL and N of REIPERTSWILLER. Four tanks were active in the DAMBACH area supporting enemy Inf with indirect fire during the afternoon and night, two to four tanks were active in the BAERENTHAL area, four Mk VIs were observed vic Q-798396 at 1115A, four Mk Vs at Q-778396 were possibly the same tanks, and three tanks were engaged at Q-725404 of which two were reported destroyed. An unknown number of tanks were reported vic Q-752421 at 1300A.

(2) Arty. Enemy arty activity increased slightly with all of the shelling falling in the zone of the 45th Div. Light guns located vic WALDECK (Q-8446) lightly shelled the communications center of PECHELBRONN (Q-8539) and harassed forward positions from BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG area during the morning. At mid-afternoon guns vic NEUNHOFFEN (Q-9146) employed an estimated 200 rds to harass forward positions along the DAMBACH (Q-9244) -- WINDSTEIN (Q-9643) road. AOP observed a btry of guns active vic NEUNHOFFEN which indicates the enemy is employing guns well forward in this area. Nightly harassing fire was extremely light consisting of fire vic LEMBACH (R-0445) and 10 rds of tank fire vic WINDSTEIN at the close of the period.

(3) Engr. Civilians reported that the Germans were repairing the bridge at NEULAUTERBOURG (R-3242) on 3 Jan, however an Air OP flown at 1700A, 4 Jan, from WISSENBURG E along the LAUTER River and then S along the RHINE, reported all the bridges still destroyed and no apparent repair work being undertaken.

(4) Inf.

45th Inf Div. Hvy enemy pressure continued across the entire salient from DAMBACH (Q-9244) to GOETZENBRÜCK (Q-7442) with the principal activity centered in the REIPERTSWILLER area. No definite advances were made by the enemy however, and he was forced, in some localities, to give up ground previously taken. Enemy activity in the DAMBACH area increased during the day consisting principally of tank, arty and 20mm gun fire. Enemy Inf action in the PHILIPPSBOURG -- BAERENTHAL areas was confined to vigorous and strong patrolling while the enemy subjected our forward elements to intense mortar fire. Some infiltration was apparent in this area since one 30 man patrol was reported vic Q-845380 and a five man patrol vic Q-870372 were observed in the afternoon. The heavy enemy pressure which had continued in the REIPERTSWILLER area, decreased somewhat during the afternoon probably as a result of our attack N from REIPERTSWILLER and the WIMMENAU (Q-7634) -- WINGEN (Q-7335) road. Over a hundred prisoners were reported taken in SAEGMUHL (Q-7937) and the enemy resisted our advance with only moderate SA, MG and mortar fire. The enemy also resisted from dug in positions vic Q-772362 and attempted to stop our attack vic Q-772365.



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with a small unsuccessful counterattack late in the afternoon. At the end of the day the road between REIPERTSWILLER and WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) was reported clear however the enemy continued to occupy the high ground N and W of REIPERTSWILLER where he was reported patrolling and digging in. The enemy force, (whose estimated size varied from a combat patrol to 200 men) which infiltrated into WINNEN the previous night, continued to hold out during the period but appeared to be completely isolated from any other enemy elements. Enemy pressure on the left shoulder of the salient continued throughout the period with several small and unsuccessful counterattacks being reported in the SARRSBERG (Q-7341) area.

79th Inf Div. The enemy was apparently feeling out the depth of our voluntary withdrawal to the MAGINOT Line positions since enemy outposts and small groups of enemy were reported active especially in the area S of WISSEMBOURG. During the afternoon, a patrol clash developed just W of NIEDERSENBACH (R-1947) in which the enemy yielded three PW; also three enemy, including one officer, were reported bicycling down the road from SELTZ (R-2732) to BILNHEIM (R-2529). The enemy has not yet come back into the evacuated area in any strength however, since our night patrols made no contact.

Task Force Linden. The only activity during this extremely quiet period was a six man enemy night patrol encountered vic R-291517. When fired upon the patrol withdrew towards the RHINE River.

(5) Motor movement. During the afternoon an enemy convoy was reported by air OP moving from MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942) to ALTHORN (Q-7545), however, further observations could not establish this movement. Another column of vehicles and personnel, size unknown, was observed moving N between R-8040 and R-8243 at 1100A. Four MT were located moving S about 4 kms above LEMBACH (R-0445) which would indicate the enemy was coming back into the area from which we have withdrawn.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

17 fr II Bn 951 GR	6 fr I Bn 456 GR
15 fr Hq 953 GR	1 fr 7 Co 476 GR
21 fr I Bn 953 GR	8 fr 256 Fus Co
143 fr II Bn 953 GR	1 fr 6 Co 457 GR
1 fr 14 Co 953 GR	1 fr 3 Co 815 AA Bn
2 fr Defense Plat 953 GR	1 Alsatian deserter
6 fr 503 SS PG Bn	223

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 148

79th Inf Div 7 miscellaneous deserters

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,25

14th Armd Div 7 miscellaneous deserters

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 930

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 042400A: 237

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 58,729

b. Enemy methods. Five tanks, some vehicles painted white and personnel dressed in white were reported observed at Q-618543 in the XV Corps zone.



S E C R E T

c. An officer PW taken from the 2nd Bn, 951 Regt by the 45th Div believes that present attack is a maneuver to relieve pressure on units attacking First American Army. The axis of the present attack is NE-SW. PW has no knowledge of objective. He states that utmost secrecy was kept and is being kept by higher echelon. (Source: 45th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Report No 130).


ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 140.

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G-2

- 4 -

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

Copy No 38

- G-2 PERIODIC REPORT -

: : : : :
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG VI Corps :
: Initials: DWD :
: Date: 6 Jan 1945 :
: : : : :

No 144

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 050001A
TO : 052400A
HQ VI CORPS
060800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. On the Corps W flank, generally no change. See Overlay to G-2 Periodic Report No 142. Enemy forces crossing the RHINE River on the Corps E flank reached R-085120 -- GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) -- OFFENDORF (R-1312) -- HERRLSHEIM (R-1214) -- ROHRWILLER (R-1217).

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

E/V Regt. Eleven PWs taken in the vic R-1618 from the 2 Co, VII Bn, E/V Regt give a fairly coherent account of their unit. The Bn, now stationed in the vic of LICHTENAU (R-2014) is reported to include 3 Cos, each about 160 strong. PWs stated that the entire 2 Co had crossed the RHINE early yesterday morning, although their party of about 25 men claimed not to have seen the rest of their Co since leaving the area E of the RHINE. These troops were armed with AT rocket launchers, rifles and MGs but had no mortars. They state that they came equipped with rations sufficient for two days. The party was led by a corporal (STABSGEFREITER) who, together with his colleagues, professed complete ignorance of their mission. The paybooks of several PWs showed them to be from 2 Co, VII Bn, E/V Regt which is a replacement training unit comparable to the C/V and D/V encountered in the central VOSGES. The patrol leader had formerly belonged to the 390 Repl Bn which was stationed successively at KARLSRUHE and MUTZIG.

81 Gren Repl Bn. PWs captured in the vic of OFFENDORF (R-1312) claim to belong to the 81 Gren Repl Bn. Normally stationed in FRANKFURT, this Bn, believed to be comparable to the 80 and 87 Gren Repl Bns recently identified within the XV And VI Corps zones, is thought to comprise 3 Cos of about 100 men each. PWs state that their Bn is located in the vic of FREISTETT (R-1408), having been in that area about 10 days.

Battle Group LOEWEN. PW taken in the vic of ASCHBACH (R-1537) stated that he belonged to the Battle Group LOEWEN. This group, about 100 strong, arrived in the OBER OTTERBACH (R-1752) area about 14 days ago, evidently with the mission of manning pillboxes just W of that town and did, in fact, occupy them. PW deserted from a patrol sent out by this Battle Group with the mission of determining whether or not ASCHBACH was free of American troops. PW stated that about 80% of the casemates in the vic of OBER OTTERBACH were occupied and that 60% of the occupying troops are VOLKSSTURM men.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary


First Fr Army. NEUNKIRCH (V-9268) cleared against light resistance. Scattered harassing arty fire along front. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 289 as of 052400A).

XV Corps. 100th Div: Considerable troop movement observed vic EPPING (Q-6557) and GUIDERKIRCH (Q-6656). Motor vehicles heard coming into EPPING and URBACH (Q-6957) from N and into SCHORBACH (Q-7653) from W. PW reports indicating holding action in center of sector with continued attacks on flanks. 44th Div: Massing of tanks and Inf in woods vic Q-6155 resulted in attack that sector of undetermined number of Inf supported by eight tanks or assault guns. Repulsed at 051800A. 103d Div and 106 Cav Gp: Continued defensive attitude. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 289 as of 052400A).

- 1 -

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

VI Corps. On the Corps W flank the enemy continued his attempts to find a weak spot in our positions apparently with the view of finding an opening in which to commit his armor. In the area E of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037), the enemy infiltrated SW across the road vic Q-826372 and by the end of the period had built up a sizable force vic Q-8236. Other enemy forces continued to hold out in WINGEN (Q-7335) but had been forced to withdraw from half the town. N of REIPERTSWILLER the enemy offered strong resistance to our attacks but pressure was relaxed somewhat on both the eastern and western shoulders of the salient. Considerable movement of personnel and vehicles observed behind the lines indicating that the enemy was probably regrouping his forces in the DAMBACH (Q-9244) area. On the Corps E flank, the enemy effected a crossing in strength vic GAMBSEHEIM area. The enemy's tactics and the type of troops employed indicated that this was a diversionary attack, although the enemy will undoubtedly exploit any success in this area and if successful it is believed that his immediate objective will be HAGUENAU. Enemy arty activity was light with most of the fire falling in the WIMMENAU (Q-7634) -- REIPERTSWILLER -- PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) area. Several hostile a/c were over the Corps area on rcn and strafing missions.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Considerable armored movement was observed on the Corps W flank throughout daylight hours. On the extreme left flank, an undetermined number of tracked vehicles were heard moving vic Q-725398 at 0645 and at the same time tracked vehicles were heard N of LEMBACH (R-0445). During the morning, three tanks were observed moving E of MOUTERHOUSE (Q-795426) toward BAERENTHAL (Q-8442). In the Q-8444 grid square, one of four tanks was destroyed by our arty and the other three damaged. At noon, two tanks were observed vic ROHRWILLER indicating that the enemy had ferried some armor across the RHINE River.

(2) Arty. Early in the period hvy caliber guns were reported interdicting OBERBRONN (Q-9038). An estimated 50 to 100 rds placed vic R-1443 at 0340A indicates that the enemy did not have full knowledge of our dispositions in this area as the fire was 1000 yds in front of forward positions. No shelling was reported during the morning but soon after mid-day light caliber guns placed 150 rds in WIMMENAU and harassing fire fell in the town during the night. PHILIPPSBOURG was target for SPs during the afternoon and sporadic harassing fire during the night. Guns E of the RHINE River lightly shelled the towns of DRUSENHEIM (R-1618) and KILSTETT (R-0908) during the afternoon in support of ground activity in the area. Shortly after dark, 30 rds harassing fire were placed in MEISENTHAL (Q-7241) and forward positions SW of WILDENGUTH (Q-7838) were intermittently harassed.

(3) Aviation. At 1421A, a total of 9 hostile a/c were observed over the Corps area. Three FW-190s observed flying E vic OFFWILLER (Q-8535) and two flights of two Me-109s each were observed flying S vic MONTBRONN (Q-9645) and NE vic GUMBRECHTHOFFEN (Q-9435). At the same time two other Me-109s were engaged by AA as they strafed the road vic WOERTH (R-0039).

(4) Engr. During the afternoon, an air OP reported enemy personnel laying mines and constructing road blocks at Q-823435 and Q-811433. Our troops destroyed the bridge at R-123172 as enemy armor approached.

(5) Inf

45th Inf Div. There was little change in enemy's attitude although considerable movement behind the lines indicated a reshuffling of troops toward the DAMBACH (Q-9244) area. The enemy remained in close contact throughout the period on the western shoulder of the salient but relaxed his pressure in the SARGENBERG (Q-7441) area somewhat. The principal action continued in the REIPERTSWILLER area where dug in enemy offered stiff SA and mortar resistance to our advance vic Q-7736 and Q-7938. However, enemy attempts to organize and regroup his forces in this area resulted in scattered breaks in resistance.




S E C R E T

Two small counterattacks during the afternoon vic Q-768367 and Q-775375 were repulsed without loss of ground. The 506 PG Bn SS was identified in this area and is reported to be made up of excellent fighters and most of them fought until they were killed rather than accept capture. The enemy continued to hold out in WINGEN although PWs reported ammo stocks were low and that they didn't have any support weapons. E of REIPERTSWILLER, elements of the II Bn 952, II Bn 477 and the 361 Fusilier Co infiltrated across the road vic Q-828368 to the SW throughout daylight hours. An estimated 300 men have assembled in the woods in this area and although PWs report that their mission was to capture the castle vic Q-819358 the enemy failed to initiate any aggressive action. Other small groups armed with automatic weapons infiltrated in the wooded hill further to the E vic Q-8637 and some enemy reached the road vic Q-867376. On the eastern shoulder, the enemy relaxed his pressure vic PHILIPPSBOURG and apparently withdrew all but scattered snipers in the town and on the high ground to the NE. Our night patrols found unoccupied positions capable of holding 150 men vic Q-846364 and small groups of enemy in this area all withdrew as soon as our patrols opened fire. During the morning, an air OP reported approx 300 men marching NE vic Q-883452. The remainder of the Div front was relatively quiet but a 15-man patrol approached our front lines vic R-038460 at 0900A.

79th Inf Div and RHINE River front. There was a considerable increase in activity along the River as the enemy effected a crossing in strength between KILSTETT and DRUSENHEIM. The principal crossing sites were vic R-138098 and R-170150, using small boats capable of carrying 12-14 men and some barges ferried across the river throughout the period. At 1215A, an estimated 300-400 troops were observed by an air CP on the E bank of the river vic R-138098. The caliber of enemy troops employed in this operation was second rate and PW apparently had no knowledge of their objective or mission. During the morning, the enemy ambushed a small group of Engrs vic R-093095 and 50-man patrols were observed at R-050118 and R-060116. The main enemy effort appeared to be in the ROHRWILLER area. Approx one Co supported by two tanks approached this town at noon and forced our bridge guarding detail to destroy the bridge and withdraw. An estimated Co occupied the town and an additional 37 men were observed digging in on the E bank of the River S of town. Other enemy forces surrounded our troops in HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) and occupied OFFENDORF and the enemy also engaged our troops in GAMBSHEIM where fighting continued throughout the period. The enemy is also reported to have reached WEYERSHEIM (R-0513) during the morning but apparently pulled back as the town was found clear at 1300A. However, an enemy platoon dug-in at the RJ vic R-085119 resisted our attack with SA fire during the remainder of the period. Early in the morning, a patrol approaching DRUSENHEIM was taken under surprise fire with good effects and just before midnight a 14-man patrol probed our positions vic STATTMATTEN (R-1921). At 1300A, 14 men in a small boat crossed the RHINE vic W-045990 and set up MGs and mortars. No further action was observed in this area and on the remainder of the Div front enemy activity was negligible except for two enemy patrols with half-track vehicles which contacted our outpost vic R-149419 and R-160403 at the close of the period.

(6) Motor Movements. Air OPs observed an estimated two Cos with 70 vehicles towing eight arty pieces moving S vic Q-865505 at mid-morning. At the same time, 20 vehicles were observed moving S from BITCHE vic Q-805495 and 10 vehicles and 50 men were observed moving NW at Q-826455. A considerable number of scattered vehicles were observed moving in vic of DAMBACH throughout daylight hours. Tac/R reports a considerable increase of motor movement, there being more vehicles observed on the road during the period than at any other time during the last month. Approx 225 vehicles were observed on the roads to the immediate front of Seventh Army and in the RHINE Valley as far N as MAINZ (M-3856). With the exception of 45 MT between BINGEN (M-1052) and BAD KREUZNACH (M-0938) the heaviest movement was 30 to 40 vehicles moving both ways between LANDAU (R-2365) and PIRMASENS (Q-9067). However, vehicular movement was generally scattered and revealed no pattern or trend. The increase in motor movement indicated no particular trend but



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it did shed light on the fact that the gasoline so carefully husbanded over the last few months has now been made available not only to units in the front line but also to rear elements in the combat zone.

(7) Rail Movements. Rolling stock in the marshalling yards increase approx 25% over the first two days in Jan. Rail movement appeared to be normal supply, that in the HOMBURG area being heavier due to the large number of Divs supplied from that point. The northward traffic in the RHINE Valley was most probably returning empty cars. The increase in the number of cars in M/Ys is probably a result of the past few days of bad flying weather of which the enemy was quick to take advantage to bring in additional supplies.

(8) River Traffic. On the RHINE River, 50 barges were observed stationary in the vic of MAINZ while 25 barges were observed stationary along W bank of River between WORMS and MANNHEIM and between MAINZ and WORMS two tugs were observed towing a total of 5 barges to the S.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

38 fr II Bn 951 GR	1 fr 14 Co 12 SS Mtn Regt
1 fr II Bn 952 GR	7 fr 506 SS PG Bn
2 fr 14 Co 952 GR	1 fr I Bn 456 GR
15 fr II Bn 953 GR	18 fr II Bn 456 GR
2 fr 13 Co 953 GR	3 fr I Bn 476 GR
1 fr Hq 953 GR	14 fr II Bn 476 GR
1 fr 361 Fus Co	1 fr 14 Co 476 GR
1 fr 1 Co 477 GR	3 fr Hq 476 GR
2 fr 8 Co 477 GR	1 fr 6 Co 481 GR
2 fr 14 Co 477 GR	1 fr 256 Engr Bn
1 Alsatian deserter	3 fr 256 Fus Co

119

Total PWs captured by 45th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 14,964

79th Inf Div

10 fr 2 Co VII Bn Regt E/V	1 fr 4 Co Volkssturm Bn
1 fr Battle Group LOEWEN	7 Miscellaneous deserters
3 fr GAF Bn	12 Unidentified wounded

34

Total PWs captured by 79th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,162

14th Armd Div

11 Alsatian deserters

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,001


Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 052400A: 164

Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 705

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 58,893

b. Security. Among German documents recently captured by 45th Div is a 361 VG Div Interrogation Report on five American soldiers of the 106 Cav Gp captured 21 Dec 44. These men told the German interrogator what their mission had been; the number of men, vehicles and weapons in their unit, the history of the unit; their APO number; their commanders' names; and the number of casualties and replacements the unit had, in addition to other facts vital to the German intelligence for an understanding of our situation.

It is imperative that front line units conduct continuous security training so that replacements and attached units will become security conscious, and to give name, rank and serial number only, if captured.



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
c. A NCO PW from 6 Co 951 GR was out on patrol on morning of 4 Jan. He states that the patrol entered REIPERTSWILLER and approached to within 20 yds of an American sentry. One of the members of the patrol who spoke English hailed the sentry from 20 yd distance and questioned the sentry on strength of troops occupying the town. He asked the sentry how many tanks were in town and received the answer: Approx 20. Since the patrol could not take a PW along they left the sentry whom they saw withdrawing a few minutes later.


d. Ranks in SS units and their US Army equivalents

<u>SS Rank</u>	<u>Approx US Army Rank</u>
SS Mann	Private
SS Sturmmann	Private First Class
SS Rottenfuehrer	Corporal
SS Unterscharfuehrer	Sergeant
SS Scharfuehrer	Staff Sergeant
SS Oberscharfuehrer	Tech Sergeant
SS Hauptscharfuehrer	First Sergeant
SS Sturmsharfuehrer	Master Sergeant
SS Untersturmfuehrer	2nd Lieutenant
SS Obersturmfuehrer	1st Lieutenant
SS Hauptsturmfuehrer	Captain
SS Sturmbannfuehrer	Major
SS Obersturmbannfuehrer	Lieutenant Colonel
SS Standartenfuehrer	Colonel
SS Oberfuehrer	Senior Colonel
SS Brigadefuehrer	Brigadier General
SS Gruppenfuehrer	Major General
SS Obergruppenfuehrer	Lieutenant General
SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer	General

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 140.


DIXON
Asst G-2



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Copy No 72

- G-2 PERIODIC REPORT -

SECRET
: Auth: CG VI Corps:
: Initials: JKL:
: Date: 7 Jan 1945:
:

No 145

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 060001A
TO : 062400A
HQ VI CORPS
070800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. Due to the fluid situation no definite front line exists; principal points of contact, however were: SARREINSBERG (Q-7441), Q-732392, E to Q-800384, CHAMPAGNE (Q-8235), BAERENTHAL (Q-8442), PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8792), DAMBACH (Q-9244), BREMMELBACH (R-1143) area, INGOLSHEIM (R-1441) area, STUNDWILLER (R-1836) area, ROHRWILLER (R-1217), GAMBSHEIM (R-1110).

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

12 SS Mtn Regt (6 SS Mtn Div). A PW deserter who surrendered at Q-756373 and belonged to the 14 Co, 12 SS Mtn Regt (6 SS Mtn Div) indicates that his Regt recently underwent a reorganization. He states that, shortly following its arrival in its present area, several Cos were re-shuffled, the former 12 Co being renamed the 14 Co while the former 14 Co became the 16 Co. Our persistent failure to contact the II Bn, the conspicuous omission of the II Bn in a recently captured Regt code list as well as statements of PWs from the 3, 4 and 6 Cos that the II Bn, 12 SS Mtn Regt was left behind and was to follow later confirm the absence of the II Bn in this area. PW states that he had not heard of the 11 SS Mtn Regt since he left NORWAY. The Div not having been scheduled to leave SCANDINAVIA until sometime in January, it is entirely probable that the 11 SS Mtn Regt has not arrived in this area, the PW and paybook found in XV Corps zone at first believed to identify this Regt having subsequently been established as belonging to the 17 SS Div.

21 Pz Rcn Bn. Several PWs taken at R-1541 from the 3 Co, 21 Pz Rcn Bn state that they constituted part of a platoon-strength patrol operating out of RIEDESELTZ (R-1543) and that it was supported by an unidentified Battle Group estimated to be 100 strong. The 1 and 2 Cos were said to be in SCHWEIGEN (R-1650) while the 4 Co and the remaining platoons of the 3 Co are believed to have remained in the vic of FIRMASENS where they are in training. PWs stated that the 21 Pz Div CP was in FRAULAUTERN, although they insisted that they had seen neither the Inf nor the armored components of their Div. The mission of the patrol was to probe our positions and make contact with our troops.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD


a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Sector generally quiet with some harassing arty fire on BOOFZHEIM (V-9570), EBERSMUNSTER (V-8468), EBERSHEIM (V-8267) and S of ORBEY (V-5647). (Source: Seventh Army Isum 291 as of 062400A).

XV Corps. 100th Div: Sector generally quiet and arty light. Four tanks engaged by friendly arty. Movement of tracked vehicles again heard vic ERCHING (Q-6557), NOUSSEVILLER (Q-7356), VOLMUNSTER (Q-7258) and ORMERSVILLER (Q-7059). 44th Div: Counterattacks in at least two Bn strength supported by 6 tanks forced friendly elements from BELLEVUE FARM (Q-6154). Remainder of Corps sector inactive. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 291 as of 062400A).

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S E C R E T

VI Corps. The enemy continued to be active throughout the Corps front, maintaining strong pressure in the BITCHE salient, and in the GAMBSHEIM bridgehead, while becoming increasingly active in the area S of WISSEMBOURG. The principal action on the W flank was in the PHILIPPSBOURG area where an estimated Bn of enemy became aggressive during the afternoon. Elsewhere in the salient, the enemy continued to maintain close contact throughout the period. In the area S of WISSEMBOURG, the enemy increased his probing action with patrols, half-tracks and some armor becoming aggressively active. PWs from the 3 Co 21 Pz Rcn Bn were identified vic STUNDWILLER which would indicate a shift by the 21 Pz Div to this area. The enemy was forced to give up several towns in the RHINE River area but offered strong resistance in vic of GAMBSHEIM throughout the period, where our troops attacking from the W and SW were forced to withdraw. Arty activity increased moderately over the entire Corps zone. While there was no change in the overall picture of the enemy situation, the increase of activity in the area S of the WISSEMBOURG Gap indicates that the enemy may be preparing to launch a strong attack in this area probably spearheaded by elements of the 21 Pz Div. The build-up in the GAMBSHEIM area continued with an estimated four Bn supported by several tanks and AT guns believed to have crossed the river.


b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. On the left flank of the Corps zone, activity dropped off sharply with only two tanks heard operating in the BAERENTHAL area. Hvy movement during the preceding period; the dropping off of armored activity in the 45th Div sector; the appearance of 4 tanks at R-171407; and two PWs taken vic R-1441 from the 21 Pz Rcn Bn, suggest the partial shifting of the 21 Pz Div from the zone of the 45th Div to the zone of the 79th Div. A probable shifting of the entire Div is possible especially since the terrain in this area is more favorable for employment of armor. Six tanks were reported operating in the GAMBSHEIM area which would indicate that the enemy has been successful in ferrying some armor across the RHINE.

(2) Arty. Just prior to daylight, LICHTENBERG (Q-8135) was moderately shelled, otherwise very little shelling occurred during the first half of the period. Activity began about midday when an estimated Bn of light guns vic MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942) placed 200-300 rds on advancing troops vic Q-7739 and Q-7439. Ground activity in the PHILIPPSBOURG area about 1530A was preceded by 200 rds from light caliber guns firing from WALDECK (Q-8446). In the southern half of the Corps zone, 12 rds of medium caliber fell on forward elements NW of HUNSBACH (R-1539) during the afternoon and was repeated by hvy caliber guns shortly after dark. Light shelling in WEYERSHEIM (R-0413) and BISCHWILLER (R-0918) during the night confirms a gun area mentioned by corporal PW as being E of RHINE vic GAMBSHEIM. Hvy caliber, estimated between 210 and 280mm, shells which were reported falling in HAGUENAU are believed to have come from a RR gun E of the RHINE firing from the SE. Increased shelling over the entire Corps zone indicates enemy has moved his arty into the pocket SE of BITCHE, the WISSEMBOURG Gap and positions E of RHINE River vic GAMBSHEIM.

(3) Inf

45th Inf Div. Generally the enemy continued to be active and maintained an aggressive attitude throughout the period. The principal activity was in the PHILIPPSBOURG area where some reorganization was evident during the morning and early afternoon. Beginning about mid-afternoon, the enemy launched three counterattacks involving a strength of about three Cos which were dispersed by our arty fire and no close contact was actually made. By 1800A, the enemy quieted down and except for patrols remained inactive during the night. There was no change in the BAERENTHAL area but an estimated 500 enemy were reported dug in SE of LICHTENBERG, apparently waiting reinforcements. However, an estimated 100 PWs were reported taken from that area. Enemy resistance to the 180th Inf W of REIPERTSWILLER



S E C R E T

(Q-8037) continued strong and steady while an increase of mortar fire was placed on our forward elements. One small counterattack launched W of WILDENGUTH (Q-7938) was repulsed late in the afternoon. There was no change on the W flank in the MEISANTHAL (Q-7241) -- SARREINSBERG area where the enemy remained in close contact throughout the period. The isolated enemy garrison in WINGEN (Q-7335) continued to hold out during the period. According to three PWs from the 13 Co 12 SS Regt sent out from the town for help, an estimated 300-500 enemy from the I and III Bns of the 12 SS Regt are in the town.

79th Inf Div. Enemy activity increased considerably in the Div zone with aggressive probing patrols in the area S of WISSEMBOURG and strong resistance in the GAMBSHEIM area. Enemy activity in the northern area centered in the vic of CLEEBOURG (R-1144), BREMMELBACH, INGOLSHEIM, OBERSEEBACH (R-1841) and STUNDWILLER and several patrol fire fights were reported. Supporting the Inf in this area throughout the period were an estimated six half tracks. Prisoners taken in the days action in this area identified a Battle Group LOEWEN in the vic of STUNDWILLER and 3 Co 21 Pz Ren Bn in the vic of INGOLSHEIM. Late in the period, a strong enemy patrol drove our listening post from R-106446 and occupied the RJ at that point. Further S along the RHINE River where the enemy established a bridgehead the day before, the enemy offered light resistance to our troops who cleared SESSENHEIM (R-1822), STATTMATTEN (R-1922), DRUSENHEIM and ROHRWILLER. A small enemy counterattack which was launched vic ROHRWILLER just after noon was repulsed. Sixty PWs including four officers were captured in the SESSENHEIM area and were from the 5 Drivers Repl Tng Bn operating under the 553 Div. The enemy continued to hold OFFENDORF and HERRLISHEIM. The core of the enemy's resistance was apparently at GAMBSHEIM where the enemy is defending the river crossing site. During the afternoon, strong enemy pressure disorganized our attacks from the W and forced our troops to fall back to the LANDGRABEN Canal (R-0810) while our troops attacking from the S were also forced to pull back.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div


10 fr I Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	19 fr I Bn 456 GR
4 fr III Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	1 fr II Bn 456 GR
2 fr II Bn 457 GR	8 fr 14 Co 456 GR
2 fr 14 Co 457 GR	3 fr I Bn 476 GR
1 fr 1 Co 477 GR	3 fr II Bn 476 GR
2 fr II Bn 951 GR (stragglers)	3 fr I Bn 481 GR
1 fr 1 Co 952 GR	5 fr II Bn 481 GR
1 fr II Bn 953 GR (straggler)	22 Miscellaneous
	<u>87</u>

Total PWs captured by 45th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 15,051

79th Inf Div

65 fr Bn HOPPE	59 fr I Bn Regt E/V
12 fr Bn SCHMIDT	1 fr Co ZAR 27 Engr Repl Bn
1 fr Co WALTER	1 fr 291 Repl Bn
3 fr BG LOEWEN	3 Miscellaneous deserters
1 fr 118 March Bn	2 Unidentified wounded
	<u>148</u>

Total PWs captured by 79th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,310



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14th Armd Div

2 fr I Bn 477 GR	2 Unidentified
4 Miscellaneous deserters	8

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,009

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 062400A:	243
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945:	948
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY:	59,136

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. To attack in the direction:

(1) INGOLSHEIM (R-1441) -- SOULTZ (R-1037) with an armored Div reinforced by strong elements of the 245 Inf Div.

(2) BITCHE (Q-7650) -- NIEDERBRONN (Q-9438) with one Inf Div and one PG Div.

b. To continue build-up in the GAMBESHEIM (R-1110) bridgehead until a strength of one Inf and one PG Div is reached, thereafter to attack in direction BISCHWILLER (R-0918) -- HAGUENAU (R-0424) or BISCHWILLER -- STRASBOURG.

c. To attack in two or more of the above directions simultaneously.


Discussion

The main effort of the enemy's attack appears to have shifted from XV Corps zone to the VI Corps zone with strong indications that the enemy is preparing to launch a major attack to the S in the ALSACE Plain. The identification of the 21 Pz Rcn Bn supported by Inf battle groups in the area S of WISSEMBOURG appears to be a prelude to offensive action in this area. Due to lack of air reconnaissance, it has been impossible to determine if the bulk of the 21 Pz Div has shifted to the WISSEMBOURG Gap area but it is believed that at least substantial elements of this Div have already been shifted to this area with the remainder enroute. The 245 Div, last identified in the area just W of WISSEMBOURG, has not been contacted for some time and it is likely that elements of this Div will support the 21 Pz Div in an attempt to force the withdrawal of our positions along the MAGINOT Line by strong pressure in the direction SOULTZ -- MORSBRONN LES BAINS (R-0033).

There has been a considerable reshuffling of the enemy forces in the PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) -- DAMBACH (Q-9344) area and counterattacks during the period in the PHILIPPSBOURG area are believed to be probing attacks to determine our strength in this area preliminary to a full scale attack launched with the view of making a break-through by the 25 PG Div to the ALSACE Plain in the NIEDERBRONN area.

Continued build-up of the bridgehead, including tanks and tank destroyers, indicates that more than a diversionary attack may be developing in this area. Although a bridge has not yet been constructed, prisoners state that one is expected to be in within the next 48 hours. Once this has been accomplished, a very rapid build-up is expected and the 553 Div, and possibly the 30 SS Div, may launch an attack from this area. The direction of this attack will depend on the build-up that has been achieved. If only a minor build-up is accomplished, the most likely direction of the

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S E C R E T

attack would be BISCHWILLER -- HAGUENAU to capture this vital road center. However, if forces approximating two Divs can be assembled in the bridge-head, the objective of the attack is likely to be STRASBOURG.

All indications point to a major effort on the part of the enemy to recapture the ALSACE PLAIN and Capability c is favored.

Any attack against VI Corps will likely be accompanied by strong pressure to the N from the COLMAR pocket in order to fix reserves in that area.

Langevin

LANGEVIN
G-2

1 INCL

1 - US Rcn Patrols



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

INCLOSURE NO 1
to
G-2 PERIODIC REPORT NO 145

7 January 1945

US RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS

(Reproduced from First US Army G-2 Periodic Report No 206, 2 Jan 1945).

On 15-16 December 1944, American Officers and Non-commissioned Officers who had led night patrols into enemy lines were assembled. They were asked to relate their experiences, and to comment upon all phases of patrolling. Questions were asked to each by others present, including intelligence officers. Following are some comments considered pertinent:

a. All leaders stated that it is most important for them to receive the order in time to allow for daylight reconnaissance of the ground, and briefing of members either on the ground, a sand table, or by photos in a lighted room.

(1) One instance where the patrol failed in its mission and suffered casualties, was directly attributed to this failure.

(2) One S-2 reported that he used a liaison plane for an air OP for the leader to reconnoiter flat terrain.

b. Some leaders related details of excellent support by mortars and artillery.

(1) One instance when by pre-arranged flare signal an artillery box barrage was placed to cover the withdrawal of the patrol.

(2) Several instances were cited of artillery or mortar fire being placed by forward observers on known enemy positions to the flank or front when enemy MGs opened fire on the patrol.

c. Some difficulties were experienced by all patrols in coordinating the return of their patrol through our lines with front line troops.

(1) Several casualties were reported by small arms fire or grenades from own troops.

(2) The main difficulty appeared to be a failure of battalion or company to pass the information down to the most forward elements.


d. Comments by the patrol leaders and intelligence officers showed the necessity for close coordination between patrol activity and the use of lights (AA searchlights reflected from clouds).

(1) Some patrols presence was disclosed by the enemy by unscheduled turning on of lights, including one by a division beyond the adjacent division.

(2) Regimental commanders of one division do not send out patrols when front line units are to be relieved due to the enemy defensive fires from artillery, mortar and small arms, which usually result from patrol activity.

e. Leaders of patrols which crossed the ROER River emphasized the necessity for experienced boat crews. Initially, the engineer crews could not cope with the swift current. Men were drowned as a result of overloaded boats capsizing, and a failure to provide life preservers.

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f. Following comments are based on actual experiences:

(1) Most of the patrols wore the steel helmet. Two cases were cited where the helmet saved the life of the wearer.

(2) All types of individual weapons were used, with a majority favoring the machine pistol M-3. One leader improvised a clamp to better secure the magazine. Most patrols carried grenades. Only combat patrols carried a BAR.

(3) All patrols dispensed with the cartridge belt, carrying extra magazines or ammunition in packets. All carried first aid packets in a pocket; the pocket in which carried being known to all members of any one patrol.

(4) On frosty nights, patrolling should be done before midnight, since the dark uniform will be silhouetted by the frost that has formed. The subject of snow suits did not come up.

(5) Various formations and methods of control were used. Most leaders used modifications of a diamond formation, with intervals and distances depending upon limits of vision. Many used signal sounds for control, such as knocking on weapon or helmet; others used physical contact and arm signals; and one used a wire from front to rear elements of the patrol - signaling being done by pulls on the wire.


(6) Action taken when fired upon also varied. Instances were related of surprise fire or demonstrators which caused the enemy to withdraw or permitted the patrol itself to retreat safely.

(7) Engineers were used by several patrols to probe for mines when advancing into areas believed mined. Although this did not permit rapid movement, it prevented casualties both from the mines and from small arms, mortar, and artillery fire opened when the presence of the patrol was disclosed by the exploding mine.

(8) There were instances cited where the leader was not told what definite information was desired.

(9) Practically all leaders were briefed before departure and interrogated after return by S-2, who wrote the report.

(Source: Memo, Hq XIII Corps dated 30 Dec 44).



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: Date: 8 Jan 1945 :
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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 146

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 070001A
TO : 072400A
HQ VI CORPS
080800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. Enemy front lines run generally: SARREINSBERG (Q-7441), Q-7340, Q-8039, PICARDIE (Q-8136), Q-8539, Q-8541, DAMBACH (Q-9244), LEMBACH (R-0445), INGOISHEIM (R-1441), ASCHBACH (R-1837), R-2321, along RHINE to R-1818, DRUSENHEIM (R-1616), HERRLISHEIM (R-1214), GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) to River at R-1309.

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

Battalion HOPPE. A large number of PWs were taken yesterday from the Battalion HOPPE. This seems to have been a hastily improvised Bn comprising the Cos LORENZ and MENZEL and the half-companies SIETERT and WIMMER and was reinforced by the (VOLKSSTURM) Bn STOERMLINGER, all of which are manning pillboxes on the E side of the RHINE as shown on a captured overlay of the area SOLLING (R-2320), HUEGELSHEIM (R-2722) and IFFENZHEIM (R-2924). The total battalion strength is estimated to be 200-250, the great majority of whom are convalescent veterans, over-age and limited service troops.

553 VG Div. Several captured maps, overlays, a memorandum and interrogation of PWs provide the following details of the 553 VG Div. The area opposite the VI Corps E of the RHINE comes under the control of the XIV Corps commanded by General of the Armed SS and Commanding General (OBERGRUPPENFUEHRER DER WAFFEN SS, KOMMANDIERENDER GENERAL) VON DEM BACH. The 553 VG Div is commanded by Brigadier General (GENERALMAJOR) HUETEKER while what is stated by an officer PW to be the 1120 GR comes under the command of Major ZWEIFANG. This Regt comprises the Bn HOPPE (Captain) and (VOLKSSTURM) Bn STOERMLINGER. The southern boundary of this Div, as indicated on a captured map, runs in a straight line from HANHOFFEN (R-0917) SE to OBERHATZENWEIER (R-2708). The southern boundary of the 1120 GR is coterminous with the southern boundary of the 553 VG Div, its northern boundary running SE from KAUFFENHEIM (R-2128) to HAUENEBERSTEIN (R-3523), the northern part of this sector, to R-2322 - R-3118, being held by the Bn HOPPE and the southern part of it by the (VOLKSSTURM) Bn STOERMLINGER. Overlays and maps showing the area N of the 1120 GR mention a 281 Regt and a Battle Group HOELZER in the same area and divide the zone OTTERS DORF (R-3029) to AU AM RHEIN (R-3639) into two Co sectors centering around PLITTERSDORF (R-3031) (shown as A-33 which equates with Co WIMMER now under Bn HOPPE farther S) and ILLINGEN (R-3437) (shown as Co A-34 which became Co MENZEL now under command of Bn HOPPE) and a VOLKSSTURM Bn centered around STEINMAUERN (R-3333).

Unfortunately the northern part of the 553 VG Div's zone is not well documented and hence becomes lost in a mist of obscurity, although the allocation of sectors seems to indicate that it may control the eastern RHINE defenses as far N as KARLSRUHE but that its responsibilities have recently undergone an extension southward. Similarly it is difficult to evaluate the present effective strength of the Div or to judge the character of its troops. PW contact with it thus far indicates that, while its original staff may remain more or less intact, it underwent no organic refitting and evidently functions primarily as an administrative headquarters for the control of a great variety of low grade static defense units situated in the area.

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First French Army. At 1200A, two Tiger tanks reported in outskirts S of KRAFFT (V-9780). Friendly strongpoints vic ROSSFELD (V-9171), HERBSHEIM (V-9272), BOOFZHEIM (V-9670) and FRIESENHEIM (V-9567) slowing enemy advance. In bridgehead area, BETTENHOFFEN (R-1009) recaptured by enemy, and friendly attacks toward GAMBSHEIM meeting strong opposition. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 293 as of 072400A).

XV Corps. Enemy inactive with few patrols and little arty reported. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 293 as of 072400A).

VI Corps. The principal enemy actions took place on the RHINE River front where the enemy attempted to enlarge his bridgehead and S of WISSEMBOURG vic STUNDWILLER (R-1836) where strong enemy forces probed our MAGINOT positions. Reinforcements of armor and Inf continued to reach the bridgehead enabling the enemy to launch a strong counterattack and retake the southern portion of DRUSENHEIM (R-1518). Five separate enemy attacks on our MLR were repulsed vic ASCHBACH -- STUNDWILLER but enemy armor forced our outpost to withdraw from those towns. On the Corps W flank, the main enemy force withdrew from WINGEN and this town was cleared at noon. Strong resistance continued to retard our advance N of REIPERTSWILLER and E of LICHTENBERG. The enemy was relatively inactive on the remainder of the Corps front. Armored activity increased considerably and an estimated total of 30 tanks and 10 SPs supported enemy aggressive actions in the bridgehead and STUNDWILLER areas. Enemy arty activity was light to moderate.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. One of the strongest armored efforts of the enemy, unfolded yesterday, when about 30 tanks and 10 SPs were committed throughout the Corps zone with most activity in the area between ASCHBACH and BUHL in the 79th Div sector and in vic of DRUSENHEIM and GAMBSHEIM in the enemy bridgehead. In the former area approx 15 to 20 tanks were employed in attacks against ASCHBACH, STUNDWILLER and BUHL and 5 of these were reported destroyed. In the bridgehead area, an estimated 10 tanks were employed in vic of ROHRWILLER and DRUSENHEIM. Four tanks were knocked out SW of ROHRWILLER and one in DRUSENHEIM. Toward the end of the period, considerable tracked vehicle movement was heard and indicated that a build-up of armor was taking place vic ROHRWILLER. Ten SPs supported Inf in the GAMBSHEIM area throughout the day. The dispositions of tanks and SPs in the bridgehead area indicates offensive intentions to the NW and holding actions to the SE. Four tanks and one SP were active in the 45th Div zone firing harassing missions throughout the night especially in the DAMBACH area.

(2) Arty. Most of the shelling occurred in the left portion of the Corps zone. Hvy shelling fell vic WILDENGUTH (Q-7838) when light btries vic Q-7940 and BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) between noon and mid-afternoon fired 300 rds in an effort to disrupt communications. The PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) area was target for medium guns firing 15 and 17 rd missions from the N just prior to dark. Enemy Inf and tank activity S of WISSEMBOURG was not supported by arty as shelling was light and scattered in this area. A RR gun estimated to be 160 or 280mm placed two rds in HAGUENAU, one at 0400A and one 1100A. From the groove bearing pointing to the NE, it is believed the gun is firing from vic GEFMERSHEIM (R-4669). In the vic of the bridgehead, BISCHWILLER (R-0918) and DRUSENHEIM were lightly shelled. Nightly harassing increased with coordinated fire on the towns of WINGEN (Q-7335), WIMMENAU (Q-7734), ROTHBACH (Q-8534), WILDENGUTH (Q-7838), MUHLHAUSEN (Q-8631), INGWILLER (R-8130) and GEFWILLER (Q-8534).

(3) Engr. At 2030A, our arty engaged an enemy working party repairing the bridge vic R-075464 under artificial light.



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(4) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy continued to offer stiff resistance to our advances N of REIPERTSWILLER and E of LICHTENBERG (Q-8135) but activity was negligible in the BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG -- DAMBACH area throughout the period. At the start of the period a large part of the enemy force in WINGEN infiltrated out of the town in groups of 20 to 40 men and some of these groups were engaged vic Q-755381 as they attempted to pass through our forward elements. Other troops left behind to protect enemy wounded continued to resist our attack until noon at which time the town was cleared and 63 PW taken. On the western shoulder the enemy remained in close contact and continued to defend the road block at Q-726397. N of REIPERTSWILLER, elements of the 506 Pz Bn SS intermingled with Volksgrenadiers offered stiff SA, MG, mortar resistance to our advance along the 39 Northing. During the afternoon, approx 100 enemy were observed digging in at Q-780399 and other troops were seen digging vic Q-778395 and between Q-775385 and Q-775388. The enemy also resisted stubbornly E of LICHTENBERG and S of PICARDIE (Q-8136) and an estimated platoon on the hill vic Q-834365 engaged our advancing troops with SA fire. After dark, several enemy patrols were active at scattered points across the Div front.

79th Inf Div. The enemy continued to reinforce his bridgehead with armor and Inf and became aggressive in that area and further N vic STUNDWILLER (R-1836) where elements of the 21 Pz reconnoitered our MAGINOT positions in force. In the bridgehead area, an estimated Bn of Inf supported by 8-10 tanks and SPs initiated a counterattack vic DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) at daybreak and by noon had succeeded in recapturing the southern portion of the town which they held for the remainder of the period. The enemy was also aggressive vic ROHRWILLER where an estimated Co of Inf supported by five tanks made several futile attempts to enter the town and the woods to the NE. Our arty broke up these attacks before contact was established and at 1500A the enemy was observed withdrawing toward HERRLISHEIM. During the morning, our patrols located dug in enemy from R-239244 to R-265245 and at 1800A, two PWs were captured and the rest of a five man enemy patrol dispersed as it attempted to probe our position vic STATTMATTEN (R-1921). In the area between ASCHBACH (R-1837) and STUNDWILLE, enemy Inf made five separate attacks on our MLR, after armor had forced our outposts to withdraw from ASCHBACH, STUNDWILLER and BUHL (R-2035). These attacks employed up to 50 men but were all repulsed without loss of ground. The enemy in this area was reported to be wearing white reversible parkas and was very aggressive until mid-afternoon when our mortar and arty fire forced the enemy to curtail his activity. Two enemy sent to investigate NIEDERROEDERN (R-2234) were captured and some enemy were observed moving NW on the road from town at 1600A. Approx 100 enemy were observed moving into INGOLSHEIM at 1700A and at 2015A our patrols located an estimated Co of Inf dug in SE of CLEEBOURG (R-1144).

(5) Motor Movements. Ground observers report hearing hvy vehicular traffic moving from STUNDWILLER toward BUHL at 2045A and in the bridgehead area considerable motor movement was reported in the DRUSENHEIM -- HERRLISHEIM area.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties.

45th Inf Div

54 fr I Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	1 fr 8 Co 951 GR (straggler)
14 fr III Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	1 fr 2 Co 456 GR
3 fr 20 Co 12 SS Mtn Regt	4 fr II Bn 456 GR
2 fr 7 Btry 6 SS Mtn AR	2 fr 3 Co 481 GR
5 fr 506 SS PG Bn	1 fr 14 Co 457 GR
4 fr Hq 952 GR	1 fr Hq Co 477 GR
117 fr II Bn 952 GR	2 fr 8 Co 477 GR
1 fr 2 (Assault Gun) Co 361 AT Bn	1 fr 14 Co 477 GR
2 fr Hq IV Bn 361 AR	1 Alsatian deserter

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Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 15,267



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79th Inf Div

1 fr I Bn Regt E/V	17 fr Bn HOPPE
54 fr VII Bn Regt E/V	2 fr Arty Battle Group TAUCHNITZ
9 fr 405 AT Bn	9 fr Bn TREUTLER
2 fr 1127 Fortr Arty Bn	2 fr 21 Ren Bn
31 unidentified wounded	<u>127</u>

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,437

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 072400A: 343
 Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 1,291
 Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 59,479

b. The following enemy paroles and countersigns were captured from the 361 Div and probably apply along the entire front:

081200A Jan 45 - 091200A Jan:	HEIMAT	-	BODEN
091200A Jan 45 - 101200A Jan:	KRAFT	-	TREUDE
101200A Jan 45 - 111200A Jan:	STURM	-	WETTER

c. Enemy methods. The following slip was found in the Soldbuch of a prisoner from the 477 GR:

"If I am captured I may give only:


Name, Rank, Home address

If I say more, I break my oath as a soldier
and am a dishonorable traitor to my country."

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 145.

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- G-2 PERIODIC REPORT -

SECRET
: Auth: CG VI Corps:
: Initials: [signature]:
: Date: 9 Jan 1945:
:

No. 147

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 080001A
TO : 082400A
HQ VI CORPS
090800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change, see G-2 Report No 146.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

Bn TREUTLER. PWs captured in the vic of R-111072 claimed to be from the Bn TREUTLER. This Bn comprises 3 Cos (2, 3 and 4 according to PWs) brought together from members of the Army NCO School ETTLINGEN and the Corps area (WEHRKREIS) NCO School, has a strength of about 350 combat effectives and is armed and equipped as Inf. The mission of the Bn, formerly known as Bn SCHMIDT, was to secure the bridgehead S flank and extend it to KILSTETT (R-0908) if possible.

1127 Fortress Arty Bn. Preliminary interrogation of PWs taken in DRUSENHEIM (R-1618) identify the 1127 Fortress Arty Bn. Equipped with 4-122mm Russian howitzers and about 85 strong, only one btry, also known as unit (EINHEIT) BISING, is believed to exist. The mission of PWs was to maintain an OP on the western side of the RHINE from which they had already directed 6 fire missions up to the time of their capture, acting in support of the VII Bn E/V.

Battle Group TAUCHNITZ. Contact with the Battle Group TAUCHNITZ was made through PWs captured 7 Jan in NIEDERROEDERN (R-2234). The Battle Group, 300 men strong and now located in the vic of WOERTH AM RHEIN (R-3850), is said to include three btries, each having 3-88mm guns used for low angle fire as arty. While in the vic of HAGUENAU a short time ago the Battle Group was attached to the 256 VG Div.

I Bn, Regt E/V. An analysis of paybooks of troops of the I Bn, E/V illustrates the curious geneology of this unit. All members of the I Bn, E/V whose paybooks were examined formerly belonged to the Battle Group 435, which was a field unit receiving its replacements from the 435 Gren Repl and Tng Bn stationed in KARLSRUHE. Sometime in Dec or late Nov the Battle Group 435 became the I Bn, E/V, the latter, as a field combat unit, receiving its replacements from the 460 Repl and Tng Bn, stationed in ULM and no longer from the 435 Repl and Tng Bn. Hence PWs claiming to belong to the Battle Group 435, the 435 Repl and Tng Bn, the 460 Repl and Tng Bn or the E/V Regt probably all belong to the same unit, namely the E/V Regt. A paybook from a PW of the VII Bn, E/V shows the 460 Repl and Tng Bn as the replacement unit of that Bn, indicating that the entire E/V Regt probably received all its troops from the former 435 and present 460 Repl and Tng Bn.

BRANDENBURG Regt. Two PWs, both French nationals and in SS uniform, were apprehended in the vic of ROESCHWOOG (R-2225). Both of them reportedly belonged to a BRANDENBURG Regt (See Incl No 1 on BRANDENBURG Regts) working with two Cos, the Co South and the Co North. Both PWs belonged to the CHARLEMAGNE Div, a French volunteer unit fighting for the Germans and members of the Nazi Truck Drivers Association (NSKK). They claimed to have been instructed to reconnoiter the area toward ROPPENHEIM (R-2327), BISCHWILLER and HAGUENAU with a view to determining the extent of the American withdrawal in the area, believing that US troops had withdrawn 20-30 kms. PWs had two carrier pigeons, one of which had been sent back with a message stating that there were American troops in SELTZ.

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c. Units capable of intervention. 245 Div. The identification of a PW from the 1 Co 937 Regt in the vic of CLEEBOURG (R-1145) indicates that this Div has not changed its sector but has merely followed up our withdrawal in this area. If this turns out to be the case, only the 25 PG Div remains to be located of those units believed to be in immediate reserve.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Fighting in SAND (V-9176) area still in progress. KRAFFT (V-9780) area free, enemy concentrating in woods SE of OSTHOUSE (V-9378) and E of HERBSHEIM (V-9272). NEUNKIRCH (V-9368) and WITTERNHEIM (V-9168) reported only towns in enemy hands as of 081500A. More troops crossing RHINE vic OTTENHEIM (W-0277). KAISERBERG region, friendly elements occupied Hill 616 (V-6546) against moderate resistance. Considerable vehicular movement on INGERSHEIM (V-6844) -- COLMAR road. Farther N, harassing arty fire fell on WANTZENAU (R-0707) and ROBERTSALL (R-0402). (Source: Seventh Army Isum 295 as of 082400A).


XV Corps. 100th Div: Fighting in W half of RIMLING (Q-6555) against 200 Inf and six tanks continued at end of period. Two Cos attacking from GUIDERSKIRCH (Q-6656) dispersed by arty fire. About five tanks supported enemy occupation of Hill 375 (Q-6454). Estimated two Cos counter-attacked vic Q-7447 without success. 44th Div: Six tanks or SPs vic Q-6354 engaged by friendly arty. Rest of Corps zone generally quiet. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 295 as of 082400A).

VI Corps. Enemy pressure continued throughout the Corps zone, however enemy aggressiveness diminished somewhat on the left flank and in the GAMBSHEIM bridgehead area. On the left flank in the BITCHE salient, the enemy offered stiff resistance to our attacks E from the SARREINSBERG (Q-7441) area and N from the REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) area while considerable activity in the PHILIPPSBOURG -- DAMBACH area was reported. The determination to hold on the W flank and in the center of the salient and the apparent reshuffling or build-up of troops on the right flank indicates that the enemy may attempt to renew his effort in the PHILIPPSBOURG area. On the Corps right flank, all attempts during the morning by the 21 Pz Div to break our positions in the ASCHBACH area were unsuccessful and enemy casualties in this action were reported as heavy. In the RHINE River area, although the enemy did not renew his efforts to expand his bridgehead, he fought stubbornly and successfully to retain the area he now occupies. Enemy arty activity on the Corps front continued from light to moderate.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) AA. Our air OP reported receiving flak and rocket fire vic OBERSEEBACH and 40mm and 88mm flak fire vic GEITERSHOF (R-1843). Although this is one of the few times flak has been reported so close to the front lines (in our present operation), it is undoubtedly due to the fact that German Pz Divs (21 Pz Div) have organic AAA units for protection of their armor.

(2) Armor. Disposition of enemy armor was generally the same except that no contact was made with armor in the bridgehead area and activity in the 45th Div zone was slightly heavier. In the zone of the 45th Div, no action of enemy armor was reported but much movement was noted and some tanks observed. At 1020A, 3 tanks were seen SW of NEUNHOFFEN and the 3 tanks seen moving W vic Q-890475 at 1045A were probably the same tanks; an unknown number of tanks were fired on by arty at Q-789392 at 1710A; an enemy tank was heard at R-005454 at 0210A; 3 tanks were reported at Q-890443 at 1250A, and one tank was reported at R-063454 at 0900A. These reports of armor are much heavier than reported during the preceding period and would indicate a possible renewed build-up of armor in this sector. In the N sector of the 79th Div where approx 10 tanks supported Inf attacks N of ASCHBACH during the morning, armored activity was a little lighter probably



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due to losses suffered during the preceding period. These attacks were repulsed with loss of 2 to 4 tanks. Twelve tanks were reported assembling in OBERSEEBACH by Air OP in preparation for another attack at 1145A. During the afternoon, at 1315A, tanks were observed with Inf at R-175378, R-172396 and R-180412. Two of the three enemy tanks disabled in a minefield at R-162381 were destroyed. A total of (4) tanks were destroyed during the period with 2 probables. One tank was retrieved by the enemy from minefield at R-162381 which indicates the necessity of completely destroying disabled enemy tanks. Armor in the bridgehead area was inactive and the enemy may have been preparing positions for employment of his armor in defense of the bridgehead against expected attacks.

(3) Arty. The enemy arty continued to support ground troops in the REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) area with heavy fire. The enemy's attack launched vic Q-790389 just after daylight was supported by fire from light guns. The heavy shelling of the previous period in the WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) area was repeated when one or two 105mm btries believed located in the MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942) -- BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) area fired 400 rds despite our comprehensive counterbattery fire. The bridge sites in DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) and SE of ROHRWILLER (R-1217) were harassed together with leading elements by direct fire weapons during the morning while shortly after midday a light gun located E of RHINE River vic LICHTENAU (R-2014) took up the harassing mission. Nightly harassing fire fell in INGWILLER (Q-8130) and was light and scattered on forward positions in the remainder of the Corps zone.


(4) Aviation. A total of three Me-262s (jet propelled) a/c appeared over the Corps area during the morning and early afternoon. Two of the planes were apparently on rcn since no hostile acts were reported, however the third dropped bombs vic INGWILLER (Q-8130), MENCHHOFFEN (Q-8329) and vic Q-9027. This plane was also reported strafing vic Q-9117. All planes were engaged by AA with no claims made. At 1350A, two Me-210s were reported strafing vic R-1833, R-1235 and R-1034. One bomb was reported dropping vic R-1532. Planes were engaged by AA but no claims were made.

(5) Inf

45th Inf Div. Generally there was no change in the enemy's disposition or attitude, however considerable activity was observed in the DAMBACH (Q-9244) -- PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) area during the morning, indicating a build-up in this sector. One group of estimated 200 enemy observed marching SE from NEUNHOFFEN (Q-9146) area towards PHILIPPSBOURG, while personnel and horse-drawn vehicles were noted N of the town. Also, the enemy appeared to be assembling troops and vehicles NW of PHILIPPSBOURG vic Q-854446. Friendly arty fired on these targets and was believed to have been effective since no further activity was reported after noon. In the center of the BITCHE salient, the enemy continued to offer strong SA and mortar resistance to our attacks NE of LICHTENBERG (Q-8135), N along LE ROTHBACH River and SW of ALTHORN (Q-7540). Three small, but persistent, counterattacks supported by arty fire were launched NW of REIPERTSWILLER during the morning but were repulsed. On the W flank of the enemy's salient, hostile forces remained in close contact and continued to offer stiff resistance from well organized positions.

79th Inf Div. Heavy enemy pressure continued on the Div's N flank and in the RHINE River area. In the area S of the WISSEMBOURG Gap, the 21 Pz Div renewed its attacks in the ASCHBACH (R-1837) area beginning at 0700A, employing at least two Bns (II Bn 192 and II Bn 125) supported by an estimated 10 tanks. These unsuccessful attacks persisted throughout the morning and according to PWs the enemy suffered heavy casualties to personnel and with an estimated 2-4 tanks knocked out. About noon, the enemy withdrew to vic OBERSEEBACH (R-1840) where he was reported assembling tanks and personnel, however the enemy is believed to have again suffered heavy casualties as a result of our dive bombing attack on the town. Except

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for placing heavy SA fire on our patrol to CLEEBOURG (R-1144) and some mortar fire on forward elements during the early afternoon, activity in this area quieted down with the enemy apparently reorganizing and regrouping. Further S in the bridgehead area, the enemy successfully opposed our attack SE of DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) and ROHRWILLER (R-1217) by the employment of heavy arty, mortar and SA fire and prevented our troops from constructing bridges over the MODER River. The enemy was also somewhat aggressive in this area launching two small unsuccessful counterattacks along the River E of ROHRWILLER. The area W of HERRLISHEIM (R-1214), however appeared to be lightly held since our patrols reached a point within 1 1/2 kms of the town without contact. There was no activity reported in the GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) area with neither friendly nor hostile troops taking aggressive action. Throughout the bridgehead there were no further indications of an enemy build-up and little activity along the RHINE itself was reported, although poor visibility greatly hampered observation.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

25 fr Hq 457 GR	1 fr I Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt
32 fr I Bn 457 GR	11 fr III Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt
4 fr II Bn 457 GR	4 fr II Bn 951 GR
6 fr 14 Co 457 GR	1 fr II Bn 952 GR (straggler)
1 fr II Bn 466 GR	2 fr Hq 953 GR
5 fr Hq 477 GR	10 fr I Bn 953 GR
2 fr I Bn 477 GR	3 fr II Bn 953 GR (stragglers)
7 fr II Bn 477 GR	1 fr 14 Co 953 GR
4 fr 14 Co 477 GR	4 fr 361 Sig Bn
127 Unidentified wounded	4 fr 361 Fus Co
	<u>254</u>

Total PWs captured by 45th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 15,521

79th Inf Div

1 fr 3 Co 125 PGR	15 fr Bn HOPPE
17 fr 5 Co 125 PGR	1 fr Bn OBERRHEIN
18 fr 7 Co 192 PGR	2 deserters
1 fr 1 Btry 155 AR	<u>6 unidentified wounded</u>
2 fr Brandenburg Div	63

Total PWs captured by 79th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,500

14th Armd Div 1 fr 6 Co 952 GR (straggler)


Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1010

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 082400A:	318
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945:	1,609
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY:	59,797

b. Enemy Methods

(1) Camouflage. The familiar German use of white clothing for troops when engaged in winter operations was again noted as a patrol of six men wearing white uniforms with capes were observed on the 45th Div front.

(2) Radio Interception. A PW from Regt Hq, 12 SS Mtn Regt, taken by 45th Div, stated that several times they intercepted our radio messages during current operations and turned them to their own use. (Source: 45th Div G-2 Report No 133).



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The interception of our radio communications is of great value to the enemy's intelligence whereby he often learns our dispositions and intentions. All echelons must be made to realize the utmost importance of radio security and it must be continually brought to the attention of all concerned.

c. Enemy Agents. Captured enemy espionage agents of a BRANDENBURG Co state that two groups of agents will soon cross the RHINE River vic SELTZ (R-2732) with a mission of blowing up existing gasoline and ammunition dumps in or near HAGUENAU.

(1) Group 1 (Civilians). The civilian group will consist of German and French personnel dressed in dark overcoats or trench coats and ski trousers of a dark color. These men may wear berets and will probably carry packs. Each man will carry a foreign pistol, Belgian or Czech and each will have identifying papers which show him to be a former French soldier. If captured, these men will state that they have escaped from a German prison camp. Several men of the group will carry plastic explosives. Explosives will be in several pieces and will probably be carried in their packs. This group is equipped with French dog tags of the wrist type.

(2) Group 2 (Military). This group will be composed of four to six men, both French and German. They will be dressed as follows: Ski shoes, beige colored ski trousers, white on inside for camouflage in snow; parka jacket, dark green on outside and white on inside; the jacket has a hood which can be pulled over the head and five pockets, three in front and two in back. These men will also wear a German dark grey mountain cap which in some cases may have a Death's Head insignia in front and a triple Oak Leaf on the left side. Each man of this group will be armed with a machine gun and a Luger pistol. Also, the group will carry four pieces of high explosives and two or three incendiary grenades. They will be equipped with German pay books, dog tags, field glasses, watches, compasses, maps and rations for four days.


4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 145.

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G-2

5 INCLS

- 1 - BRANDENBURG Div
- 2 - Enemy Strength & Casualty Analysis
- 3 - Breakdown of PWs Captured by VI Corps
1 Jan to 8 Jan, Inclusive.



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46
US ARMY

ENCLOSURE NO 1
TO
H-2 REPORT NO 147

9 JANUARY 1944.

BRANDENBURG DIVISION AND LEHRREGIMENT KURFUERST

1. On the 1st November, 1942, the Lehr-Regt BRANDENBURG z.b.V. 800 was transferred into the Brandenburg Division and in April, 1943, came directly under the "Amt Ausland Abwehr".

2. The Division is composed of Germans and Volksdeutsche, i.e. Germans from the Baltic Countries, the Black Sea, the Volga, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Palestine, Africa, etc. It is composed of four regiments, each of three battalions.

In general the duties of the Division are:-

- a. To send men to destroy or protect targets of operational, tactical or economic importance.
- b. To send guerillas behind the lines into enemy territory.
- c. Tactical and operational reconnaissance in disguise.

3. The 5th (Lehr) Regiment is no longer under the command of the Brandenburg Division, but is directly under the control of "Abwehrabteilung II" and is known as "Lehrregiment Kurfuerst". Among its functions are the dispatch of single agents or small commando groups and also the training of men who can be called on by the Division or by the "Amt Ausland Abwehr".

4. Units of the Division are not equipped for infantry fighting and are not to be used as infantry unless it is a question of fully exploiting an initial success at all costs. They are most likely to be met with in mobile warfare when they will be used with motorized and armored units in advance and rearguard actions. The capture of means of transport and protection and destruction of bridges are likely to be amongst their functions. Special units of the Division are trained to deceive the enemy by all types of military subterfuge and to obtain local temporary superiority through surprise. The functions of the 15th Company of the 4th Regiment is the dropping by parachute of personnel in disguise.


5. Members of the Division and Lehrregiment are likely to be operating in civilian clothes or the uniforms of Allied countries and if operating in German uniforms will not necessarily admit to any special status and may have been provided with uniform and pay-books showing them to belong to some ordinary military formation.

6. Members of the Brandenburg Division and Lehrregiment Kurfuerst should, when captured, be dealt with in the following manner:-

- 1. If captured in civilian clothes or the uniforms of Allied countries, they will be treated as spies and not as PWs.
- 2. All members of the Brandenburg Division will be sent to CSDIC for specialist interrogation after any tactical intelligence has been obtained from them.
- 3. All members of the Lehrregiment Kurfuerst, being directly under the control of the German Secret Service (Abwehr II), will be turned over to SCI for special interrogation.

Source: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff G-2.

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HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS

APO 46

US ARMY

INCLOSURE NO 2

TO

G-2 REPORT NO 147


9 JANUARY 1944.

STRENGTH AND CASUALTY ANALYSIS OF ENEMY UNITS ON VI CORPS FRONT FOR PERIOD
010001A to 082400A JANUARY 1945.

(NOTE: Strengths shown below refer only to front line combat troops. Arty AT, Sig and Eng (on strictly Eng duties) are NOT included.)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>Initial strength on contact (estimated)</u>	<u>Strength at 082400A Jan (estimated)</u>	<u>Estimated casualties for period</u>
257 VG Div (elements only)			
Elements 457 GR	500	350	150
477 GR	600	500	100
TOTAL 257 VG DIV	1100	850	250
361 VG Div			
951 GR (II Bn and Regtl Cos only)	400	destr	400
952 GR	800	240	560
953 GR	800	135	665
361 Fus Co	120	45	75
361 Repl Bn	200	(absorbed)	200
TOTAL 361 VG DIV	2320	420	1900
6 SS Mtn Div			
Elements 12 SS Mtn Regt	1125	450	675
506 SS PG Bn	350	250	100
Unidentified elements (believed to be in immediate reserve)	2000	2000	
TOTAL 6 SS MTN DIV	3475	2700	775
256 VG Div			
456 GR	750	325	425
476 GR	825	220	605
481 GR	800	400	400
256 Fus Co	100	destr	100
256 Eng Bn	250	250	
TOTAL 256 VG DIV	2725	1195	1530
245 INF DIV	3500	3500	
25 PG DIV*	2000	2000	
21 PZ DIV	1800	1500	300

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<u>Miscellaneous Units</u>	<u>Initial strength on contact (estimated)</u>	<u>Strength at 082400A Jan (estimated)</u>	<u>Estimated casualties for period</u>
8.5 AA Bn	250	250	
8.6 AA Bn (elements)	80	80	
52 GAF Inf Bn	300	300	
I Bn Regt XII/1	250	250	
II Bn Regt XII/1	260	225	35
III Bn Regt XII/1	300	(to 952 GR)	300
Regtl Cos Regt XII/1	150	150	
104 Repl Bn	435	435	
Battle Group LOEWEN	100	50	50
Battle Group DITTERN	270	270	
Volkssturm Battalions	1630	1630	
Elements GAF Bn	150	130	20
693 AA Bn	300	300	
Battle Group HOPPE	300	150	150
I and VII Bns Regt E-V	600	290	310
Battle Group TREUTLER	<u>300</u>	<u>300</u>	<u> </u>
TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS UNITS	5675	4810	865
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>GRAND TOTALS</u>	22595	16975	5620

* Post period intelligence.



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
HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46
US ARMY

ENCLOSURE NO 3
TO
-2 REPORT NO 147

9 JANUARY 1944.

BREAKDOWN OF PWS CAPTURED BY VI CORPS 1 JANUARY TO 8 JANUARY INCLUSIVE

	<u>Co</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>Regt</u>	<u>Div</u>
I Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt		65		
II Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt		30		
III Co 12 SS Mtn Regt	3			
Total 12 SS Mtn Regt			98	
II Bn 6 SS Mtn AR		2		
Total 6 SS Mtn AR			2	
SS Sig Bn		5		
06 SS PG Bn		18		
TOTAL 6 SS MTN DIV "NORD"				123
<hr/>				
I Bn 125 PGR		1		
II Bn 125 PGR		17		
Total 125 PGR			18	
II Bn 192 PGR		18		
Total 192 PGR			18	
I Bn 155 AR		1		
Total 155 AR			1	
21 Rcn Bn		2		
TOTAL 21 PZ DIV				39
<hr/>				
I Bn 456 GR		72		
II Bn 456 GR		28		
4 Co 456 GR	8			
Total 456 GR			108	
I Bn 476 GR		89		
II Bn 476 GR		32		
4 Co 476 GR	9			
1 Co 476 GR	10			
Total 476 GR			140	
I Bn 481 GR		16		
II Bn 481 GR		9		
Total 481 GR			25	
56 Engr Bn		7		
56 AT Bn		1		
56 Fus. Co	37			
TOTAL 256 VG DIV				318
<hr/>				
I Bn 937 GR		1		
Total 937 GR			1	
II Bn Regt XII/1		2		
Total Regt XII/1			2	
TOTAL 245 INF DIV				3



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	<u>Co</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>Regt</u>	<u>Div</u>
I Bn 457 GR		32		
II Bn 457 GR		7		
L4 Co 457 GR	8			
Hq Co 457 GR	25			
Total 457 GR			72	
II Bn 466 GR		1		
Total 466 GR			1	
I Bn 477 GR		6		
II Bn 477 GR		11		
L4 Co 477 GR	7			
Hq Co 477 GR	6			
Total 477 GR			30	
Total 257 VG DIV				103

II Bn 951 GR (u/c 953 GR)		69		
Total 951 GR			69	
I Bn 952 GR		2		
II Bn 952 GR		120		
L4 Co 952 GR	2			
Hq Co 952 GR	1			
Total 952 GR			125	
I Bn 953 GR		31		
II Bn 953 GR		162		
L3 Co 953 GR	2			
L4 Co 953 GR	2			
Hq Co 953 GR	20			
Total 953 GR			217	
IV Bn 361 AR		2		
Total 361 AR			2	
361 Engr Bn		2		
361 AT Bn		1		
361 Sig Bn		4		
361 Fus Co	5			
TOTAL 361 VG DIV				325

I Bn Regt E/V		60		
VII Bn Regt E/V		64		
Bn Treutler		21		
405 AT Bn		9		
TOTAL 405 ADMINISTR DIV				144

Bn Hoppe		97		
TOTAL 553 VG DIV				97

Miscellaneous and unidentified: 457

TOTAL PWs CAPTURED 1 TO 8 JANUARY 1945: 1,609



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: Auth: CG VI Corps:
: Initials: DWD :
: Date: 10 Jan 1945:
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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 148

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 090001A
TO : 092400A
HQ VI CORPS
100800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front line. Generally no change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 14
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

21 Pz Div. Interrogation of PWs from various units of the 21 Pz Div contacted during the last several days in the STUNDWILLER (R-1836) -- ASCHBACH (R-1737) area throws much light on the recent reorganization of this division. PWs from the 125 PGR all agree that they had come from LANDAU about 3 January, whither they had gone after leaving the vic of SAARLAUTERN, indicating that the Regt underwent a refitting there. The 192 PGR, which still had elements in contact opposite the 79 Inf Div on 23 December, experienced a quick but only partial refitting since that time. It will be recalled that only brief and occasional contact was made with its II Bn which had recently undergone several cycles of rejuvenation, the I Bn being regularly committed in line. Since the middle of December the II Bn seems to have been in process of another reconstitution in KANDEL (R-3453), receiving replacements from the 104 Res PG Bn which had been committed in its sector, whereupon it moved to the vic of BITCHE, presumably for commitment in that area. The 21 Pz Rcn Bn has also undergone some revamping for it now has 4 Cos, the 1, 2 and 3 Cos being half-track Cos, the 4 Co being the heavy Co. The 3 Co is reported to have a strength of 100 which represents a considerable reinforcement. Even the 155 Arty Regt is reported to have received weapon replacements during the past three weeks, now once more having three Bns, two light Bns (with 105mm motor drawn G/Hs) and one medium Bn with three btries of four 150mm Hows each. Preliminary reports of unit combat strengths clearly indicate that the Div has, however, enjoyed only a partial and very incomplete re-equipment and refitting.


6 SS Rcn Bn (6 SS Mountain Div). PWs from 6 SS Rcn Bn (6 SS Mtn Div) taken at Q-7638 state that their Bn has four Cos with a total strength of about 200. The 1 and 2 Cos are motorcycle Cos, the 3 Co a duck (amphibious VOLKS-WAGEN) Co, while the 4 Co is the heavy Co, having four 75mm AT guns, four to six 75mm IGs and an unknown number of 81mm mortars. The Bn has been committed since 7 January when it left LEMBERG (Q-7445). PWs confirm other reports that the I and III Bns of the 12 SS Mtn Regt are almost wiped out. They heard that elements of the 6 SS Engr Bn had been committed somewhere in the REIPERTSWILLER salient. The identification of the 6 SS Rcn Bn and the reported presence of the 6 SS Engr Bn clearly indicates that the Div is arriving into this area piecemeal and suggests that the rest of the Div, namely the II Bn, 12 SS Mtn Regt and the 11 SS Mtn Regt may soon arrive in the area. It is also clear now that the 6 SS Mtn Div has a proper Rcn Bn and that the 506 SS Mtn Bn simply functions as a mobile attachment which may compensate for the missing II Bn, 12 SS Mtn Regt. The comparatively low initial strength of the 6 SS Rcn Bn, the reported depletion of the still uncontacted 6 SS Engr Bn and the low initial unit strengths of the 12 SS Mtn Regt confirm earlier impressions that the Div as a whole has been appreciably depleted without receiving replacements prior to its dispatch to this area.

115 PG Tng Bn FIRMASENS. PWs of the 1 and 3 Cos 115 PG Tng Bn FIRMASENS taken respectively at Q-805375 and Q-795385, state that their Bn, apparently under command of the 953 GR, has three rifle Cos, each about 60 strong and having one IMG per squad but without heavy weapons. PWs state that their unit had been manning WESTWALL fortifications in the WISSEMBOURG

- 1 -

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(R-1548) -- WEIDENTHAL (R-0166) area until about 7 January when it went to the BAERENTHAL area. Prior to its commitment in the WESTWALL the Bn had been stationed in DARMSTADT. Most of the Bn's personnel comprise young recruits, elderly men recently discharged from convalescent hospitals predominating in the 1 Co, however.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First French Army. I Corps: Raid after arty preparation on LUTTERBACH (V-6606) repulsed. II Corps: Friendly counterattack broke ring around ROSSFELD (V-9171). Renewed enemy effort in progress against SAND (V-9176) at end of period. Smoke screen observed E of SELESTAT (V-7962) and OSTHEIM (V-7351). Hvy traffic noticed NE and W of V-6841. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 297 as of 092400A).


XV Corps. 100th Div: Three small attacks with 20-40 foot troops repulsed throughout day. Apparent all out effort against RIMLING (Q-6555) from NE, NW and W in progress at end of period. Rest of Corps zone generally quiet. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 297 as of 092400A).

VI Corps. Sizable elements of the 25 PG Div continued the offensive in the central Corps front vic HATTEN (R-1733) by launching two separate tank and Inf attacks. In the first attack which began before dawn, two Bns of Inf and seven tanks temporarily forced a limited withdrawal vic R-184355 but our positions were restored by 0940A. The second attack which was spearheaded by 20 to 30 tanks and approx 50 other vehicles, succeeded in surrounding HATTEN and some armor even reached a point S of RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) before our counterattack forced the enemy to withdraw. At the end of the period most of our positions had been retaken but some enemy and one tank still held a small part of HATTEN. The enemy remained on the defensive elsewhere on the Corps front but after dark the enemy launched a counterattack and succeeded in getting some Inf and five tanks behind our force which had cleared approx two-thirds of HERRLISHEIM. Enemy arty activity increased only slightly but a definite increase in volume of fire was reported, especially in the HATTEN area. A few hostile a/c were on the Corps front on rcn.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Tank and AT battles raged throughout the period in the HATTEN area of the 79th Div zone as the enemy committed 20-30 tanks in an attempt to effect a breakthrough. At 0510A, an attack with seven or more tanks supporting Inf was repulsed and two tanks were destroyed by our arty. A second and much stronger attack at 1300A involved some 20 or more tanks, supported by Inf, the Inf apparently being carried into position on half-tracks, dismounting, and joining the assault. This attack gained initial successes but the strength of our AT defenses, involving tanks, TDs, arty and AT guns, mauled enemy armor and stopped the attack with the enemy suffering 11 tanks destroyed and two damaged. At the close of the period, fighting continued with one tank and some Inf remaining in HATTEN. In the bridgehead sector, some 10 to 15 tanks and SPs were observed but little contact with armor was reported, until dark when five tanks and some Inf worked behind our troops in HERRLISHEIM. One tank or SP was destroyed on the DRUSENHEIM -- HERRLISHEIM road and two other tanks or SPs were damaged by arty fire. At 1620A, in the zone of the 45th Div, two tanks supported Inf at Q-762395. These tanks were fired upon by arty with unknown results.

(2) Arty. A RR gun definitely identified as 280mm by fragments fired nine rounds in HAGUENAU between 0115A and 0250A. Enemy arty was only slightly active during the first half of the period except in the bridgehead area where moderate fire fell on forward positions vic DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) and SE of ROCHWILLER (R-1217) at 0800A which was continued intermittently throughout the period. Just before noon light and medium guns in the OBERSEEBACH (R-1841) -- TRIMBACH (R-2138) area attempted to harass and disrupt communications in the HATTEN area with 20 to 40 round missions prior to the enemy's attack in this area. Arty fire was also reported being employed to cover the withdrawal of



S E C R E T

enemy's armor following our counterattack. Inf defending from dug-in positions NW of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) were supported by SP guns and arty, which fired an estimated 300 rds on forward positions and communications from 1400A to 2100A. The movement of horse-drawn arty was reported on the BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG road during the night and may indicate some regrouping of arty to support future operations. Nightly harassing fire was light and scattered.

(3) Aviation. Between 1348A and 1543A, a total of four Me-109s were engaged by light and hvy AA while flying at low to medium altitudes on run over the Corps area.

(4) Engr. Civilians report a small pontoon bridge on the RHINE at SELTZ. The bridges at R-089130 and R-09361340 were reported destroyed.


(5) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy continued on the defensive throughout the period across the Div front. Close contact continued in the southernmost portion of the salient with dug-in enemy supported by mortar, arty and SP fire. PW captured here said that the 6th SS Rcn Bn and 506 PG Bn SS had orders to hold this ground at all costs. E of REIPERTSWILLER, elements of the 952 and 953 GRs defended the high ground vic Q-810377 -- Q-800380 and Q-795386. On both shoulders of the salient the enemy situation remained unchanged although the I Bn 118 GR was identified vic PHILIPPSBOURG. Movement and activity was reported in the CLIMBACH (R-0845) area and this may involve elements of the 245 Div moving forward. After dark an undetermined number of enemy were encountered by our patrol in DAMBACH.

79th Inf Div. The enemy resumed the offensive with two separate large scale attacks in the STUNDWILLER (R-1836) area and continued to offer stiff resistance to our advance in the bridgehead. At 0510A, the enemy launched an attack vic HATTEN (R-1733) employing an estimated two Bns of Inf and 7 tanks. The attack initially forced our troops to withdraw from positions vic R-184335 but by 0940A our positions had been restored and the attack dispersed except for a few snipers which were being mopped up in HATTEN. The offensive was resumed at 1300A and was spearheaded by 25 to 30 tanks and approx 50 other vehicles and supported by an undetermined number of Inf. A breakthrough was made on a narrow front and the armor surrounded HATTEN and then pushed on to a point S of RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1633). Enemy Inf followed the armor and were engaged by our arty with good results, however, some Inf did reach HATTEN. At 1500A, our counterattack forced the enemy armor to withdraw to the E and at the close of the period most of our positions were retaken although some Inf and one tank was still in HATTEN. In the bridgehead area the enemy continued to offer stiff SA resistance to our attack on HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) but by 1800A the enemy had withdrawn under pressure from two-thirds of the town and an estimated 100 PWs had been captured. Shortly after dark, however, the enemy launched a counterattack and by the end of the period had succeeded in working some Inf and four or five tanks behind our troops. In the remainder of the bridgehead the enemy was relatively inactive except for hvy mortar and arty interdiction of our bridging operation in ROHRWILLER (R-1217) and DRUSENHEIM (R-1518). On the Div N flank long-range MG fire and mortar concentrations forced our troops on the outpost line S of CLEEBOURG (R-1144) to fall back on the MLR. In the area S of the HAGUENAU Woods to the RHINE, enemy movement and activity increased and may indicate that the enemy intends to launch an attack in this area to join forces with the bridgehead.

(6) Motor Movement. Throughout the afternoon, enemy movement was observed between RIEDSELTZ (R-1543) and INGOLSHEIM and from WISSEMBOURG to the S. After dark several vehicles were heard vic NEUNHOFFEN (R-9146) and one was seen driving with lights. Activity along the BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG road is believed to have involved the movement of horse-drawn arty. Prior to midnight heavy traffic including tracked vehicles was reported between RIEDSELTZ and INGOLSHEIM; STUNDWILLER (R-1836) and BUHL (R-2035) and from R-188326 to EICHELGARTEN (R-2230).

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3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

1 fr I Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	4 fr I Bn 952 GR
1 fr III Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	2 fr II Bn 952 GR
2 fr 6 SS Rcn Bn	31 fr I Bn 953 GR
7 fr 506 SS PG Bn	3 fr II Bn 953 GR
2 fr I Bn 476 GR	1 fr II Bn 361 AR
4 fr II Bn 476 GR	1 fr 361 Fus Co
2 fr I Bn 481 GR	4 fr I Bn 118 GR
1 fr II Bn 457 GR	3 fr 115 PG Repl Bn
	<u>69</u>

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 15,590

79th Inf Div

1 fr Hq Co 125 PGR	5 fr I Bn 35 PGR
1 fr I Bn 192 PGR	3 fr II Bn 119 PGR
1 fr II Bn 192 PGR	1 fr 25 Rcn Bn
2 fr 220 Engr Bn	5 fr I Bn 1119 GR
30 unidentified	68 fr III Bn 2 SS Police Regt
5 fr Bn HOPPE	<u>122</u>

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,622

12th Armd Div

9 fr I Bn 1119 GR

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 092400A: 200
 Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 01001A January 1945: 1,809
 Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 59,997

b. Enemy supply and equipment. Arty destroyed an enemy ammo dump vic R-18424117. A total of 13 enemy tanks were destroyed and four more were claimed probably destroyed in the two attacks launched vic HATTEN. In addition, two C & R cars, one full tracked vehicle, two half-tracks and one staff car were destroyed in these attacks. One SP or tank was destroyed in HERRLIS-HEIM.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES


No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 145.

Dixon
 DIXON
 Asst G-2

2 Incls

- 1 - Counterintelligence Summary
- 2 - Security Measures

SECRET



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

INCLOSURE No 1
to
G-2 REPORT No 148

10 January 1945

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 1

1. German Espionage and Sabotage

a. The use of American uniforms and equipment by German soldiers in connection with the offensive operations on the part of the enemy has resulted in what has been primarily a military security problem. However, as our forces advance and retake territory which has been abandoned by the enemy, the primary threat from a counterintelligence viewpoint, will emanate, once more, from the civil population into which the German Intelligence Service, profiting from the present tactical situation, will undoubtedly attempt to introduce stay-behind agents.

b. The employment of short-range line-crossers and parachutists by the German Intelligence Service in the near future should be examined carefully in the light of his present tactical capabilities; a sudden concentration of agents in one of the critical or inactive sectors may well be a harbinger of offensive action or a diversionary attack.

c. It is also deemed significant that the sudden appearance of the EINHEIT STIELAU (the only part of the 150 Pz Brigade of CI interest) in any zone may indicate offensive enemy action. From a counterintelligence viewpoint, the real threat comes from small teams of specially trained personnel of the EINHEIT STIELAU who can circulate within our lines speaking good English. The EINHEIT STIELAU have a threefold mission, namely:

(1) F - Troops (Fuehrungs troops, similar in purpose to Rangers or Commandos). These troops were equipped with approximately 30 jeeps and 4 Citroen staff cars. Their mission was infiltration, long-range reconnaissance, and destruction of Allied leaders and their headquarters.

(2) H - Troops (Nachrichten or Signal troops). They were equipped with approximately 10 jeeps with radio transmitters. Their mission was to circulate behind our lines, transmit information at regular intervals, and monitor and destroy our communications.

(3) Pi - Troops (Pionnier or Demolition troops). Their mission was to destroy bridges and strategic points. They were equipped with approximately 10 jeeps.

d. EINHEIT STIELAU marks roads for its following troops by chalk. During the move, roads are marked by arrows, and houses by circles.

e. It has been reported that the following sabotage equipment is available to members of EINHEIT STIELAU:

(1) Time-bombs disguised as American canteens.

(2) Capsules of BIAUSAURE (Hydrocyanic acid, HCN) which can be hidden in a match box or a cigarette lighter and used, if necessary, as an aid in escaping or evading capture. When a capsule is broken by being hurled against the ground, the contents are said to evaporate immediately in sufficient potency to kill the arrestor and permit the user to flee while holding his breath.

(3) An explosive called NEBOLITH or NEBOLET, previously reported by two sabotage agents captured in the Seventh US Army zone.

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- (4) A plastic explosive, OD in color and cheese-like in substance.
- (5) Smoke grenades.
- (6) Egg grenades and small cylindrical grenades.
- (7) Pistol with shoulder rest for launching a type of armor piercing hand grenade.
- (8) Pull detonators and time pencils.
- (9) Glass capsules of sulphuric acid to be thrown at the apprehender in attempt to escape.
- (10) Large sums of British or US currency "for purchases or emergencies"; in one case a long-range team had \$900 and 1000 pounds. No special instructions were given as to the use contemplated for the money nor were reasons given as to why such large sums were used. One of the purposes may have been to acquire recently issued Belgian currency. Another possibility, although less likely in view of the tactical nature of the mission, may have been cash payments to agents or sympathizers who might be over-run.
- (11) US identity cards of the AGO 65-4 series, which carry an officer's countersignature below the holders signature.

f. Indications are that the German Intelligence Service will undoubtedly recruit short-range agents from sympathizers in the new Army area. This has already been substantiated by the arrest of a subject of LUXEMBOURG nationality, a former railroad worker who was recruited just before Christmas. This agent had the mission to find out how many armored units were in the MANTERNACH (L-0524), LELLIG (L-0625), BERBURG (L-0327), HERBORN (L-0628) and MOMPACH (L-0828) areas; their unit numbers and strength in men and weapons; whether or not they were fully motorized, and their locations. This agent was apprehended by an alert enlisted man of the 4th Inf Div before he had even started to work.


2. Security of Documents in Forward Areas (Source: G-2, 75th Inf Div)

a. Failure to adhere to security requirements regarding the carrying of documents into forward areas is indicated by the following extracts taken from a SHAEF letter:

"(1) A capable and intelligent regular officer Prisoner of War, very security conscious in every respect, stated that the Germans relied most exclusively on Prisoner of War information for operational and other intelligence. Although Allied Prisoners of War were very security conscious, documents which were usually found in large numbers on Prisoners of War were an excellent source of information.

"(2) A captured German Intelligence officer stated on interrogation that the security of documents in the Allied Armies is 'shocking'. Again and again 'Top Secret' documents were found in Prisoners of War pockets and cars in the front line. PW recalled an occasion when he found on an Allied Lieutenant a 'Top Secret' OB document giving the complete regrouping of the Allied Forces shortly before the breakthrough at AVRANCHES. When he made a remark about it to the Lieutenant he received as an answer, "Well, you cannot keep all this in your head". PW states that, had the Germans been able to move their troops at all (a thing they could not do owing to the Allied air supremacy) this lack of security could have caused the Allies great harm, as locations and moves of Allied units were thereby known well in advance. Innumerable notebooks containing 'Secret' and 'Top Secret' information did almost as much damage, although they had to be deciphered first.

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"(3) The same PW found inter-Allied distribution lists on nearly all documents one of the most valuable sources of information.

"(4) Many Allied soldiers continue to carry personal mail into combat.

"(5) A captured map classified 'Top Secret' 'Bigot' was shown to an Allied officer Prisoner of War, who later escaped. He stated that, at that time, towards the end of June, 'the Germans had amazing information about our order of battle'. As far as he could see, they had all Corps areas and location of all units except an Armd Div.

"(6) A German officer PW, who had been an interrogator, stated that Allied officers frequently had air photographs of 'first class quality' which gave an indication of objectives. In many cases Allied air photographs were the only means of testing the effectiveness of German camouflage which was sometimes altered or improved after our photographs had shown defects.


"(7) Recently an officer of a forward reconnaissance element went into enemy held territory carrying a copy of the Div's operation order relating to the assault due to take place very shortly. He lost his way, was shot and the document was captured. This document therefore became known to the enemy in time for effective use to be made of it.

"(8) A Staff Officer went out in a jeep early in the campaign, to pick up some German prisoners of war. He himself was captured with the jeep in which was a phase-map. The Germans used this information in their Trans-Ocean radio service to show that the progress of the invasion was behind schedule."

b. In no case must the operational plans of a unit larger than a Regt be taken forward of a Regtl command post. Necessary precautions will be taken to see that visiting officers comply with this procedure. Commanders must insure that all officers and non-commissioned officers are thoroughly familiar with the need for strict enforcement of these security restrictions.

(Source: Third Army G-2 Report 210, 7 Jan 1945)

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S E C R E T

INCLOSURE No 2
to
G-2 REPORT No 148

10 January 1945

I. WHY HELP THE ENEMY?
II. HOW TO BE AN AGENT

I. WHY HELP THE ENEMY?

Following incident occurring 2 Jan 1945 is an indicative that there are still those who are derelict in properly instructing men posted as sentries on road blocks. In light of information recently disseminated concerning the infiltration of Germans in American uniforms and the probable movement of German Intelligence agents behind our lines, the dereliction disclosed below is even more glaring.

An officer was riding in a civilian car painted OD with US markings. He had no helmet on at the time and no visible unit insignia. His vehicle was stopped at a road block and the sentry looked inside the car. Without a single question being asked, the car moved on. Amazed at such laxity, the officer questioned the sentry.

"Why did you stop this car?"

"This is a road block, sir."

"What are you looking for?"

"We're checking vehicles to see if there are any Germans in American uniforms in them."

"Well, how do you know that I am not a German?"

"I know that you are an officer because I saw the bar on your collar."

"Don't you ask for the password?"

"Yes, in cases when we're not sure of the man."

"What do you do if a passerby does not know the password? I don't happen to know it myself."

"That's all right, sir. The password today is BUZZ - BOMB. You'll need it at the next road block down the way."

At the next road block, the vehicle was again stopped and upon being challenged the password, BUZZ - BOMB, was given. The sentry replied, "Sir, that's the old password which has been compromised and they're not using it any more. The new password is THOROUGH - JOB."


ARE YOU SURE THAT THE ABOVE DID NOT TAKE PLACE AT ONE OF YOUR ROAD BLOCKS

(Source: Third Army G-2 Report 210, 7 Jan 1945)

II. HOW TO BE AN AGENT

During the past several days attention has been called to the ease with which officers and men of the American Army and, in some instances, of the German Army, have circulated within our lines. Following extract from Ninth US Army Cir 20 is quoted as further evidence that the enemy will always take advantage of our gullibility: "On 19 Dec 44 an agent of the Sicherheitsdienst (German Intel Service) was arrested in KERKRADE. Interrogation of subject revealed that he approached several American officers on 22 Sept 44 and asked to be attached to the American Army. He was given a short interview and stated that his nationality was Dutch. He was not required to substantiate his statements with any documents. He was given an American uniform and was given no specific duties other than to drive a Lt Col around, until he was apprehended.

(Source: XX Corps G-2 Report 152, 8 Jan 1945)



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Copy No 28

- G-2 PERIODIC REPORT -

: : : : :
: SECRET :
: Auth: CG VI Corps :
: Initials: JJK :
: Date: 11 Jan 1945 :
: : : : :

No 149

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 100001A
TO : 102400A
HQ VI CORPS
110800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. See Overlay, Incl No 1.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

25 PG Div. PWs taken in the vic of HATTEN (R-1733) from the I Bn, 35 PGR and the II Bn, 119 PGR agree that these two Bns participated in the attacks launched 9 Jan, the I Bn, 35 PGR being on the northern flank of the attacking force. The tanks which spearheaded the attacks evidently belonged to the 5 Tank Bn for, according to PWs from the latter unit its 1, 2 and 3 Cos each had 9-11 Panther tanks while the 4 Co was an assault gun Co equipped with 9-75mm assault guns on Mark IV chassis (Mark IV Specials?). Thus it is evident that the 5 Tank Bn has been completely refitted with modern armored equipment. The attack was prepared by men from the 220 Engr Bn (21 Pz Div) who were sent forward to clear mines from a 15-yard lane for 5 tanks to go through. Hereupon the tanks advanced, infantrymen from the I Bn, 35 PGR, II Bn, 119 PGR and elements of the 25 Rcn Bn being sent forward to hold the ground gained, the enemy evidently being under the impression that the pillboxes of the MAGINOT Line E of HATTEN along the road were unoccupied. The first attack having failed to gain its objective, stated to be KUHLENDORF (R-1334), the survivors of the I Bn, 35 PGR and II Bn, 119 PGR withdrew to the forest for regrouping.

In the second attack the survivors of these two Bns were supported by the II Bn of the 192 PGR which had been held in reserve in the forest E of HATTEN after its recovery from the ASCHBACH -- STUNDWILLER undertaking. All PWs agreed that very heavy losses were sustained in these attacks, the 25 PG Div having suffered several hundred casualties while the II Bn, 192 PGR probably lost half of its effective strength, not to mention the 17 tanks and assault guns which PWs claim were destroyed in the encounter. PWs from the 35 PGR as well as the CO of the 3 Co, 119 PGR evidently working with the II Bn, 119 PGR state that the III Bn of the 35 PGR was dissolved and incorporated into the I Bn, suggesting that manpower bottlenecks have recently reduced this Regt to two Bns for its 10 and 12 Cos were still in contact several weeks ago opposite the XV Corps. As for the 119 PGR, it is believed to have no more than I and II Bns at the present time, a circumstance confirmed by the CO of its 3 Co, its III Bn (10 Co) having been contacted last on 23 Nov by the XII Corps. The collaboration of elements of the 125 and 192 PGRs and the 220 Engr Bn in this attack, together with statements by a PW to the effect that the attacks were launched under the auspices of the 21 Pz Div CG lends weight to the belief that General FEUCHTINGER sponsored the enterprise, using elements of the 21 Pz Div and a battle group of the 25 PG Div including two Bns of motorized Inf, some of its rcn elements and its tanks, although the CO of the 3 Co, 119 PGR insisted that the 25 PG Div was not operating under the 21 Pz Div but independently.

553 VG Div. According to PWs from the 1119, 1120 and 1121 GRs, the 553 VG Div underwent a reorganization toward the end of Dec 44 in which remnants of all these Regts were formed into a Bn KAPPES (1st Lt) which, about 300 strong initially, now constitutes the I Bn, 1119 GR. It remains to be seen to what extent the 1120 and 1121 GRs will be reconstituted but, judging from recent interrogation of PWs from Bn HOPPE, efforts were made to rebuild at least the 1120 GR, now considered to be defunct once more. Thus recent contacts with 1119, 1120 and 1121 GRs actually identify only I Bn, 1119 GR, also known as Bn KAPPES. Most recently the Bn KAPPES, which has had serious reverses of its own, is claimed to have also absorbed these remnants of the II Bn, 2 SS Police Regt which survived the action in the vic of DRUSENHEIM (R-1518).

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11 SS Mtn Regt (6 SS Mtn Div). Contact was made yesterday with troops of the III Bn, 11 SS Mtn Regt (6 SS Mtn Div) at Q-820378. PW was from the 15 Co and stated that the III Bn of the 11 SS Mtn Regt (with Cos 12-18) had relieved a Bn (probably I Bn) of the 12 SS Mtn Regt and the I and III Bns (the only ones so far contacted in this area) of which have been reduced to a shadow. Significant was the statement of PW that, notwithstanding the absence of reinforcements, the Cos of his Bn are 120-150 strong and that his Regt suffered few casualties in FINLAND. PW claimed to have heard that the commitment of his (III) Bn was the prelude to an imminent large-scale attack in which another SS Div (believed to be the 5 SS PG Div VIKING) and a heavy weapons brigade were to take part.

c. Enemy reserves and forces capable of intervention. The 10 SS Pz and the 11 Pz Divs are still unlocated.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Strong pressure continued vic OBENHEIM (V-9675). Bn Inf reported vic V-9779. Tanks reported cruising HERBSHEIM (V-9272) -- ROSSFELD (V-9171) -- HUTTENHEIM (V-8873) area. Hvy arty continued on HERBSHEIM. In the bridgehead area, tracked vehicles heard in GAMBSHEIM (R-1110). Patrols active vic KILSTETT (R-0908). (Source: Seventh Army Isum 259 as of 102400A).


XV Corps. 36th Div: Sector quiet with only light and scattered harassing arty reported along front. 100th Div: Small attack vic Q-7547 repulsed. Inf Bn reported entrenched vic Q-7448 -- Q-7547. Strong SA, AW and mortar resistance encountered vic Q-7349 and Q-7449. Two tanks observed moving W on road vic Q-7551. 44th Div: Front generally quiet. 103d Div: Small attack from vic Q-3964 repulsed. Mortar fire received from vic OETING (Q-4064) and sniper fire from PETIT ROSELLE (Q-3668) and the edge of woods at Q-3666. Vehicle movement heard N of FORBACH (Q-3966) towards close of period. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 259 as of 102400A).

VI Corps. There was little hostile aggressive action during the period but the enemy maintained strong pressure on the left flank along the nose of the BITCHE salient and on the right flank in the HATTEN (R-1733) and HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) areas. For the most part, the enemy attitude was defensive and he was apparently reorganizing after the hvy fighting of the past few days. Throughout the period he clung tenaciously to his ground in the BITCHE salient, however since he is holding an unsatisfactory long term defensive line in this area it may be expected that he is attempting to regroup or reinforce in this area with a view to again taking up the offensive. His stubborn defense in the HATTEN area appeared to be a bid for time, to recuperate from his reported hvy losses and organize his forces for another push by units of the 21 Pz Div and 25 PG Div. In the bridgehead area, the enemy continued to operate much as he has in the past few days, by strongly defending the area under his control. Enemy arty activity increased to moderate with our forward elements being the principal targets.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) AA. Our air OP reported receiving 20mm, 40mm and 88mm AA fire from SELTZ (R-2732) area.

(2) Armor. Enemy armored activity continued in all active sectors of the Corps zone, with most of the armor supporting Inf at the critical points of HATTEN and HERRLISHEIM. In the HATTEN area, enemy tanks supported Inf throughout the period, and two tanks were reported destroyed during this action. Twelve tanks were reported in vic of R-182337 at 1830A indicating enemy armored strength in this area remains at about 15-20 tanks and the enemy was regrouping his forces for renewed offensive action. In the bridgehead area, during the early part of the period and continuing throughout the morning, 4 or 5 tanks supported Inf action in HERRLISHEIM with two tanks knocked out. At 1425A, 5 enemy tanks reported in vic of R-124135 and 7 reported at R-131152 indicates that at least 12 tanks are operating in the



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bridgehead area. In the zone of the 45th Div, single tanks were active N of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) with one tank disabled by arty fire vic Q-780392. Tanks reported destroyed during period - 4; tanks reported disabled or damaged - 1; total tanks reported destroyed since 1 Jan - 43; total tanks reported damaged or disabled since 1 Jan - 18. *mm*

(3) Arty. Despite the decided increase in shelling little change occurred in the pattern from that of the previous period. In the left portion of the Corps zone, Inf attacking vic ALTHORN (Q-7540) and N of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) were moderately shelled throughout the day. Shortly after daylight, 75mm guns firing from the NW placed 70 rds of harassing fire vic PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8542). The heaviest shelling occurred in the HATTEN area where mixed calibers and Nebelwerfers fired hvy harassing missions during the day. In the bridgehead area, Inf positions vic HERRLISHEIM, DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) and ROHRWILLER (R-1217) were harassed with some Nebelwerfer fire reported in the latter town during the morning. The communications town of KURTZENHAUSEN (R-0515) was target for 100 rds at mid-morning while BISCHWILLER (R-0918) was shelled at 1720A. Nightly harassing fire was light and scattered.


(4) Aviation. During the afternoon, many enemy a/c were reported over the Corps area on rcn, bombing and strafing missions and there was an apparent increase in the enemy's use of jet propelled planes. At 1209A, four Me-262s and two Me-109s bombed and strafed in the SOULTZ (R-1137) -- SURBURG (R-0934) -- OBERBETSCHDORF (R-1233) area. Planes were engaged by AA and one Me-109 was destroyed crashing at R-111121. (From 1155A to 1210A smoke shells were reported landing in R-1435, twenty seconds apart, and it is believed that the enemy was marking a target for the a/c). At 1300A, a P-47 with American markings and a red tail was reported strafing the road vic ZUTZENDORF (Q-8628) and was engaged by LAA. About the same time, one FW-190 was reported flying rcn vic Q-8515. At 1405A, several Me-262s were over the area. Four of these were reported bombing and strafing vic R-1333 and were engaged by LAA. LAA also engaged one Me-410 on rcn from Q-9525 to R-0835. At 1554A, approx eight Me-262s and five Me-109s were reported in the area. Both HAA and LAA engaged targets. Some of these planes were apparently on rcn while others committed hostile acts. Four HE bombs dropped vic OBERBETSCHDORF (R-1233).

(5) Inf

45th Inf Div. Enemy resistance in the BITCHE salient remained very strong in the SARREINSBERG (Q-7441) -- ALTHORN (Q-7440) area and E along the high ground N of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) to vic Q-8338, while hvy mortar fire was placed on our attacking troops. The enemy attitude in this area appeared to be defensive with the enemy digging in all along the line. The only aggressive action was in ALTHORN where the enemy launched a small unsuccessful counterattack about 2200A. However, the enemy apparently continued to reinforce this area since the long missing 11 SS Regt of the 6 SS Mtn Div was finally identified in vic of Q-7939. There was no change in the area from BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) to DAMBACH (Q-9244) with only normal enemy activity being observed. Our patrols in the NIEDERSTEINBACH (Q-9847) area, however, reported two small enemy groups dug in SE of the town.

79th Inf Div. Enemy activity centered in the N in the vic of HATTEN and on the S in vic HERRLISHEIM where stubborn enemy resistance continued throughout the period. In HATTEN, the enemy apparently reinforced his forces during the morning and hostile Inf supported by tanks offered stiff resistance for the remainder of the day. PWs taken identified these forces as elements of the 25 Rcn Bn and the Battle Group LOEWEN, so apparently the major units of 25 PG Div which launched their attack in this area the day before had been locally withdrawn for reorganization. At the close of the period, the enemy was in possession of the eastern half of the town. Inf and tanks were reported in the woods SE of HATTEN while ROPPENHEIM (R-2527) and FORT LOUIS (R-2522) were still held by hostile forces. In the bridgehead area, our troops succeeded in making contact with the friendly

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forces that had been virtually encircled in HERRLISHEIM late in the previous period but the enemy opposed bitterly our efforts to clear the town. House to house and street fighting ensued throughout the day but at the end of the period our troops executed a planned withdrawal from the town. There were no indications of enemy bridging operations in the bridgehead area during the period, however poor weather hampered observation. The general situation elsewhere remained unchanged.

(6) Motor Movements. On the W flank, the increased vehicular activity in the MELCH (Q-7840) area and on the N-S road to WILDENGUTH from 0800A to 0930A, ceased after our arty fire. On the E flank, considerable vehicular traffic was heard in the area S of WISSEMBOURG and in vic of HATTEN and INGOLSHEIM (R-1542) during the night. This latter movement indicates either a build-up or a shifting of troops in this areas as a probable prelude to renewed offensive action. In the enemy rear areas, only scattered MT movement was noted throughout the day, except in the vic of the COLMAR pocket where two tank concentrations were observed during the early morning. One consisted of an estimated 58 tanks vic EMMINDINGEN (W-0947) and the other totalled approx 70 MT, of which 20-30 were tanks, W of KENZINGEN (W-0363). This considerable movement of MT and armor would indicate the presence of some sizable unit and may involve the unlocated 30 SS Div.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

1 fr III Bn 11 SS Mtn Regt	1 fr 5 Co 951 GR (straggler)
21 fr I Bn 457 GR	22 fr I Bn 952 GR
24 fr II Bn 457 GR	1 fr 6 Co 953 GR (straggler)
2 fr 14 Co 457 GR	3 fr 13 Co 953 GR (stragglers)
1 fr II Bn 466 GR	3 fr 361 Med Co
11 fr Hq 477 GR	90

Total PWs captured by 45th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 15,680

79th Inf Div

36 fr I Bn 35 PGR	44 fr I Bn 1119 GR
1 fr II Bn 119 PGR	2 fr BG WIMMER (553 VG Div)
3 fr 5 Tank Bn (u/c 25 PG Div)	2 fr III Bn 2 SS Police Regt
5 fr II Bn 192 PGR	10 fr 405 AT Bn
15 deserters and unidentified	6 fr Bn HOPPE
	124

Total PWs captured by 79th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,746

14th Armd Div 2 deserters

Total PWs captured by 14th AD in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,012


Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 102400A:	216
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945:	2,025
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY:	60,213

b. German Tactical use of Searchlights in a Ground Role. The following are observations and recommended countermeasures by units who have had these lights used in their sectors:

Observations

(1) The lights appear to be high intensity arc lights and are so strong that troops directly in front of them cannot observe movement of enemy or locate positions of lights.

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S E C R E T

- (2) Beams appear to be used to spot objectives and as guides for Inf, tanks and arty.
- (3) Beams are stationary and are sited at angles ranging from the horizontal to 45 degrees. When sited at angles above the horizontal, the beam reflects from the low clouds or overcast and lights the ground.
- (4) Lights were used in groups of from 3 to 12.
- (5) Lights stayed on from 15 minutes to one hour. In one case reported, they were used on and off during the entire night. In most instances they were used only for a short time prior to daylight.

Recommended Countermeasures

- (1) Use of sound and flash arty teams to locate lights.
- (2) Use arty and night fighters to destroy lights.
- (3) Fire from flanks, as enemy troops and vehicles are silhouetted in beams.
- (4) Use of liaison planes to locate lights.
- (5) Flank Bns take intersection and arty can fire on lights.

When first used our troops were confused, but advantage was taken of their subsequent use and hvy casualties were inflicted on the enemy troops silhouetted in the lights. (Source: 30th British Corps)

c. German Soldiers in American Uniform Department - Division of Appeals and Apologies. (From Twelfth Army Group P & PW Daily Intelligence Summary, 5 Jan). Seven Germans caught in American uniforms in First Army territory, after having been sentenced to death, addressed the following appeal for reprieve to the Commanding General:

"This morning the undersigned were notified of their death sentence for having entered the American zone of operations in American uniforms, in contravention of the Geneva Convention. The undersigned beg to be allowed to present this appeal for reprieve to the Commanding General with the request for mercy and re-examination of the motives for the act. It may be repeated that the act was not voluntarily committed but on higher orders, and that the undersigned, in the truest sense of the word, were driven into certain death. The personal ambition of a single man is responsible for this criminal action. We were taken out of our old units because we knew English and with the understanding that we would be interpreters which is an honorable assignment. Only shortly before our commitment were we informed of the criminal background of the whole enterprise. One of my comrades who refused to obey the order, was courtmartialed and undoubtedly sentenced to death. Therefore we could no longer escape death. We were captured by American troops without having fired a shot because we did not want to become murderers. We were sentenced to death and are now dying for some criminals who have not only us but also - and that is worse - our families on their conscience. Therefore, we beg mercy of the Commanding General; we have not been unjustly sentenced, be we are de facto innocent."


4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 145.

Langevin
 LANGEVIN
 G-2

2 INCLS

- 1 - Overlay
- 2 - Translations of Captured Documents



SECRET

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46
US ARMY

INCLOSURE NO 2
TO
G-2 REPORT NO 149

11 January 1945.

TRANSLATIONS

EXTRACTS FROM ORDERS OF 2 CO 361 SIG BN:

SECRET

6 Nov 44.

Order of the Day, 361 VG Div, Commanding General

During the night of 29-30 Oct 44 Pvt Wladislaus SCHLACHTER of 4 Co 952 GR deserted to the enemy.

The court martial assembled on the same day and passed death sentence on SCHLACHTER.

Thus he was expelled forever from the community of our people and may never return to his home. Most ruthless reprisals will be enacted upon the members of his family, measures which are a necessity in this struggle for the survival of the German people.

On 23 Oct 44 an enemy patrol succeeded in deceiving German guards by using the German language and thus took two squads by surprise. Eleven soldiers are missing from that action. I, therefore, issue urgent warning to allow German speaking strangers to approach only if they are able to give the correct parole. In all other cases they may be allowed to approach after taking the necessary precautions (alerting of entire guard, approaching persons to raise their hands and lay down weapons)

It is learned again and again from intercepted enemy radio messages that our CP locations were compromised by captured maps. Every map showing a CP location is automatically classified "TOP SECRET" and must not be taken into the front lines.

CPs can be marked on maps just as clearly by underscoring the name of the town in which the CP is located, or by the use of commander's initials or code names as by conventional symbols or obvious description. . . .

22 Dec 44.

Lately, much important information and details of organization and equipment of the German Army have been revealed to the enemy by PW statements.

I order every member of the Company to observe strictly the repeatedly published rules and regulations.

If it becomes known that a soldier has made irresponsible statements, his family will be subjected to adequate security measures.

/s/ ROSEN, 1st Lt
Commanding


EXTRACT FROM A LETTER:

Roemerstadt, 7 Dec 44.

Dear Hermann,

It was with great amazement and admiration that I received from your father the glad news of your having been decorated with the Iron Cross 1st class. I beg you, therefore, to accept my most sincere congratulations, for by now I have a faint idea as to what a soldier must accomplish

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out there before he is awarded such a decoration.

As for myself, I have just been discharged from the Labor Service and am now awaiting my induction into the Army. I am very curious to find out what fate has in store for me. I liked the Labor Service quite well and must admit that the food was not half bad.

A daily schedule ran about like this:

0600 - reveille	1200 - dinner
0700 - morning formation	1300 - 1400 - classes
0700 - 0800 - inf training	1400 - 1500 - firing exercise
0800 - 0900 - sports	1500 - 1600 - terrain exercise
0900 - 1000 - firing exercise	1600 - 1700 - sports
1000 - 1100 - terrain exercise	1700 - 1800 - equipment instruction
1100 - 1200 - classes	1800 - supper


You can see from the above schedule that they put considerable stress on firing and terrain exercises and I think we won't have to learn very much more in the Army with the exception of the use of weapons. I got a lot of fun out of the firing exercises and think that the shooting is the best part of the whole thing, after all.

LETTER TO CAPT KNAPP, CO II BN 952 GR FROM FORMER COLLEAGUE:

Glessen, 26 Sept 44.

Shortly before we left the refitting area at DIRSCHAU, I returned to the Regt after a period of D/S in East Prussia. . . . Our formerly proud Regt was smashed completely at VOGILEV. VOGILEV was ordered held at all cost and to achieve this the 89th Regt was sacrificed. Only small elements of the fighting troops and services got out of VOGILEV. Only the following are left from among the officers of the Regt: Capt HEINEMANN, Capt GUST (was hospitalized before the VOGILEV action), Lt BAUMGARTEN, Lt RIX, Capt HENN (in hospital), Lt SCHERER (hospital) and I. The General, the Col, Capt ELLERBECK, Maj SIMON, Capt WICHEL, LINDENHORST etc. were all lost at VOGILEV. After Capt GUST had taken temporary command of the Regt for a short time, Maj LEMBKE was charged with the command in the refitting area. Capt GROESSBODT joined us subsequently and took over the I Bn, while Capt v. AHN received the II Bn where I was made Exec. Capt HEINEMANN was made Regt Exec and Capt GUST took charge of the 13th Co. The Regt was completely replenished in personnel and equipment. The Division (12 VG Div - on First US Army front - transl note) is now commanded by Col ENGEL, 27 Regt by Maj LEMM and 48 Regt by Maj OSTERHOLD. The other officers who joined the Regt are all younger men, some of whom had previously been with the 89th. The Division's new area of action is the vic of STOLLBERG, S of AACHEN. Here too we have taken quite a pounding. As soon as the Bns detrained they were immediately thrown in to counterattack. Our casualties of officers and EM are rather high. After the counterattacks had made good initial progress, the Americans laid down arty barrages of such intensity that many an old combat soldier from the East was dazed. I was wounded on 19 Sept in the right leg by a shell fragment and at the moment I am lying in Station Hosp # 1 at GLESSSEN on the LAHN. I have quite a big hole (fist size) in my foot and three metatarsals are fractured. I guess it'll take a quarter of a year to heal. Capt HEINEMANN, GROESSBODT and v. AHN are also wounded. I hope I have given you a little outline as I am sure that the Capt is interested in the fate of the old Regt. The Officers Corps which accounted for the Regt's famous name remained at VOGILEV. The thing that is presently called the 89th is no more than a hodge-podge bunch. Unfortunately, the time allowed for reformation was too short and an esprit de corps is non-existent so far. Let's hope that it will improve. . . .

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: : : : : : : : : :
: SECRET :
: Auth: CG VI Corps:
: Initials: JH :
: Date: 12 Jan 1945:
: : : : : : : : : :

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 150

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 110001A
TO : 112400A
HQ VI CORPS
120800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change, see G-2 Report No 149.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

Bn WIMMER. Evidently not all the remnants of the 553 VG Div found their way into the Bn KAPPES. PWs from the Bn WIMMER claim that this Bn was organized 30 December from troops of the 1120 GR in BUSENBACH and has two Cos of 80 men each. The Bn made its way across the RHINE 6-7 Jan on a ferry and proceeded to the vic of OFFENDORF (R-1312). The Bn WIMMER thereupon proceeded to HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) which it was to hold jointly with the I Bn, 1119 GR, supported by four tanks. The Bn was subsequently reduced to about 100 as a result of our arty barrage on the town.

6 SS Mtn Div. Identification yesterday of troops from the II Bn, 11 SS Mtn Regt (Q-787382) and II Bn, 11 SS Mtn Regt (Q-810358) accounts for all the Inf components of that Div with the exception of the I Bn, 11 SS Mtn Regt. Preliminary interrogation shows the Cos of the II Bn, 11 SS Mtn Regt to be considerably below strengths earlier indicated for the Regt as a whole, although not all of the Bn seems to have arrived in our zone.

36 VG Div. Contact with the 6 Co, 118 GR, 36 VG Div at Q-876434 establishes the presence of the entire 118 GR within the VI Corps zone and represents a reinforcement of the BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG area. PW statement that his Co is 35-45 strong shows that the Div may not have received any replacements since it left the XV Corps about a week ago when it had a total estimated effective combat strength of about 1500. Notwithstanding the recent statement of a PW from I Bn, 118 GR, to the contrary, it is highly improbable that his Regt has three Bns. The Div has undergone several cycles of revamping but was never able to muster enough men for 3d Bns. In its present state, and barring the possibility of refitting during the last week, the Div does not have enough troops to maintain all of its proper component units, the II Bn, 165 GR having been defunct for some time.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Attack vic BENFELD (V-9074) repulsed. Fighting continued vic ROSSFELD (V-9171) and HERBSHEIM (V-9272). (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 301 as of 112400A).

XV US Corps. Front continued quiet. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 301 as of 112400A).

VI Corps. The enemy resumed the offensive in the southernmost portion of the salient on the Corps W flank and continued to exert increasing pressure in the vic of HATTEN but remained relatively inactive elsewhere on the front. Shortly after dawn, the 6 SS Mtn Div attacked along the axis of the N-S road running through WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) and after heavy fighting advanced generally to a point along the 38 Northing between the 78 and 80 Eastings. In HATTEN, enemy Inf and tank forces increased their pressure throughout the day and by the end of the period had our troops cut off in the SW corner of town. The enemy controlled the eastern half of RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) after heavy fighting had contained his force in this area. Shelling continued to be moderate and concentrated in the WILDENGUTH and HATTEN areas.



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b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Throughout the period enemy armor continued very active in the 79th Div zone where the enemy committed approx 20 tanks in support of numerous attacks against HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN. However, the enemy lost a total of six tanks in this action. No armored activity was observed in the bridgehead area, but in the zone of the 45th Div, single tanks were active vic DAMBACH and in the Q-7639 grid. PWs continue to report the presence of enemy armor assembled vic BITCHE. This information along with inactivity reported in the bridgehead area might indicate preparations for a pending coordinated attack. Tanks destroyed since 1 Jan 45: 49; damaged or disabled: 18.


(2) Arty. Counterbattery fire was placed on gun positions vic BISCHWILLER (R-0819), WIMMENAU (Q-7734) and W of NIEDERBETSCHDORF (R-1233). Inf N of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) were supported by arty fire during their attack and later by heavy harassing and counterbattery fire to prevent the launching of a counterattack by our forces. The enemy employed an estimated 1500 rds of mortar and arty fire in this area between 0900A and 2000A. During the afternoon, PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8743) and the area SE of BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) were shelled which together with alertness to ground activity indicate that the enemy is sensitive in this area. Hvy harassing missions were placed on our Inf in RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) and HATTEN (R-1833) by mixed caliber guns in support of enemy Inf resisting stubbornly, while shelling in the bridgehead area was light, falling vic WEYERSHEIM (R-0513) and ROHRWILLER (R-1217). The enemy continued to employ heavy caliber arty to fire a few harassing rounds on communication routes and centers during the hours of darkness. A gun estimated 210mm placed five rds vic road S of NIEDERBRONN (Q-9339) shortly after dark. Fragments identify 210mm gun as responsible for placing of semi-armor piercing shells in Q-9135 square during the previous period, and groove bearing indicates photo location of heavy gun in Q-8561 square may be active. The most active arty position areas continue to be MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942) -- BAERENTHAL (Q-8442), ECKELSHARDT (Q-8246) -- WALDECK (Q-8446) and OBERSEEERBACH (R-1841) -- TRIMBACH (R-2138).

(3) Inf.

45th Inf Div. Elements of the 6th SS Mtn Div resumed the offensive shortly after daylight in the area NW of REIPERTSWILLER. From PW identifications it appears that the 12 SS Mtn Regt reinforced by the Engr Bn of the 6th SS Div extended W of the N-S road running through WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) and that the 11 SS Mtn Regt was echeloned to the E of the road. The 12 SS Regt launched its attack without arty preparation and moved S until they were stopped after cutting the road vic Q-783383. The 11 SS on the E maintained close contact but did not exert much pressure until noon when they became increasingly aggressive and after heavy fighting advanced to a point generally abreast the 12 SS Regt along the 38 Easting where forward movement was effectively stopped. However, at 1800A, an estimated Bn launched an attack on our positions on the high ground vic Q-795380 and succeeded in making some gains. Our counterattack to regain this ground met stiff enemy resistance. Close contact was also maintained across the salient between ALTHORN (Q-7540) and OBERMUEHLTHAL (Q-8439) and a Co size attack launched at our positions on Hill 415 (Q-830381) late in the evening was dispersed after heavy fighting. In the remainder of the Div zone there appeared to be no change in the enemy situation although some forward displacement of enemy troops is indicated as platoon size groups were encountered vic Q-907471, Q-916449 and Q-921464.

79th Inf Div. The enemy continued to apply heavy pressure in the HATTEN area throughout the period but in the bridgehead and elsewhere on the Div front remained comparatively inactive. The enemy skillfully used the cover of heavy mist to infiltrate an Inf group supported by two tanks into RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) and although this force was contained in the eastern portion of town, heavy fighting continued throughout the period and the enemy remained sensitive to any attempt to enter the town from the S. The enemy increasingly built up pressure on our troops in HATTEN and at noon had approx 15 tanks supporting the offensive in that area. After dark additional tank and Inf forces were thrown in from the N and S and succeeded in forcing our troops into the SW corner of the town where they were cut off. During the morning, three enemy in a six man recon patrol were captured in ROESCHWOOG.

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(R-2225) and identified elements of the 25 PG Div. During the afternoon, activity was observed vic CLEEBOURG (R-1144) and our night patrols later identified the I Bn 937 GR in the area. Enemy patrols were active along the road from HATTEN to R-201305 to FORSTFELD (R-2228) and a 30 man enemy patrol was dispersed in the bridgehead area vic R-118155.

(4) Motor movements. Early in the period tank movement was heard vic HATTEN and INGOLSHEIM (R-1542). At dusk our arty engaged vehicular and personnel movement on the NEUNHOFFEN (Q-9146) -- DAMBACH (Q-9244) road. Our night patrols report hearing hvy truck and tracked vehicular traffic throughout the night between STEINSELTZ (R-1445) -- RIEDESELTZ (R-1543) and INGOLSHEIM.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

18 fr I Bn 457 GR	12 fr II Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt
78 fr II Bn 457 GR	4 fr 2 Co 6 SS Engr Bn
5 fr 13 Co 457 GR	4 fr I Bn 952 GR
3 fr 14 Co 457 GR	2 fr I Bn 481 GR
3 fr Hq 477 GR	4 fr II Bn 481 GR
4 fr II Bn 477 GR	2 fr II Bn 118 GR
1 fr 2 Btry 257 AR	28 deserters and unidentified
1 fr 1 Co 257 AT Bn	169

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 15,842

79th Inf Div

4 fr I Bn 937 GR	1 fr 25 Ren Bn
9 fr BG LOEWEN	1 fr 220 Engr Bn
2 deserters	17

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,763

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 112400A: 186
 Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 2,211
 Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 60,399

b. Enemy supply and equipment. In the 79th Div zone vic HATTEN and RUTTERSCHOFFEN, six enemy tanks, one scout car, one armored car and one 2½ ton truck were destroyed during the period.

c. Raiding parties. Further indication that enemy raiding parties are active on the Corps front is a document taken from a carrier pigeon captured vic SARREINSBERG (Q-7441), 10 Jan, by 2nd Bn 179th Inf:

RAIDING DETACHMENT "EDITH"

Squad: BERGMANN

6 Jan 45, quarry 600 m
 W of RUNZENHEIM (R-1924)
 Time: 1400 hrs


TO: Major SULZER.

Several attempts to pass the enemy lines during the night of 5-6 in the direction of SUFFLENHEIM (R-1625) failed because of hvy enemy movements. Legnaire LEGRAND wounded. Will try to reach objective tonight via LEUTENHEIM (R-2027). Liaison with Captain HOPPE could not be established since his location was not known yesterday and he is cut off today.

/s/ BERGMANN, Sgt.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 145.



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Copy No 11

SECRET
:Auth: CG VI Corps:
:Initials: DWD :
:Date: 13 Jan 1945:
:

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 51

FROM: 120001A

TO : 122400A

Map: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

HQ VI CORPS

130800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change, see G-2 Report No 149.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

REIPERTSWILLER Salient. During the last four or five days the enemy's order of battle in the REIPERTSWILLER Salient has undergone a considerable rationalization. The 256 VG Div is in process both of narrowing its sector and shifting westward, its 481 GR having shifted from the DAMBACH (Q-9244) -- OBERSTEINBACH (Q-9648) area to the area just W of FECHLEBRONN (Q-8539) since 6 Jan. Similarly, the 456 GR moved from PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) to the vic of OBERMUELTAL (Q-8440), its II Bn relieving the I Bn, 477 GR (257 VG Div). The I Bn, 456 GR evidently was withdrawn from line several days ago in vic of BAERENTHAL for a reorganization prior to its recommitment. The 477 GR, which had been attached to the 361 VG Div, seems to have shifted farther W, now being identified in the vic of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) where it has apparently rejoined the 257 VG Div. The westward shift of the 256 VG Div leaves the PHILIPPSBOURG -- DAMBACH area held very thinly and suggests, as stated by one PW from the 481 GR, that elements of the 36 VG Div are destined for that area. Failure to identify the Inf components of the 361 VG Div, now no more than 450 strong, since 10 Jan, points to the likelihood of its relief by elements of the 6 SS Mtn Div for a long overdue rest and refitting. Thus more or less clearly defined divisional sectors seem to emerge in this area: the REIPERTSWILLER Salient being held by the elements of the 559 VG Div on the extreme W, the 257 VG Div in the vic of ALTHORN (Q-7540), the 6 SS Mtn Div holding several km E and W of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) and the 256 VG Div's sector extending from about Q-8040 to shortly NE of BAERENTHAL (Q-8342). This would give the 36 VG Div a very wide sector, reaching from just NE of BAERENTHAL eastward. Considering the low combat strength of the 36 VG Div, it would seem that the line E of BAERENTHAL is held very weakly, indicating the need for considerable reinforcement in this area, unless, of course, the 24 Inf Div is strong enough to assume this entire responsibility.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First French Army. Arty fell on SERMERSHEIM (V-8672), HUTTENHEIM (V-8873) and KRAFFT (V-9780); otherwise generally quiet. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 303 as of 122400A).

XV US Corps. 36th Div: SA fire received by patrols vic Q-7543 and Q-442. 100th Div: Sector generally quiet. 44th Div: Advance vic Q-5555 encountered SA, MG and Nebelwerfer fire. 103d Div: Patrols met SA and AW resistance vic FORBACH (Q-4363) and LIXING (Q-4662). 106th Cav Gp: Sector remained quiet. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 303 as of 122400A).

VI Corps. Employing an aggressive defense the enemy opposed bitterly our attacks in the salient S of BITCHE and against the RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) -- HATTEN (R-1733) penetration, while on the remainder of the Corps front he was generally passive. Enemy arty, supporting his Inf actions, was very active particularly in the HATTEN -- OBERBETSCHDORF (R-1233) -- HOFFEN (R-1536) area. The strong resistance to our counterattacks SE of BITCHE would indicate that the enemy is determined to hold this area as a line of departure for

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further offensive action, since it has little value to him as an all-out defensive line. Likewise the enemy showed every intention of holding the initial gains made in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area, since he fiercely contested every bit of ground. Meanwhile, the continued reports of vehicular and armored movements in the INGOLSHEIM (R-1441) area may indicate that the enemy intends to make another thrust from that vicinity. In the corridor between the HAGUENAU Forest and the RHINE River the enemy was reported constructing roadblocks which indicates that he has concern for a friendly counter-thrust against his flank and rear through that area. The relative quiet in the bridgehead area is no indication that the enemy has neglected this sector and it is believed that he is further reinforcing his positions for possible future offensive action.

b. Operations of component elements


(1) Armor. In the zone of the 79th Div, approx 12 tanks and SPs supported Inf action with direct and indirect fire in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area, while some tanks were heard in INGOLSHEIM (R-1441) area throughout the period. In the bridgehead area no armored activity was reported for the second consecutive day. In the zone of the 45th Div some SP fire was received from vic MELCH (Q-7940) and one SP was observed vic Q-755404 at 1500A. Enemy losses in recent offensive actions is apparently reducing his effective armor, since a noticeable decrease transpired in recent days, especially in the HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN areas where the bulk of the enemy's committed armor has made its appearance. At the height of his offensive, 20-30 tanks were employed, whereas only 10-15 tanks and SPs were employed in this sector during the period. Tanks destroyed during period - 4. Damaged and disabled - 0. Tanks destroyed since 1 Jan - 53. Damaged and disabled - 18.

(2) Arty. Little change in volume of shelling was noted in the BITCHE salient, however the WILDENGUTH area received only occasional attention while vic PHILIPPSBOURG and SE of BAERENHIAL forward positions were sporadically harassed. The heaviest shelling in this area occurred vic ALTHORN (Q-7540) during the afternoon and the enemy counterattack launched NW of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-9037) at mid-afternoon was supported by arty and SP fire. Both light and medium guns firing from the NE and E placed an estimated 1500 rds in the HATTEN -- OBERBETCHSDORF -- HOFFEN area during the day. Missions consisted of 20-200 rds with medium calibers forming a large portion of the shelling. In the bridgehead area shelling was light and harassing vic ROHRWILLER (R-1217) and DRUSENHEIM (R-1518). Shell fragments from vic BISCHWILLER (R-1918) identify 128mm Flak gun believed to be active from E of the RHINE River vic LICHTENAU (R-1914).

(3) Engrs. The bridge at R-180349 has been repaired and is reported guarded by one tank and 35 Inf. Our Recon patrols found the bridge at R-186202 mined and defended.

(4) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy fought bitterly to maintain his line on the W flank and in the center of the BITCHE Salient while the remainder of the Div front was generally quiet. Our advance E from vic ALTHORN (Q-7540) was countered by an estimated two Cos of enemy N of the village who offered stiff resistance, while an unknown number of enemy S of the village supported by arty and mortar fire resisted with considerable SA fire. The enemy strongly opposed our attack N of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) and SAEGMUHL (Q-7937) throughout the day and about 1600A launched two counterattacks in this area. One counterattack came in vic Q-780385 and consisted principally of SA fire, but the other vic Q-798385 was supported by mortar, arty and SP fire. Both attacks were contained but heavy fighting continued. E of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037)



S E C R E T

where the enemy has a road block vic bridge at Q-824371, our combat patrol engaged the enemy defending the block and took 17 PWs. The enemy apparently continued to occupy his line in the BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG area since an estimated Co was reported dug in vic Q-829389, another vic Q-839400 and an unknown number N of PHILIPPSBOURG. After dark the enemy became slightly aggressive and attempted to make two infiltrations: one S of ALTHORN where an estimated 30 enemy attempted to infiltrate our road block vic Q-762389; and the other S of DAMBACH where after a heavy mortar concentration and an exchange of SA fire, an unknown number of enemy tried to get behind our pillbox positions vic Q-930430.

79th Inf Div and 14th Armd Div. The principal enemy activity was in the RITTERSHOFFEN -- HATTEN area where the enemy persisted in the aggressive defense of his gains during the previous period, while some activity was also indicated in the HERRLISHEIM area. Our counterattack by the 14th Armd Div and elements of the 79th Div on RITTERSHOFFEN was met by a determined enemy employing SA, mortar, tanks, SP and very heavy arty fire throughout the period. House-to-house fighting continued in RITTERSHOFFEN until after dark with the battle centering around the church and a strongpoint vic the cemetery on the SE edge of town, with the enemy retaining his hold on the N and E perimeter of the town at the close of the period. The enemy maintained his grip on HATTEN and our Bn which was heavily engaged in the town remained physically severed from friendly forces throughout the period. E of HATTEN it appeared that the enemy was digging in along the road from R-185326 to R-195365. There was little enemy activity in the corridor between the HAGUENAU Forest and the RHINE River but two small enemy patrols were engaged vic R-210297 and R-200241 while a pillbox was found occupied at R-175184. Also our rcn patrols found ROESCHWOOG (R-2125), LEUTENHEIM (R-2027), STETTMATTEN (R-1921) and DENGOLSHEIM (R-1821) clear during the morning. In the bridgehead area, which in reality is now a continuation of the fringe of terrain the enemy holds all along the W bank of the RHINE, the enemy appears to be extending his defenses SW of HERRLISHEIM. Patrols found the enemy dug in along the E bank of the ZORN Canal as far SW as R-104135. Enemy activity was observed in vic of HERRLISHEIM throughout the day and the enemy twice became aggressive. Before dawn, a 30 man enemy patrol was driven off vic R-118155 and after dark, one of our OPs was forced to withdraw because of a grenade attack supported by MG fire.

(5) Motor movements. Vehicular movement in the 45th Div sector was generally light and scattered although some movement in vic NEUNHOFFEN (Q-3046) early in the morning was reported, and vehicles using lights were observed in the DAMBACH -- NEUNHOFFEN area, after dark. Movement on the 79th Div front appeared to be much heavier however. During the morning, tracked vehicles were heard in INGOISHEIM and hvy traffic SE of the town was reported. The road between HATTEN and EICHELGARTEN (R-2230) appeared to be well patrolled by the enemy throughout the period and after dark hvy traffic was heard on this road moving in the direction of EICHELGARTEN. The movement on this road may be concerned with the shuttling of troops from assembly areas in the woods to the front lines. Continuous traffic on the BUHL (R-1935) -- HATTEN road between 1930A and 2200A was also heard, however, after midnight the traffic flow shifted towards BUHL. This movement may well be concerned with maintenance and supply.


3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

14 fr Hq 456 GR	11 fr I Bn 457 GR
8 fr I Bn 456 GR	6 fr II Bn 457 GR
2 fr 13 Co 456 GR	1 fr II Bn 477 GR (straggler)
2 fr 14 Co 456 GR	2 fr 2 Btry 257 AR
5 fr I Bn 481 GR	2 fr 257 Engr Bn
22 fr II Bn 481 GR	1 fr 856 AA Bn (deserter)
1 fr II Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	20 unidentified
	97

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 15,946



S E C R E T

79th Inf Div

2 fr II Bn 125 PGR
1 fr I Bn 119 PGR

7 deserters and unidentified
10

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,774

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 122400A: 107
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 2,318
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 60,506

b. Gross Carelessness. When troops capturing prisoners remove their documents and appropriate them as souvenirs or otherwise misplace them the result is just as costly as to allow PW to destroy the documents himself. The loose rule of "finders keepers" does not hold. Once documents are taken from PW, they must be marked with PW's name and sent back with his escort guard. This rule must be repeatedly impressed on troops, especially replacements. They must be made to realize that these documents often spell difference between highly profitable interrogation and a dud. (Source: 90th US Inf Div G-2 Report No 200).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 145.

Dixon
DIXON
Asst G-2

3 Incls

- 1 - Translations of captured documents
- 2 - FPNs since 1 Jan 45.

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46
US ARMY

INCLOSURE NO 1
TO
G-2 REPORT NO 151

13 JANUARY 45

TRANSLATED EXTRACTS FROM ORDERS OF 2 CO 361 SIG BN:

S E C R E T

The WD, A C of S, G-4, has issued the following orders:

In order to avoid excessive loss of equipment every person, whether officer, EM or auxiliary who

- a. loses
- b. irresponsibly abandons when wounded (surgeons will decide in such cases)
- c. when transferred does not arrive at his new post with his

MG, sidearm or gasmask will be held accountable.

The person losing any of the above articles will not only be subjected to the necessary unit punishment or court martial, but will also be deprived of:

- a. his right to a furlough for one year, exception: special furlough in case of death of family members,
- b. his right to PX rations of any kind including tobacco for the next six months.

In each case the govt must be reimbursed for the loss. The following amounts will be deducted:

- 120.- Marks for an MG
- 88.- Marks for an MP 44
- 50.- Marks for a rifle or Sub-MG
- 30.- Marks for a pistol
- 20.- Marks for a gasmask.

10 Dec 44.

361 VG Div, G-3, 560/44.

The nearer the enemy gets to our borders the more imminent becomes the danger of gas warfare and the more necessary for us to be constantly prepared. . . .

The gasmask, gas cape and skin decontamination ointment will be carried at all times by each member of the battalion. In addition to this, all men on duty within the battalion area will wear their gasmasks every day from 1500 to 1600 while performing their duties. Telephone and radio teams on detached service will execute gasmask drills in accordance with the rules of the units they are attached to.


/s/ ROSEN, 1st Lt
Commanding

TRANSLATED EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS WRITTEN TO SS MAN OF 12 PGR BY HIS FATHER:

Munich, 3 Sept 44.

. . . I can hardly believe it, but it must be so. I read in the Sunday paper that the Finnish National Assembly met in a special session on Saturday. There must be a deep reason for that. In any case, we must assume something

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

to be wrong. I imagine the inevitable must happen and expect that you too will now be involved in a big retreat, and I won't have any news from you for some time. Yes, the small nations succumb to the steady pressure exerted on them and they lose faith and confidence in our victory. Such are the consequences of our withdrawals in France and Russia. Let's hope that the tide will turn again and bring us new successes, especially in the West. Since the enemy has penetrated so far, his fronts must be very much extended and he will no longer be able to concentrate his forces at a few points and mass his tanks and planes for a breakthrough. Perhaps it is our turn again, and the war of movement was always one of our strong points. . . .

13 Sept 44.


. . . . I hope you were able to get out safely with your unit. Now the Finns won't be able to go back, even if they wanted to. Judging from the newspaper reports they desert in large numbers into Swedish territory, especially those who have had personal experience with Bolshevism. . . . Nothing new at home - it's now hard to believe in a speedy end to the war. The next year will probably see the end. Whoever gives in is done for. We must not yield at any price. The consequences would be disastrous. If only all the European nations had stood fast and united, it would all be over by now and they would never have dared to invade. But the nations don't deserve any better. They are all still immature and let themselves drift too much. It's easy to talk of course, and we must not forget what state we were in ourselves. If the attempt on the Fuehrer's life had succeeded, we'd be in the same fix now. And in nearly all the small countries, and in Italy as well, groups of traitors have seized the leadership from the decent people by coup d'etats. . . .

31 Oct 44.

. . . . In any case, the situation high up in the North is not so harmless anymore. The Russians will make every effort to get possession of Norway and, if possible, Sweden too. If they don't swallow the Balkan countries first, they will soon send still more troops to the North. Well, I have not yet given up hope for a turn of the tide in our favour. As soon as we regain mastery of the air, the decision must come. So long as the enemy has better planes, they are of course superior to us. . . .

5 Nov 44.

. . . . This morning from 8 to 11 we had our first Volkssturm formation. The proclamation was read and explained, the rosters made up etc. Next Sunday afternoon at 2.30 we have the next meeting. So now, of course, we no longer have free Sundays. But that does not make any difference. We get no rest anyway because of the air raids. . . . How much longer is your retreat going to last? I imagine you should have reached your objective by now. I feel sorry for the Finnish people. It was not their fault after all, that their government turned weak. I am sure, the people would have been much better off with us and they could have held out for a long time yet. But it's strange, they all thought they could not stand it any longer and now they have more misery than ever. . . . Yesterday they shot down another 134 enemy planes. That's how it should be all the time. It would immediately curb the raids of those bandits. The situation remains serious; now on the eve of presidential elections in America they want to win a great victory, but I think they hope in vain. Our troops stood firm both in the East and in the West and the Japanese inflicted a painful defeat on them. They'll be ground to bits soon, believe me. . . .



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46

INCLOSURE NO 2

TO

13 JANUARY 1945


G-2 REPORT NO 151

THE FOLLOWING GERMAN MILITARY PERSONALITIES
HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED SINCE 1 JANUARY 1945:

AHRENS	Capt	5 Tank Bn	CO
ALBRECHT	Capt	III Bn 11 SS Mountain Regt	CO (WIA)
ALTENSCHMIDT	2 Lt	4 Co 457 GR	CO
ASMANN	2 Lt	3 Co 165 GR	CO
BACH, von dem	LtGen	RHINE Commandant and CG XIV Corps	
BARDON	2 Lt	3 Co 481 GR	CO (WIA)
BASS	2 Lt	2 Co 58 Fortress MG Bn	CO
BASTIAN	2 Lt	6 Co 953 GR	CO
BAUER	Capt	361 Signal Bn	CO
BAUERMANN	?	953 GR	Sig Off
BAUMANN	Capt	I Bn 456 GR	CO (WIA)
BECHTEL	1 Lt	II Bn 953 GR	CO (WIA)
BECKER	2 Lt	1 Co 952 GR	CO
BENEDIK	2 Lt	1 Co 257 AT Bn	CO ? Plat Ldr?
BESE	1 Lt	2 Co 6 SS Eng Bn	CO
BIENOWICZ	1 Lt	9 Co 12 SS Mountain Regt	CO
BODSCH	Maj	Rheinkommandant KOBLENZ	
BOETTGER	2 Lt	1 Co 361 Eng Bn	CO
BOLLO	2 Lt	5 Co 481 GR	CO
BONHARD	Maj	58 Fortress MG Bn	CO
BORTCHER	Capt	I Bn 165 GR	CO
BRANDSCHEIDT	1 Lt	14 Co 952 GR	CO
BRAUN	Maj	II Bn 11 SS Mountain Regt	CO
BROGARDT	Capt	7 Co 95k GR	CO
CATTERFELD	2 Lt	1 Co 477 GR	CO
DAUSTER	2 Lt	7 Co 1127 GR	CO
DAVIDS	2 Lt	1 Co 457 GR	CO (KIA)
DEMUTH	Capt	I Bn 257 Arty Regt	CO
DICKENHAHN	Capt	2 Co 125 Pz Ren Bn	CO
DOEHNIG	Maj	I Bn 456 GR	CO
DUERR	S/Sgt	Co WAGEMANN ROTC WIESSBADEN	CO
EGGER (ECKERT)	Capt	4 Co 953 GR	CO
ENGEL	Maj	II Bn 257 Arty Regt	CO
EUGENSCHMIDT	(see ALTENSCHMIDT)		
FASTNACHT	OC	1 Co 953 GR	CO (WIA)
FERK	S/Sgt	1 Co 481 GR	Asst CO
FEUCHTINGER	MGen	21 Pz Div	CG
FICK	Col	37 SS PGR	CO
FIEDLER	2 Lt	1 Co 405 AT Bn	CO
FIEL	2 Lt	3 Co 5 Tank Bn	CO
FREIBERG	2 Lt	1 Co 118 GR	CO
FROHM	1 Lt	7 Co 953 GR	CO
FROST	2 Lt	II Bn 456 GR	Res Plat Ldr
FUNK	Capt	I Bn 476 GR	CO
GABOR	Capt	361 Eng Bn	CO
GEISS	2 Lt	1 Co Regt XII/1	CO
GELBLAUSEN	Capt	I Bn 457 GR	CO


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S E C R E T




S E C R E T

GEYER	1 Lt	1 Co 6 SS Ren Bn	CO
GLAESSNER	Capt	506 SS PG Bn	Actg CO
GOETLER	1 Lt	7 Co 12 SS Mountain Regt	CO
GOETZ	2 Lt	2 Co 481 GR	CO
GROSSHAUPT	1 Lt	953 GR	?
GUENTHER	2 Lt	14 Co 953 GR	CO
HAAS	Capt	V Bn 405 Arty Corps	CO
HAMMELBECK	1 Lt	Battle Group HAMMELBECK	CO
HANNEL	2 Lt	HHQ Co 476 GR	Eng Plat Ldr
HARTZ, von	Maj	Regt. XII/1	CO
HEINEMANN	2 Lt	13 Co 457 GR	CO
HEINEVETTER	2 Lt	8 Co 1127 GR	CO
HEITMANN	Maj	Battle Group HEITMANN	former CO
HEMPER	1 Lt	1 Co 457 GR	CO
HENGST (?)	2 Lt	5 Co 476 GR	CO (?)
HENNE	2 Lt	8 Co 477 GR	CO
HENSCHER	2 Lt	10 Co 37 SS PGR	CO
HERZER	Capt	II Bn 457 GR	CO
HESSLER	2 Lt	1 Co 481 GR	CO ?
HILGER	2 Lt	1 Co 165 GR	CO
HOEFFLER	1 Lt	2 Co 257 Eng Bn	CO
HOEFER	Capt	256 Eng Bn	CO
HOELKIN	2 Lt	2 Co 405 AT Bn	CO
HOESTER	Capt	II Bn 192 PGR	CO
HOFFMANN	2 Lt	4 Co 58 MG Bn	CO
HORNIG	2 Lt	1 Co 456 GR	CO
JANSEN	M/Sgt	Trains 21 Pz Ren Bn	?
KANIN	2 Lt	Assault Gun Co 361 AT Bn	CO
KAPPERFELD	2 Lt	1 Co 477 GR	CO (WIA)
KAPPES	1 Lt	I Bn 1119 GR	CO
KEISLER	2 Lt	2 Co 456 GR	CO (PW 2 Jan)
KENTNER	Col	ROTC WIESSBADEN	former CO
KEPNER	Maj	256 Div	G-4
KIRSCHHAUSER	Capt	II Bn 953 GR	CO
KITTMAYER (?)	Capt	Battle Group HEITMANN	CO
KLEY	2 Lt	1 Co 58 MG Bn	CO
KNAPP	Capt	II Bn 952 GR	CO (KIA)
KOEHLER	1 Lt	2 Co Battle Group HEITMANN	CO
KOENIGS	1 Lt	3 Co 115 PG Tng Bn	CO
KOESTER	2 Lt	5 Co 476 GR	CO (WIA)
KOHL	2 Lt	3 Co 456 GR	CO
KRAEMER	1 Lt	5 Co 953 GR	CO (MIA)
KRAHL	Capt	477 GR	?
KRAMER	1 Lt	5 Co 953 GR	CO
KRENKE	Capt	II Bn 37 SS PGR	CO
KREUZINGER	Capt	III Bn 12 SS Mountain Regt	CO
KRUEGER	2 Lt	6 Co 477 GR	CO
KUEHNE	Capt	II Bn 1127 GR	CO
KUNTZ	Capt	220 Pz Eng Bn	CO
KUPRIK (?)	2 Lt	361 Fus Co	CO (?)
LEETZ	Capt	6 SS Signal Bn	CO
LEIGHT	2 Lt	2 Co 815 AA Bn	CO
LENK	Maj	II Bn Regt XII/1	CO
LICKEL	2 Lt	1 Co 481 GR	CO
LINDEMANN	1 Lt	256 Div	G-2
LOEFELER	2 Lt	5 Co 952 GR	CO
LOESCH	2 Lt	7 Co 37 SS PGR	CO
LOEWEN, von	1 Lt	Battle Group LOEWEN	CO
LOHN (LAHNE)	Capt	II Bn 118 GR	CO




S E C R E T

MAIER	Capt	I Bn 477 GR	CO (?)
MANN	1 Lt	6 Co 118 GR	CO
MANNHERZ	Capt	405 AT Bn	CO
MAUER	2 Lt	2 Co 1119 GR	CO
MAXEINE	1 Lt	3 Co 815 AA Bn	CO
MEINDELHUBER	2 Lt	6 Co 457 GR	CO
MERCHLINGER (?)	Capt	I Bn 952 GR	CO
MIDACH	2 Lt	2 Co 37 SS PGR	CO
MOCK	Capt	I Bn 118 GR	CO
MORITZKY	1 Lt	2 Co Regt XII/1	CO
MORG	Capt	Battle Group OBERRHEIN	CO
MOSER	2 Lt	2 Btry 257 Arty Regt	CO
MOSER (MOESNER)	Maj	II Bn 12 SS Mountain Regt	CO
MOTT	2 Lt	3 Co Regt XII/1	CO
MUELLER	2 Lt	8 Co 481 GR	CO
MUELLER	Maj	457 GR	CO
MUELLER	S/Sgt	6 Co 951 GR	CO
MUELLER	2 Lt	7 Co 87 GR	CO
MEITISCH	2 Lt	5 Co 456 GR	CO (KIA)
NIESCHLAG	Capt	I Bn 37 SS PGR	CO
NUESKE	2 Lt	4 Co 481 GR	CO
OENEMANN	?	953 GR	?
OPPELN, von	2 Lt	1 Co 361 GR	CO
OPPERMAN	Capt	257 Eng Bn	CO
OTTMANN	1 Lt	1 Co 506 SS PG Bn	CO
OTTO	Capt	953 GR	Sig Off
PESCHKE	1 Lt	3 Co 125 PGR	CO
PHILLIPI	Col	361 Div	CO
PITTMANN (?)	Capt	Battle Group HEITMANN	CO
POHLWEIT	2 Lt	3 Co 457 GR	CO
POLLACKE	2 Lt	5 Co 481 GR	CO
POTZIAN	2 Lt	14 Co 477 GR	CO
PROST	1 Lt	12 Co 12 SS Mountain Regt	CO
PUTRZEL	2 Lt	2 Co 953 GR	CO
QUAST	2 Lt	3 Co 457 GR	CO (KIA)
RAJEWSKI (?)	1 Lt	7 Co 11 SS Mountain Regt	CO
REINKING	S/Sgt	8 Co 951 GR	CO
REINZ	Capt	506 SS PG Bn	CO (WIA 4 Jan)
REUSCH	2 Lt	6 Co 74 GR	CO
REUTER	M/Sgt	I Bn 953 GR	Sig Section ?
RICKER	2 Lt	1 Co 481 GR	CO
RIEDEL	1 Lt	15 Co 11 SS Mountain Regt	CO
ROLLMANN	2 Lt	953 GR	In Off
ROSE	2 Lt	3 Co 1119 GR	CO
ROSE	1 Lt	2 Btry 257 Arty Regt	CO
ROSEN	2 Lt	2 Co 361 Sig Bn	CO
ROSSNER	Maj	Battle Group ROSSNER	CO
RUDOLF	2 Lt	2 Co 457 GR	CO
SAALEFRANK (?)	1 Lt	II Bn 476 GR	CO
SAUER	1 Lt	1 Co Battle Group HEITMANN	CO
SCHAEFER	2 Lt	256 Fus Co	CO (PW 4 Jan)
SCHAEFFER	2 Lt	II Bn 87 GR	CO
SCHAMBERG	Capt	1 Co GAF Inf Bn	CO
SCHILL	2 Lt	II Bn 476 GR	CO
SCHINDLER	2 Lt	14 Co 12 SS Mountain Regt	CO (KIA 4 Jan)
SCHLAGENBERG	Capt	I Bn Regt XII/1	CO
SCHLEGEL	Capt	I Bn 257 Arty Regt	CO
SCHMIDT	1 Lt	1 Co 115 PG Tng Bn	CO
SCHNEEMANN	2 Lt	2 Co 118 GR	CO



S E C R E T

SCHNEID	2 Lt	3 Co 953 GR	CO
SCHNEIDER	Capt	953 GR	Ex Off
SCHREIBER	2 Lt	8 Co 477 GR	CO
SCHROEDER	Capt	361 Fus Co	CO
SCHROEDER	Maj	815 AA Bn	CO (MIA)
SCHUETZE	Capt	15 Co 12 SS Mountain Regt	CO
SCHULZ	Maj	477 GR	CO
SCHULZ	Capt	I Bn 481 GR	CO
SCHULZ	2 Lt	6 Co 481 GR	CO
SCHUSTER	2 Lt	1 Co Battle Group OBERRHEIN	CO
SENGER	2 Lt	I Bn Hq Regt XII/1	CO
SESSLER	Maj	361 Arty Regt, IV Bn	CO
SEYBT	1 Lt	Hq Co Regt XII/1	CO
SPITZEL	2 Lt	2 Co 256 GR	CO
SPRUESSEL	1 Lt	3 Btry 257 Arty Regt	CO
STAMMLE	1 Lt	II Bn 951 GR	CO
STANEK	2 Lt	7 Co 457 GR	CO
STEFANS	1 Lt	2 Co VII Bn E-V	CO
STEINLER	1 Lt	3 Co 220 Pz Eng Bn	CO
STRALLER	2 Lt	6 Co 456 GR	CO
STREPP	Col	165 GR	CO
TENNENBERGER	Maj	I Bn 155 Pz Arty Regt	CO
TESCH	2 Lt	3 Co 104 Repl Bn	CO
THIEM	2 Lt	1 Co 937 GR	CO
THINNIS	2 Lt	6 Co 952 GR	CO
TIGGES	Capt	I Bn 953 GR	CO (KIA 3 Jan)
TOTHFISCHER	2 Lt	II Bn 1127 GR	Adj
TUROWSKI	1 Lt ?	5 Co 125 PGR	CO
VOLLMANN	2 Lt	7 Co 192 PGR	CO
VOSS	?	953 GR	MO
WAGEMANN	1 Lt	II Bn ROTC XII WIESSEBADEN	CO
WALLICH	1 Lt	1 Btry 155 Pz Arty Regt	CO
WALTER	1 Lt	2 Co 506 SS PG Bn	CO
WANGENMANN	2 Lt	6 Co 476 GR	CO
WEHREN	2 Lt ?	II Bn 951 GR	CO (?)
WEILANDT	2 Lt	953 GR	In Off
WESHOFFER	S/Sgt	1 Co 361 Fd Repl Bn	CO
WIEDEMANN	2 Lt	5 Co 951 GR	CO (PW)
WIMMER	1 Lt	Battle Group WIMMER (1120 GR)	CO
WOJKE	2 Lt	2 Co 6 SS Ren Bn	CO
ZANK	2 Lt	2 Co 481 GR	CO
ZIMMERMANN	Capt	6 SS Mountain Ren Bn	CO
ZUEKUM (?)	2 Lt	8 Co 457 GR	CO
ZWERS	1 Lt	115 PG Tng Bn (Bn PIRMSENS)	CO



SECRET

SECRET
:Auth: CG VI Corps:
:Initials: JH:
:Date: 14 Jan 1945:
:

Copy No

37

- G-2 PERIODIC REPORT -

No 152

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000.

FROM: 130001A
TO : 132400A
HQ VI CORPS
140800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- Enemy front lines. Generally no change. See G-2 Report No 149.
- Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Raid E of ILE NAPOLEON (V-7407) repulsed. Strong patrol activity vic V-7659 reported. Arty fell on BENFELD (V-8974), SAND (V-9176), HUTTENHEIM (V-8873) and AMMERSCHWIHR (V-6647). KAYSERBERG (V-6549) received harassing 170mm fire. Inf and arty concentration reported in woods vic V-9275. Considerable number of enemy supported by arty reported attempting to cross ILL River vic V-9276. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 305 as of 132400A).

XV Corps. No enemy contact reported during period. Arty light, harassing on forward elements. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 305 as of 132400A).


XXI Corps. Sector generally quiet. Train carrying pontoons vic Q-357670 at 1515A reported destroyed by arty. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 305 as of 132400A).

VI Corps. The principal action took place on the center of the Corps front where enemy Inf and tanks continued to offer stiff opposition and limited aggressive action in both RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) and HATTEN (R-1833). The enemy still occupied a small part of the former town but counterattacks launched late in the afternoon and at 2115A were both repulsed with hvy losses inflicted on the enemy. Hvy fighting also continued in HATTEN but contact was made with our troops which had been previously cut off. On the Corps W flank, the enemy offered stiff resistance to our advances S and SE of ALTHORN (Q-7540) and vic LE FORLENKOPF (Q-7838). Shelling was light to moderate and decreased from the previous period. A considerable number of hostile a/c were over the Corps area on bombing, strafing and ren missions.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Armored activity continued hvy in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area where the enemy employed some 15 tanks in support of Inf defenses and in a hvy counterattack launched at 2115A. In this counterattack the enemy employed flame-throwing tanks indicating the close-in fighting and tenacious efforts of the enemy to maintain his hold on RITTERSHOFFEN and HATTEN. The employment of armor, in night attacks, is becoming a favorite with the enemy, possibly with the belief that our anti-tank defenses will be partially neutralized during darkness, however the enemy lost eight tanks destroyed during this action. Throughout the period, the enemy lost 14 tanks destroyed, one SP destroyed, three tanks and two SPs damaged. Reports of a bridge being guarded, intact, at INGOLSHEIM, along with recent tank movement in this area, would indicate a possible preparation for an armored attack. No activity was reported in the bridgehead. In the zone of the 45th Div, some tanks and SPs were active throughout the period. A train carrying tanks, was taken under attack in vic NEUSTADT (R-3285), by our dive bombers with 7 tanks reported damaged. Tanks destroyed during period 14; damaged or disabled 12; tanks destroyed since 1 Jan 68; damaged or disabled 30.

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(2) Arty. The volume of shelling decreased probably due to the enemy's desire to conserve ammunition after the heavy expenditure of previous periods together with improved visibility allowing maximum use of AOPs. Positions N of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) were occasionally harassed by light caliber guns from the MOUTERHOUSE area. The bulk of the shelling in the Corps zone again fell in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area as light and medium guns vic OBERSEEBACH -- TRIMBACH supported ground troops. Morning activity was light but increased during the afternoon with the heaviest concentration of the period consisting of 100 rds placed in the RITTERSHOFFEN area shortly after noon. Fifty rds light caliber harassing fire fell in ROHRWILLER (R-1217) from guns E of RHINE and was only actively reported from the bridgehead. A heavy gun placed 4 rds vic PFAFFENNOFFEN (Q-9027) early in the morning and an unspecified number of heavy shells in the WEYERSHEIM (R-0512) area.

(3) Aviation. A total of 31 hostile aircraft appeared over the Corps area on bombing, strafing and reconnaissance missions between the hours of 1209A and 1639A. Over half of these aircraft were of the jet-propelled type. Between 1209A and 1308A, 9 Me-262s, 3 FW-190s and 2 Me-109s entered the Corps area and oriented themselves near SOULTZ (R-1137). Three HE bombs were dropped vic NIEDERBETSCHDORF (R-1433), three HE bombs vic SOULTZ, six AP bombs at R-120330 and AP bombs vic WALBOURG (R-0432). A white smoke burst was observed at R-130330 and this may have been used to mark a target. At 1314A, 3 Me-262s flying extremely fast dropped one HE bomb vic SOULTZ and two S of HATTEN. At 1543A, 3 additional Me-262s dropped three 500-lb bombs and many AP bombs vic WIMMENAU (Q-7634). At 1609A, 3 Me-262s and 2 FW-190s flew over the Corps right flank and one plane circled GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) for 9 minutes. Other planes of this flight dropped two HE bombs vic R-1232. At the same time, 6 P-47s were engaged by HAA and LAA as they bombed and strafed vic MORSBRONN (R-0034). One Me-262 is claimed destroyed but the wreckage has not yet been found. The increased enemy air activity is probably the result of our increased armored activity in the center of the Corps front.

(4) Engr. Enemy attempts to repair the bridge at R-180348 were taken under artillery fire. A can of corned beef and two US helmets were found booby trapped with AT mines vic Q-768383. AP mines were discovered behind our front lines along the road vic Q-787383 and had apparently been laid by a night patrol.


(5) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy remained on the defensive throughout the period and continued to offer stubborn opposition to our advance on Division flank. In the area S and SE of ALTHORN (Q-7540) and vic the high ground LE FORLENKOPF, the enemy made some withdrawals under the pressure of bitter fighting. The enemy employed heavy mortar and artillery defensive fires in this area throughout the day. During the morning, the enemy group which had infiltrated through our lines and cut the road vic Q-824371 was eliminated. After dark, an undetermined number of enemy raided and overran our outpost line vic Q-793385 and immediately turned two captured MGs on our positions. A fire fight developed when our troops attempted to retake this position.

79th Inf Div. The enemy remained relatively inactive throughout the period. Enemy in positions along the canal SW of HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) engaged our troops with sporadic long range SA fire during the morning. During the afternoon, a 7-man enemy patrol was observed moving N from PFAFFENHEIM (R-2128) and other patrols were active vic R-1416 but made no attempt to cross the MODER River. Our patrols reported DENGOLSHEIM (R-1821), MALHUNDEN (R-1819) and ROESCHWOOG (R-2225) clear but the enemy engaged our night patrols vic R-123156 with MG fire and opened fire on our patrol at R-133164 with heavy weapons.

- 2 -

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14th Armd Div. The enemy was aggressively defensive in the RITTERSHOFFEN -- HATTEN area and continued to contest our advances with very hvy and bitter fighting throughout the period. In RITTERSHOFFEN, the enemy was forced to make some withdrawals but still maintained a hold on a small portion of the town including the church. As the house to house fighting progressed, every type weapon was employed including SA, MG, mortar, flakwagons, tanks, SPs and flame-throwers. At approx 1700A, the enemy launched a 60-man counterattack on the town from the N, however this effort was easily dispersed and hvy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. Shortly after dark, a 12-man patrol was destroyed as it attempted to infiltrate into the town from the NE. This action culminated in a strong Inf counterattack supported by tanks launched from HATTEN at 2115A. This attack was dispersed after two hours of hvy fighting and the enemy suffered many casualties including eight tanks destroyed. Hvy fighting also continued in HATTEN and although our armor had the town virtually surrounded, the enemy managed to infiltrate vehicles into the town from the E. Our troops which had been cut off in town were contacted and reinforced during the afternoon. At 2350A, enemy Inf and tanks were reported moving NE from HATTEN.

(6) Motor Movement. Light normal motor movement was observed over the entire Corps front with the only movement of note observed being 12 MT moving S from PIRMASENS (Q-9067).

(7) RR Movement. On the Route SPEYER (R-5180) -- LANDAU (R-2866) approx 115 cars were observed, the largest train consisting of 65 cars moving W into LANDAU from vic R-3068. On the axis NEUSTADT (R-3084) -- LANDAU, three trains totalling approx 68 cars were seen, however, only movement was one train of 18 cars, loaded with armored vehicles, in a westerly direction.

(8) River Traffic. A total of 53 barges averaging 75-100 ft long were observed on the RHINE River between KARLSRUHE (R-5047) and MANNHEIM (R-5500). E of LAUTERBOURG vic R-340400, two barges 100 ft long were seen crossing W on the river and an air OP observed a boat moving W across the river vic R-154118 at 1100A.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

5 fr Hq 456 GR	1 fr I Bn 466 GR
40 fr I Bn 456 GR	1 fr Hq 477 GR
3 fr II Bn 456 GR	8 fr II Bn 477 GR
1 fr 13 Co 456 GR	1 fr 13 Co 477 GR
4 fr 14 Co 456 GR	1 fr II Bn 11 SS Mtn Regt
2 fr I Bn 476 GR	7 fr I Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt
1 fr Hq 481 GR	1 fr II Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt
49 fr II Bn 481 GR	1 fr 6 Btry 6 SS AR
1 fr 14 Co 481 GR	3 fr I Bn Fortr Regt XII/1
2 fr I Bn 952 GR (stragglers)	2 fr 38 GAF Fortr Bn
6 fr III Bn 361 AR	140

Total PWs captured by 45th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,086

79th Inf Div

3 fr Bn MAYER	1 fr 125 Ren Bn (not 25 Ren Bn as previously
1 fr 109 Repl Bn	9 deserters and unidentified (rptd)
	14

Total PWs captured by 79th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,788



S E C R E T

14th Armd Div

2 fr II Bn 125 PGR
1 fr I Bn 192 PGR

1 fr I Bn 119 PGR
1 deserter
5

Total PWs captured by 14th AD in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,017

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 132400A:	159
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945:	2,477
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY:	60,665

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report 145.

Discussion

There has recently been a considerable number of PW and civilian statements which indicate the possibility of a general offensive against both XV Corps and VI Corps beginning 15 Jan. These reports have not been substantiated conclusively by either Tac/R or photo coverage but intelligence from these sources during the corresponding period have been very scarce due to weather restriction.

The 103d Div captured a PW vic LIXING (Q-4662) on 3 Jan who stated that a SS NCO had recently arrived to look over the ground for occupation of his troops.

On 8 Jan, a PW reported that all civilians had been banned from the forest N of FORBACH (Q-4065) and that a SS Div was to launch an attack in this area on 15 Jan.

The 106th Cav Gp also captured a PW, 8 Jan, who stated that 200 troops in the CLARENTHAL (Q-3870) area were to be used in an attack soon.

On 10 Jan, the 106th Cav Gp captured a PW who reported a group of SS soldiers had come to inspect their positions vic PETIT ROSELLE.

A civilian came through the front lines and reported he had seen 26 tanks parked in SAARBRUCKEN on 4 Jan and many troops wearing black uniforms. This could not be confirmed by agents which had been in the town on the 6th and 8th of Jan.

On 11 Jan, a civilian reported 600-700 troops in the woods N of FORBACH.

On 12 Jan, Tac/R observed approx 1300 troops and 150 vehicles including some armor converging on SAARBRUCKEN.


A PW from the 12 SS Mtn Regt captured 14 Jan by 45th Inf Div stated the 11 SS Mtn Regt is presently in reserve and will attack on 15 Jan.

PW captured by 14th Armd Div stated paratroopers were in RITTERSHOFFEN and that at least one Regt was present in this general area. This was confirmed in part by a civilian report that 350 paratroopers had relieved elements of the 25 PG Div in the RITTERSHOFFEN area 14 Jan.

In view of the strong attacks against VI Corps since 1 Jan and the recent identifications of both the 21 Pz and 25 PG Divs in the WISSEMBOURG - SELTZ area, a general attack in the near future remains a strong enemy capability.

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LANGEVIN
G-2

S E C R E T



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Copy No 71

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG VI Corps:
: Initials: *JK* :
: Date: 15 Jan 1945:

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 153

FROM: 140001A

TO : 142400A

HQ VI CORPS

150800A JAN 45

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. See Overlay, Incl No 1.

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Para 3a below.

REIPERTSWILLER Salient. Some reshuffling continues to characterize enemy's units in the REIPERTSWILLER Salient. The I Bn, 456 GR and II Bn, 476 GR are being identified on or W of the 82 Easting, representing a further westward shift of the 256 VG Div. Farther to the W the 506 SS PG Bn remains in rest while more of the II Bn, 12 SS Mtn Regt is being identified in line. Only 5 PWs have been taken from the 11 SS Mtn Regt, from its 7 and 15 Cos. Hence, although some elements of the 11 SS Mtn Regt may be in line the bulk of it remains in reserve. The capture of PWs from the 952 GR may indicate that one Regt of this Div (361 VG Div) remains in line but may have moved to a more quiet sector farther E.


38 Fortress Bn. Only 1 and 2 Cos of this Bn seem to have arrived in the VI Corps zone where they occupy positions in the vic of BAERENTHAL. The Bn had been committed in the vic of SAARLAUTERN until about 3 January. The 1 and 2 Cos each are about 100-120 strong; the 1, 2 and 3 Cos being rifle Cos and the 4 Co a hvy Co, all Cos being armed as Inf.

7 Para Div. The constantly recurring accounts of paratroopers operating in the vic of HATTEN seem to have been clarified by the identification of 1 Co, 20 Para Regt, 7 Para Div. This is a comparatively new formation. PW claimed that his unit had arrived in vic of HATTEN on 9 Jan, coming from LANDAU whither they had gone from HOLLAND. Toward the end of September and the early part of October the Regts MENZEL (now 19 Para Regt), GRASMEHL (now 20 Para Regt) and HARDEGG (now 21 Para Regt) of the former BRDMANN Div, which was committed in southeastern HOLLAND, reorganized to form the 7 Para Div. The Div was formed without being withdrawn from the line. Besides the three Para Regts, each of which has three Bns, the Div is thought to have a motorized arty Regt of three Bns, each of which in turn has three batteries of four 105mm gun hows each, making a total of 36 arty pieces. The Div is also stated to have an AT Bn of three Cos each with about seven 75mm AT guns. The Div has had little combat experience but is expected to include a good percentage of jumpers and many veterans of older para formations and to represent the usually high grade of troops found in para units. Preliminary interrogation indicates that the I Bn of the 20 Para Regt has a combat strength of about 400-450. Although only one Co of this formation has actually been identified here it is not improbable that the entire Div, carried unlocated for several weeks, may be destined for this area.

I Bn, Regt XII/1. PWs taken at R-095450 from the 1 Co, XII/1 Regt state that the I Bn of this Regt left the WESTWALL bunkers 4-5 days ago and are now in position in the vic of CLIMBACH (R-0846). According to them some VOLKSSTURM troops remain in the bunkers of the SIEGFRIED Line in that area.

21 Pz Div. Notwithstanding its reverses in the STUNDWILLER and HATTEN areas, the 21 Pz Div has been able to maintain its PG Bns by the assimilation of recently arrived replacements. Thus the 220 Inf Repl Tng Bn, coming from FANE ISLAND, DENMARK, arrived in LANDAU on 28 December, with an estimated 1200 replacements, all of them reportedly Poles. According to a PW from II Bn, 192 PGR, about 75% of these replacements went to the 21 Pz Div and the 25 PG Div refitting their greatly depleted ranks. The rest of the recent arrivals, about 300 strong, are said to form a replacement pool stationed in WISSENBURG.

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Bn MEYER. The Bn MEYER, identified by 3 PWs taken S of DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) is composed of three Cos and has a total reported strength of 250. Its troops came from an NCO School in the vic of WARTENBURG, and, since July, was on security duty in various towns behind the lines in FRANCE. Later committed in the SIEGFRIED Line, on the night of 7-8 January the Bn crossed to the western side of the RHINE where it occupies a position from R-253156 to R-259166, supported by an SS Co (probably a Co of the 2 SS Police Regt).

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Patrols vic KILLSTETT (R-0908) repulsed. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 307).

XV Corps. No enemy activity reported. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 307).

XXI Corps. Sector remained quiet. Train with four cars loaded with pontoons at Q-347682 fired upon by arty with unknown results. (Source: Seventh Army Isum No 307).

VI Corps. An aggressive and determined enemy continued the all out defense of HATTEN (R-1833) and RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) in the center of the Corps front while on the W flank the enemy retained a strong defensive attitude all along the nose of the BITCHE Salient. Two counterattacks were launched in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area and two small aggressive actions were reported in the area NW of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037), however, elsewhere along the Corps front the enemy was generally quiet, confining himself to normal patrol activities. Some reinforcement or relief of the hostile forces in HATTEN was apparent with identification of the 1st Co 20 Para Regt. The stubborn defense of this town during the past few days may be explained in part by the fact that the enemy was trying to effect this relief prior to fresh offensive action. The I Bn XII/1 was identified in the INGOLSHEIM (R-1441) area which may indicate that elements of the 245 Div have been withdrawn and assembled in reserve for future offensive action. Enemy arty activity continued light to moderate but some decrease in volume was noted in the HATTEN area. Several jet propelled air craft were again active over the central part of the Corps area engaged in bombing and strafing missions.

b. Operations of component elements.

(1) AAA. An estimated 12 searchlights were reported operating during the night 14-15 January in the vic of STEINSELTZ (R-1445). It is not known if the enemy was employing these lights as "artificial moonlight" to aid his night operations and confuse our troops, or if he was using the lights as an anti-aircraft measure. Preliminary study of photo coverage of 14 Jan shows a build up of AA emplacements in the LAUTERBOURG area. Also seen were positions for eight 3-gun AA batteries in the OFFENDORF (R-1312) area. Our air OPs operating over this area throughout the day drew no fire however, which indicates that the enemy either does not have his guns in position as yet, or that he does not wish to fire to disclose his positions. The build up of AA positions however, indicates the importance the enemy places on this area.

(2) Armor. Activity was generally lighter throughout the period, probably due to recent losses, which has undoubtedly affected the enemy's armored capabilities. In the zone of the 79th Div, approx 10-15 tanks, some reported mounting flame-throwers, were employed by the enemy in two Inf-tank counterattacks against RITTERSHOFFEN at 1415A and HATTEN at 2210A. One tank was reported destroyed in this action. In the HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) area, 3 tanks were observed, taken under fire, and 2 tanks reported destroyed. Our dive bombers report the damaging of 4 enemy tanks during the day. Tanks destroyed during period - 3. Damaged or disabled - 4. Tanks destroyed since 1 Jan - 71. Damaged or disabled - 34.



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(3) Arty. Forward elements in the SARREINSBURG -- ALTHORN -- WILDEN-GUTH -- OBERMUEHLTHAL (Q-8439) area were moderately harassed during the day by light guns including some 75mm Inf Hows and medium caliber guns firing from vic MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942) and BAEKENITHAL (Q-8342). There was some decrease noted in the shelling of the HATTEN area; however, RITTERSHOFFEN was moderately shelled during the morning and early afternoon. Delayed reports of the previous period indicate 40 rds from two heavy caliber guns fell in RITTERSHOFFEN and indicate that the enemy will employ his hvy caliber guns on forward positions if the situation warrants. Shelling was light in the area SE of BISCHWILLER (R-0818) with harassing fire falling in DRUSENHEIM (R-1517), ROHRWILLER (R-1217) and on the road between BISCHWILLER and ROHRWILLER. Nightly harassing fire was light and scattered with 280mm gun again reported active, firing 15 rds into HAGUENAU.


(4) Aviation. Several enemy a/c were active during the day with the majority of planes continuing to be jet propelled type, employed in bombing and strafing missions. At 0900A, approx 8 Me-262s were over the general areas of WALBURG (R-0332) and OBERBETSCHDORF (R-1333). Both HE and AP bombs were reported dropped from altitudes varying from 6,000 to 8,000 feet. At 1100A, one Me-109 flying at 2,000 feet was reported on a recon mission vic Q-9223. At 1124A, an estimated 5 Me-262s were reported over the same general area as those earlier in the morning. Bombs were reported dropping vic R-0832, R-0734 and R-0535. Strafing of WALBURG and the WALBURG -- BIBLISHEIM (R-0433) road was also reported. No claims by our AA were made on the above aircraft but in many of the engagements LAA was seen to hit the target and smoke was emitted from at least three of the planes. In the afternoon at 1508A, two Me-262s dropped one cluster of AP bombs vic R-1233. LAA hits on the planes were observed but with no apparent damage. At 1537A, one Me-109 bombed and strafed vic R-1233 and AP and HE bombs fell in vic R-1136. Planes were reported hit by light AA with no apparent damage.

(5) CWS. In the past few days fighting in HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN, the enemy has been reported using several flame throwing tanks. PWs state, however, that in some instances the flame throwers are not mounted on the tanks themselves, but are the portable type and are operated by individual soldiers riding on tanks or half-tracks.

(6) Engrs. The 45th Div reports the enemy using an increased number of mines and booby traps in the nose of the BITCHE salient. A minefield was also reported between R-096117 and R-098121. On the road from Q-830367 to Q-837360 Engrs lifted 44 freshly laid Tellermines and found a stockpile of 15 mines. These mines were freshly laid and were not yet frozen in. The road had been swept the previous day. The bridge at INGOLSHEIM (Q-147418) was reported by air OP as being good only for foot troops because of shell holes in each end of the structure and vehicles approaching from the N were reported to have had to turn around at the stream. Bridge at R-179349 is only a foot bridge. Recent photo coverage of 14 January 1945 show eight ferry sites between GAMBESHEIM and DRUSENHEIM. A cable ferry was reported operating between R-234213 and R-233211 on an hourly schedule.

(7) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy continued to offer strong resistance to our attack in the area SARREINSBURG (Q-7441), ALTHORN (Q-7540), WILDEN-GUTH (Q-7837), OBERMUEHLTHAL (Q-8439) throughout the period. The enemy was reported well dug in and employed all Inf weapons while placing hvy mortar and arty fire on our forward elements. Twice during the period the enemy became aggressive. A counterattack of Co strength was launched vic Q-745385 but was repulsed about 1545A. Just after dark an estimated 100-150 enemy attempted to infiltrate S across the road at Q-774386. Hvy casualties were believed inflicted on this force by friendly arty and mortar fire and the sector became quiet by 2300A. Enemy activity on the remainder of the Div front was negligible, however, patrols reported dug-in positions NE of PHILIPPSBURG (Q-8742), vic Q-888444 to Q-891432.



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79th Inf Div. The enemy was fairly quiet during the period with patrol contacts being the principal activity reported. The enemy continued to guard the bridge at INGOLSHHEIM (R-1441) and PWs taken from the town identified the I Bn XII/1 who stated they were used as outposts and for patrols. Enemy OPs were also reported on the edge of GROSSENWALD Woods (R-1344). S along the RHINE River out troops occupied ROESCHWOOG (R-2125) and KAUFFENHEIM (R-2128) without enemy opposition. Enemy patrols however, engaged our patrols vic R-201217 and R-216300 while another patrol was active vic R-210294. The enemy placed MG fire on our patrol which crossed into the S part of DRUSSENHEIM (R-1518) in the afternoon. The only aggressive action by the enemy was in the vic of R-105145 when an early morning combat patrol attempted to probe our positions but was driven back.

14th Armd Div. The enemy continued his stubborn and determined defense of HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN throughout the period. Bitter house to house fighting raged in both towns with the enemy employing all Inf weapons and supported by tanks, SPs, arty and flame throwers. During the afternoon, enemy Inf supported by tanks launched a counterattack in RITTERSHOFFEN which reached the church area where it was reported contained, but fierce fighting continued. NE of HATTEN an estimated Bn of enemy were reported dug-in along the N bank of a river between R-179344 and R-171348, and enemy was also reported in vic of pillbox at R-185327. During the afternoon, our Inf was halted in HATTEN vic R-176337 by enemy fire and about 2200A, using Inf and tanks, the enemy counterattacked, forcing our troops to withdraw from the northern part of the town. At the close of the period the attack was reported contained. The enemy has apparently relieved or reinforced his units in HATTEN with elements of the 7th Para Div since 1 Co, 20th Para Regt was identified in the fighting.

(8) Motor movements. Movement observed by Tac/R during the day was relatively light in enemy rear areas, and indicated nothing more than normal supply traffic. Motor movement reported in forward areas was principally in the area N and E of the HAGUENAU Forest. This movement was reported as hvy after dark and was probably concerned with the fighting in HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN and with the enemy positions along the W bank of the RHINE River, where in both places the enemy is believed to be relieving, reinforcing and supplying his troops.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div


3 fr III Bn 11 SS Mtn Regt	1 fr I Bn 952 GR
1 fr I Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	1 fr II Bn 952 GR
20 fr II Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	1 fr 257 AT Bn
2 fr I Bn 456 GR	1 fr 51 GAF Bn
29 fr I Bn 476 GR	26 deserters and unidentified
2 fr I Bn 937 GR	87

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,173

79th Inf Div

3 fr I Bn 192 PGR	1 fr I Bn 2 SS Police Regt
2 fr II Bn 192 PGR	2 fr I Bn Fortr Regt XII/1
2 fr I Bn 119 PGR	1 fr BG MOLTKE (192 PGR)
1 fr 25 AT Bn	4 deserters and unidentified
	16

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,804



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14th Armd Div 2 fr I Bn 192 PGR

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,019

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 142400A: 105

Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 2,582

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 60,770

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. To attack in the direction:

- (1) LAUTERBOURG (R-3242) -- HAGUENAU (R-0424).
- (2) BITCHE (Q-7750) -- HAGUENAU.
- (3) BITCHE -- SAVERNE (Q-7215).

b. To make diversionary attack in the direction:

- (1) GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) -- HAGUENAU.
- (2) GAMBSHEIM -- STRASBOURG.

c. To attack in two or more of the above directions simultaneously.

Discussion

In what appeared at first to be a determined effort to pin down all VI Corps troops and those of adjacent Corps to prevent their movement N to the ARDENNES salient, the enemy launched strong attacks on the first day of the new year. The principal effort of these attacks came in the HARDT Mountains and in the GROS REDERCHING -- ACHEN area in the zone of the XV Corps. Some success having been gained in the mountains SE of BITCHE by the 361, 256, 257 VG Divs and elements of 559 VG Div, the enemy continued the attack, throwing in the 6 SS Mtn Div, recently arrived from NORWAY. It appeared that he was attempting to exploit the penetration his initial attack had achieved by a breakthrough, either turning to the W to link up with other troops attacking W of BITCHE (Q-7750) or turning E to force an opening into the ALSACE Plain. As the attack developed, it became apparent that a breakthrough could not be effected W of BITCHE, therefore the enemy attempted to exploit his initial success in the mountains with a view of clearing the mountain passes so that the 21 Pz and 25 PG Divs could debouche into the ALSACE Plain. The development of the salient was accompanied by a shift of the 257 VG Div and elements of the 19 Inf Div to the W flank of the penetration, and a move of the 36 VG Div to BAERENTHAL -- PHILIPPSBOURG sector while the 256 VG Div shifted further SW into the salient. From DAMBACH (Q-9244) to the RHINE, the 245 Inf Div and miscellaneous units were holding and patrolling though there was little firm contact with organic elements of this Div which suggests that it may be regrouping for offensive action.

When the drive in the mountain salient was halted and in some cases thrown back thereby containing the attack in terrain unsuitable for operation of armor, the enemy again changed his plans and to keep the initiative he moved his mobile Divs (21 Pz and 25 PG) to the WISSEMBOURG -- LAUTERBOURG area. Attacks were made from E to W in vic of HATTEN, and, though they met with some initial success, they were not well coordinated (probably due to an under estimation of our strength in that area). In the meantime, local attacks continued in the salient in what appeared to be an effort to hold our troops in place, improve positions, and retain the initiative. A crossing of the RHINE and establishment of a bridgehead in the DRUSENHEIM -- GAMBSHEIM area was accomplished by the infiltration of strong patrols and a gradual build-up by troops under control of 553 and 405 Divs.

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Though the initial enemy plan may have been solely for the purpose of pinning down VI Corps and adjacent troops, it became apparent as the attack progressed that a more comprehensive plan was developing, which involved possibly the recapture of STRASBOURG and retaking of the ALSACE Plain. The attack N out of the COIMAR bridgehead appears to be a part of the plan to link up with the forces pressing down on VI Corps from the N and reports to the effect that HIMMLER is in command of this operation lend credence to the apparent and oft repeated enemy intention of reoccupying ALSACE.

Of the 15 divisions believed originally allocated for the operation, the enemy has committed against the VI Corps 9 Divs (245 Inf, 36, 256, 257, 361, 553 VG Divs, 6 SS Mtn Div, 21 Pz Div, 25 PG Div) and elements of three others (19 Inf, 405, 559 VG). However, all of the enemy's attacks have thus far been blunted though, despite quite hvy losses in personnel and armored equipment, the enemy continues with strong limited objective attacks. These appear to be for the purpose of keeping the initiative until such time as additional reinforcements can arrive for more decisive action. In fact, one new Div, the 7 Para, was identified today in the HATTEN area which is a further indication that this may be the area in which the enemy attack will develop. At least one, or possibly two additional Pz Divs (11 Pz or 10 SS Pz), may also be put into the action as well as some units now being withdrawn from the ARDENNES although the new Russian offensive may influence the further commitment of strategic reserves in this sector.

That additional Divs will be committed against VI Corps in a final bid to retake ALSACE is a definite possibility, particularly in view of the rapid deterioration of the German ARDENNES salient. The success of the operation in ALSACE should have a high priority for it would do much to retrieve home morale after defeat in the N and would be a severe blow to Allied prestige. Indeed, PWs reiterate a strong rumor among German troops that a resumption of the offensive on a large scale is expected soon.

Up to the present time, attacks in the mountain salient have not been coordinated with the attacks from the E, but it is expected that if a major attack is launched from the WISSEMBOURG -- LAUTERBOURG area, it will be coordinated with additional attacks in the mountain salient and from the COIMAR bridgehead. If this meets with success in converging on HAGUENAU, further attacks will probably be made from the DRUSENHEIM -- GAMBSHEIM area to recapture STRASBOURG and drive Allied forces W of the VOSGES.

The enemy arty which had been supporting the enemy's attacks is well organized and it is believed a major attack will be supported by approx 13 Bns, consisting of 108 light, 39 medium and four heavy guns.

Enemy air has been increasingly active over VI Corps sector during the past few days particularly in the area N of the HAGUENAU Forest which is some indication that the enemy has offensive intentions in that area. Now that there is less need for offensive enemy air action in the ARDENNES area, it is expected that, weather permitting, maximum air effort will support the launching of a major attack.


For the reasons outlined above, capability c is favored.

Rungworn
 LANGEVIN
 G-2

1 Incl - Overlay

- 6 -

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

Copy No 21

- G-2 PERIODIC REPORT -

SECRET
:Auth: CG VI Corps:
:Initials: JEL:
:Date: 16 Jan 1945:
:

No 154

FROM: 150001A
TO : 152400A
HQ VI CORPS
160800A JAN 45

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change, see G-2 Report No 153.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

6 SS Mtn Div. A PW from the 476 GR captured vic Q-803384 reports that the eastern flank of the 6 SS Mtn Div has been narrowed by a relief of one of its units. A prisoner from the I Bn 477 GR was captured vic Q-7738 and would indicate that elements on the western flank of the 6 SS Mtn Div had also been relieved. Apparently the Div front is being narrowed and it is possible that the entire Div is being withdrawn from the line for commitment elsewhere.

36 VG Div. Prisoners captured vic Q-8542 identify the I Bn 118 GR indicating that that Regt has side-slipped SW from its original positions N of PHILIPPSBOURG. The tentative identifications of the 36 Fus Co and the 165 VGR in the DAMBACH -- PHILIPPSBOURG area are further indications that the 36 VG Div is now entirely on our front, holding a sector generally astride the PHILIPPSBOURG -- EQUELSHARDT road.

22 Pz Regt (21 Pz Div). According to a PW from the 2 Co, 22 Pz Regt, a part of his Co was in action as Inf in the vic of SAARLAUTERN for several days just before Christmas. PW and several other men from his unit were ordered to report to a tank repair shop in KAISERSLAUTERN to receive a Mark IV Tank which was being overhauled there. At KAISERSLAUTERN these men were told to proceed with their tank to HATTEN where they were to join the II Bn but on their arrival there were told by an unknown officer that the situation was critical and ordered by him to join several Panther tanks in the vicinity in the attack already underway against HATTEN. PW insisted that the II Bn, 22 Pz Regt includes the 2, 5 and 8 Cos but had no knowledge of its armored strength. It seems clear, in any case, that the 22 Pz Regt was involved in the HATTEN attack and that its II Bn may have rejoined the Regt once more. Regt CO is given as Lt Col WOLF, CO II Bn as Major von GOTTBERG.

1151 and 1152 Army Arty Bns (HEERESARTILLERIE ABTEILUNG). A PW taken in the vic of HATTEN from 1 Btry, 1152 Army Arty Bn mentions the presence in that area of the 1151 and 1152 GHQ Army Arty Bns. Each of these Bns is reported to have 3 btries of 3-150mm howitzers drawn by 8-ton trucks. PW states that his unit had been in BITCHE at the time of the attack on 31 Dec but did not participate in it. This, together with the statement of PW that his Bn was attached to the 119 Regt (119 PGR?) (25 PG Div was out of line in the BITCHE area at the time) and the known deficiency of the 25 PG Div in organic arty suggests that, not unlike the 5 Tank Bn, these arty Bns are attached to and ordinarily provide hvy weapons support for the Div.

c. Arty. Organic arty in the WISSENBURG -- SELTZ area is reinforced by at least two medium GHQ arty Bns, namely the 1151 and 1152. Photos of 14 Jan, which covered only the eastern portion of the Corps front, reveal that field arty locations are mainly in the R-1942 square near FROHNACKERSHOF and in the area of the railway and forest immediately SE of WISSENBURG. In this latter area five field or SP btries and one LP btry are seen.

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2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Patrol activity vic BENFELD (V-8975) and OSTHOUSE (V-8878). Harassing arty on SELESTAT (V-7963), ERSTEIN (V-9481), RIBEAUVILLE (V-6955) and ORBEY (V-5848). (Source: Seventh Army Isum 309 as of 152400A).

XV Corps. Sector remained quiet with only light patrol activity reported. Considerable vehicular activity heard vic BLIESBRUCK (Q-5957). (Source: Seventh Army Isum 309 as of 152400A).

XXI Corps. Sector generally quiet. Undetermined number tracked vehicles reported entering QETTING (Q-4064) at 1835A brought under fire 1930 with unknown results. (Source: Seventh Army Isum 309 as of 152400A).

VI Corps. Hvy fighting continued in HATTEN throughout the period as a result of two strong enemy attacks. The enemy was also aggressive on the Corps W flank but remained quiet in the DRUSENHEIM -- GAMBSHEIM area. The first attack in HATTEN started at 0545A and the other was launched at approx 1500. Both offensives were supported by armor and were only repulsed after bitter fighting. Close contact was maintained across the front of the salient on the Corps W flank. A strong counterattack launched vic Q-815394 at mid-afternoon was repulsed as were two local probing actions between PHILIPPESBOURG and DAMBACH. Shelling was light to moderate with the bulk of the fire falling on Inf positions vic REIPERTSWILLER and in the HATTEN area.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) AA. Concentrations of both hvy and light flak are seen on photos of 14 Jan around WINZENBACH (R-2637), NEEWEILLER (R-2839) and particularly LAUTERBOURG (R-3141); as these three places are all connected by the same highway it seems that this is probably a main supply route. Other flak btries are located E of WISSEMBOURG, on the W bank of the river at GERMERSHEIM (R-4669), and a large concentration of light flak is seen vic the village of OEFFENDORF (R-1312) in the bridgehead area. Further flak btries, some unoccupied, are seen close to the ferry sites at R-154119 and R-169139.

(2) Armor. An undetermined amount of enemy armor supported the two offensives launched in the HATTEN area at 0545A and 1500A. In the bitter house to house fighting in this town several tanks employed their flame throwers. Armored activity was again light in the bridgehead area where one enemy tank was destroyed by bazooka fire. On the Corps W flank, 2 tanks harassed forward elements with light fire. Two tanks were destroyed during the period bringing the total destroyed figures since 1 Jan 45 up to 73.

(3) Arty. Shelling was moderate and scattered on forward elements in the left zone from daylight to mid-morning. Little activity was reported during the afternoon from guns previously active firing into SARREINSBERG -- WILDEGUTH area, but moderate missions were placed on Inf positions NE of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037). In the HATTEN area, KUHLENDORF (R-1335) was the target for medium guns during the morning, probably medium GHQ arty Bns recently identified from PW statements. Hvy caliber guns firing from the N placed harassing fire in the communication centers of MERTZWILLER (Q-9629), ZINSWILLER (Q-8935) and MUHLHAUSEN (Q-8631) soon after daylight. Recent photos indicate position areas vic WISSEMBOURG and LICHTENAU (R-2014) while other known gun areas were either not covered or the quality of photographs was very poor.

(4) Engrs. All the RHINE River crossings N of STRASBOURG are covered by photos of 14 Jan. Between GAMBSHEIM and DRUSENHEIM, six ferry sites are located at R-123082, R-141104, R-147111, R-154119, R-164132, R-169139. The concentrations of light flak in the vicinity suggests that the sites at R-154119 and R-169139 are those most heavily used.

73
35
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(S)



S E C R E T

(5) Inf

45th Inf Div. The enemy remained in close contact along the front line in the salient and during the afternoon became aggressive and launched one strong counterattack and two probing attacks at scattered points across the Div front. During the morning, our patrols and OPs reported small scattered groups moving behind the lines. However, the ALTHORN -- WILDENGUTH area was relatively inactive and the enemy was apparently consolidating positions to a new eastern boundary after relief of unknown elements of the 6 SS Mtn Div. Further E vic Q-803384, the I Bn 476 GR was identified indicating that this flank of the 6 SS Mtn Div had also been shortened. At 1620A, the enemy launched a strong counterattack with hvy mortar and arty support vic Q-815394. This effort was dispersed after a stiff fight but hvy mortar and arty fire continued to fall on our forward troops and, although there were indications that the enemy would continue his aggressive action, there were no further developments. In the area between PHILIPPSBOURG and DARBACH, enemy local attacks vic Q-915435 at 1315A and vic Q-893435 at 1600A, were both repulsed and hvy losses inflicted. After dark, enemy patrol attempting to infiltrate our positions vic Q-818393 was dispersed by SA and MG fire. The enemy engaged our patrol with hvy SA fire as it approached vic Q-865393.

79th Inf Div. The enemy remained relatively inactive across the entire Div front. During the morning, an enemy patrol working along the stream at R-170358 and a small group between the canal and R-091133 were dispersed by arty and mortar fire. Our patrol to vic R-167352 encountered and killed two enemy who identified the 4 Co, 192 PGR. In the afternoon, an undetermined number of enemy were observed on bicycles vic R-113443. Our night patrols drew MG fire vic R-209313 and R-200312 but another patrol reached R-115458 without contact.

14th Armd Div. The enemy continued aggressive and launched two strong attacks in an effort to dislodge our troops in HATTEN. The first attack jumped off at 0545A and was supported by four or five tanks and some of this armor was equipped with flame throwers. This attack was contained at 0645A after hvy fighting. During the morning, considerable movement of personnel vic R-171345 and behind the ridge N of HATTEN was taken under arty fire. At approx 1500A, the enemy resumed the attack on HATTEN from the E. The enemy initially employed an estimated Inf Bn and several tanks but this force was later reinforced and very bitter fighting continued until our counterattack had regained the main CR vic R-179335 just before midnight. However, the enemy is still entrenched in basements vic R-178332 and holds a strongpoint at R-178332. Enemy troops were fairly quiet in RITTERSHOFFEN but at 1730A started a short fire fight which was supplemented by increased mortar and arty fire.

(6) Motor Movements. Ground observers heard motor movement in the woods vic R-1932 at noon, and some vehicular movement was heard in the southern portion of DRUSENHEIM. Shortly after dusk, personnel and vehicular movement vic BAERENTHAL was dispersed by mortar fire. On the center of the Corps front, MT movement was reported going from BUHL (R-2035) towards HATTEN at 2030A and from BUHL to STUNDWILLER (R-1836) at 2330A but traffic was lighter in this area than on previous nights. Some night movement was heard in DRUSENHEIM and HERRLISHEIM at 1900A and motors and tracked vehicles were reported moving from NEUNHOUSEN (R-2525) and FT LOUIS (R-2322) towards ROESCHWOOG (R-2225).

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties


45th Inf Div

1 fr Hq 476 GR	1 fr I Bn 457 GR
6 fr I Bn 476 GR	1 fr I Bn 477 GR
4 fr II Bn 476 GR	2 fr I Bn 118 GR
7 fr II Bn 481 GR	2 fr 3 Btry 6 SS Arty Regt

24

- 3 -

S E C R E T



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Total PWs captured by 45 Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,197

14th Armd Div

3 fr 2 Co 22 Pz Regt	4 fr 2 Co 125 PGR
3 fr 1 Co 20 Para Regt	4 deserters
3 fr Hq Btry 1152 GHQ Arty Bn	<u>17</u>

Total PWs captured by 14 AD in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,036

79th Inf Div

1 fr 8 Co 2 SS Police Regt
<u>4</u> deserters
<u>5</u>

Total PWs captured by 79 Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,813

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 152400A:	46
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945:	2,628
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY:	60,816

b. Enemy supply and equipment. The following translated extract from a captured 361 VG Div administrative order, dated 6 Jan 45, indicates that the enemy intends to continue the use of captured American vehicles in front line units.

"a. Every Regt may retain two captured vehicles and every independent Bn one. Additional vehicles will be reported to G-4.

b. In the case of armored personnel carriers the armament will be reported.

c. Captured trucks may be used by Regts, the number of them to be reported to G-4.

The state of each vehicle, as concerns the damages, must be included in the report."

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES


No change. See G-2 Periodic Report 153.

Langevin

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G-2

1. INCL

1 - Translations of Captured Documents



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46
US ARMY

(B1)

INCLOSURE NO 1

16 JANUARY 1945.

G-2 REPORT NO 154

TRANSLATIONS.

COMBAT NEWS SHEET NO 6.

THE WINTER AND THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY.

The enemy's plan for the year 1944 was to smash us from three fronts.

THESE WERE THE ENEMY'S DEADLINES:

- May: Offensive in Italy
- June - July: Offensive in the East and Invasion in the West.
- August: Breakthrough across Germany's border.
- October: Churchill and Stalin to meet in Berlin.

Today the Anglo-American press acknowledges the following:

1. The Germans do not give up the fight at the Reich frontier. The Germans show just as much resistance against rain, cold, destruction and hardship as they did in Russia in the winter of 1941/42.
2. The Fuehrer's new armament program is no bluff. It exists. It is a reality!

THUS THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REALIZED IN ENGLAND AS WELL AS IN AMERICA:

Once the V-weapons take full effect, once the new German fighter planes and the new German submarines join the battle, the war will take an entirely new turn. Therefore, we must beat the Germans before the new weapons can be fully employed. We must beat them and beat them at any price. If we do not win the war this winter, next spring will be too late - this is a literal quotation from the British press.

WE HAVE COMPLETELY UPSET THE ENEMY'S PLANS, writes Dr. GOEBBELS on 26 November. He is right. For these things were not taken into account in the enemy timetable:

- The unexpected resistance at Germany's borders,
- The revival of V-1, the effect of V-2,
- The necessity for fighting great battles of materiel W of the RHINE river too.


THEREFORE, WHAT IS OUR MISSION AT THE WEST WALL?

The enemy has been attacking the Ruhr and Saar basins since November 16, 1944. As many as three American offensive waves have been beaten off E of Aachen. The reinforcements in German weapons have begun to take effect.

We in Alsace and Lorraine delayed the enemy for two whole months on the approaches to the West Wall. Now he is assaulting the West Wall with the

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intention of breaking through.

OUR MISSION IS:

TO HOLD THE WEST WALL AGAINST ANY ATTACK!

OUR AIM IS:

TO MAKE THE WEST WALL A SECOND VERDUN FOR THE ENEMY! HIS STRENGTH MUST BE BROKEN AT THE WEST WALL!

Every one of us knows that this will be a savage struggle. For the enemy is still superior to us in numbers of men and materiel. Rain and mud are good protection against fighter bombers and tough for the infantryman in the foxhole. But this does not matter now:

HE WHO WEAKENS NOW BETRAYS HIS FAMILY AND THE NATION!

Mail, furlough, Christmas - all these things will come again once the battle has been decided and the enemy beaten. What will not come again is the opportunity of this winter.

THEREFORE: YOU AND I, ALL OF US, HAVE THE SAME WATCHWORD:

BE ALERT! BE DETERMINED! FIGHT! BECAUSE

HE WHO WINS THE WINTER

WINS THE WAR! "

TRANSLATED EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS WRITTEN BY SOLDIERS FROM 7 Co
"STELLUNGSKAMPFGRUPPE" XII/1.

6 Jan 45.

... It's a little quieter now. On Jan 4 we cleared out of two villages again with 14 men. You see, sometimes you get into a jam and later you hardly know how you got out of it. But you have to have a little luck in life and up to now I've had it. When we chased the Americans they had to abandon everything. You should see the stuff they had! It's hard to believe. Chocolate, candy, figs, crackers, sugar and things like that. I'll send you a little package and you'll be amazed. I'll also send you two cakes of good soap for the child. Now I have enough cigarettes for the time being and also a box of cigars. We also have enough meat, cheese and butter - all in cans, which will last us for 2 months at least. It's a shame that we can't get a furlough, we'd be able to take the stuff home. But nothing doing for the time being, and so I'll have to lug it around. I also got a nice new raincoat, which I'll get home one of these days and two pairs of new and two pairs of used socks. You'd be surprised if you could see all that. ...

6 Jan 45.

... How did you spend the holidays and New Year's Eve? We didn't do much inasmuch as we are a new unit and they don't have things organized for amusement yet. We are engaged in very hard fighting again, but have had much success and perhaps it'll all end soon now. ...

6 Jan 45.

... Since the Americans have withdrawn from this sector it happens quite frequently that we are away from our unit for two days when on patrol. We keep on the heels of the Americans. We must do that as those fellows are not bad soldiers either. Most of them are well trained and very cautious. Several of our boys, unfortunately, did not keep their eyes open and lost their lives. Our squad leader is an old infantryman who has had quite a lot of experience. That gives me a feeling of safety and by following him I'll be sure not to make many errors when attacking the enemy. ...



S E C R E T

Copy No 37

: : : : : : : : : :
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG VI Corps:
: Initials: DWD:
: Date: 17 Jan 1945:
: : : : : : : : : :

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 155

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

21 JANV 1945

FROM: 160001A
TO: 162400A
HQ VI CORPS
170800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change. See G-2 Report No 153.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

257 AT Bn (257 VG Div). The equipment of the 2 Co, 257 AT Bn (257 VG Div) with 75mm (t 38) TDs reported by a PW from the 1 Co of that Bn indicates the use of modern TDs by VG Divs and probably explains the frequently reported presence of armor in the REIPERTSWILLER Salient. PW's statement that the 2 Co has 35-40 of these TDs certainly is a great exaggeration but it may well have the new T/BA of 14 as previously reported for GHQ TD units in this area.

165 GR (36 VG Div). PWs from Regtl Hq 165 GR (36 VG Div) taken at Q-92435 confirm the suspected depletion of that Regt. According to them the Regt has only three Cos with a strength of about 70-80 each, all of them constituting part of the I Bn. Statement of PWs that the Regtl CP is at Q-96483 also confirms testimony of PWs from 118 GR that the 165 GR is in position NE of PHILIPPSBOURG and leaves no doubt that the bulk of the 36 VG Div is committed within the VI Corps zone.

XXXIX Pz Corps. An administrative order of the 256 VG Div dated 11 Jan, and giving the location and code names of various supply points, mentions a XXXIX Panzer Corps having a supply point at HOCHSTADT (R-3471). According to our latest information, dated July 1944, this Corps was last reported encircled and isolated W of MINSK (Capital of White RUSSIA) where its commanding general was killed. The appearance of a Panzer Corps whose supply point is about 20 miles N of the VI Corps' right flank suggests that this may be the Hq controlling the 21 Pz and the 25 PG Div and may, in fact, be planning to receive additional armored reinforcement for which the 10 SS Pz Div, recently reported detraining in KAISERSLAUTERN, may be a likely candidate.

Enemy situation in RITTERSHOFFEN and HATTEN. A PW from the 1 Co, 119 PGR (25 PG Div) stated that his Co was to be relieved in RITTERSHOFFEN by a Para Co and that he saw a group of paratroops moving into RITTERSHOFFEN early 13 January. Apparently the 7 Para Div was to relieve the 25 PG and 21 Pz Divs in the RITTERSHOFFEN -- HATTEN area as evidenced by persistent rumors from PWs from the latter two units interrogated during the last two days, but our continuing attacks on these two villages have made such relief extremely difficult. The 35 PGR (25 PG Div) has been out of contact since the first attack on HATTEN. PWs state that the Regt has had about 60% casualties and is now held in reserve in RITTERSHOFFEN, presumably for re-commitment in a new attack by the 21 Pz and 25 PG Divs. These two mobile Divs are reported to have left about 20 tanks, being repaired in SCHLEITHAL (R-1143), 8-10 operational tanks and assault guns in HATTEN, and approx six assault guns and tanks in RITTERSHOFFEN. Relief of any of the units of the 21 Pz and 25 PG Divs has apparently not yet been accomplished nor may it be feasible at the present time in view of the constant American pressure on these two villages. The entire 119 PGR, according to PWs, remains in RITTERSHOFFEN with a residual strength of 300-350, not to mention elements of the 20 Para Regt and the 125 and 192 PGRs still in position there. The enemy garrison in HATTEN, including the I Bn, 20 Para Regt and elements of the 192 and 125 PGRs, comprises about 1000-1200 which, in conjunction with the 25 AT Bn, are protecting the flanks of the town. The enemy's apparently

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inexhaustible supply of armor and assault guns seems to be explained by the fact that the 1 and 2 Cos of the 25 AT Bn each were equipped with 12-75mm assault guns, entirely apart from the organic armor and assault guns of the 5 Tank Bn and 22 Tank Regt. (Based on 79 Inf Div IPW Report 14-15 Jan 1945).

Bn THOMAS. Several PWs captured 16 January in the vic of DAIHUNDEN (R-1819) claim to belong to the Battalion THOMAS. These men said they were attached to the 48 VG Div (in SCHALLBACH) until the end of December arriving in ACHERN about 12 January. On 14 Jan the Bn, including the 5, 6, 7 and 8 Cos, each about 120 strong, crossed to the western bank of the RHINE where they were to hold the bridgehead and eventually extend it to connect with the one farther S. According to their paybooks PWs' replacement unit was the 460 Repl and Tng Bn stationed in ULM which would seem to associate them with the E/V Regt of which the Bn THOMAS may be one Bn.


c. Arty. Air photos of 15 Jan show a considerable light arty build-up near LICHTENAU (R-2014); eight btries with a total of 34 guns are seen. They are located at the following references: four gun hvy DP Btry at 21241393; six gun light field Btry at 21611330; four gun light field btries at 20391167, 19981250, 21111441, 22831329, 22791345; and a four gun btry in casemates at 23481584. Activity around four casemates at 233163 indicates that these probably also cover light field guns. Recent photographs indicate three Bns of HAA and accompanying LAA guns disposed with one Bn in each of the following areas: WISSEMBOURG to SCHLEITHAL (R-2243), NIEDERROEDERN (R-1333) to NEEVILLER (R-2839) and vic LAUTERBOURG (R-3241). These Bns are believed to be the normal AA protection associated with Pz Divs to protect installations and routes to assembly areas.

d. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.

10 SS Panzer Div "FRUNDSBERG". Recent information from higher Hq places the 10 SS Pz Div in the KAISERSLAUTERN area. Persistent PW statements to the effect that they saw SS troops in rear areas and that after having pushed through the hills (S of REIPERTSWILLER), they will be followed up by a Mtz or Pz Div may lend credibility to this information. One PW mentioned the 10 SS Div "FRUNDSBERG" as one of the units destined to attack in the REIPERTSWILLER Salient. However, none of the PWs seem to have any definite knowledge of any unit.

This Div was formed in SW FRANCE during the winter 1942/43 and was first committed in the NORMANDY campaign where it suffered hvy casualties, following which, in Oct 1944, it was withdrawn to GERMANY for reorganization. The Div was next identified by the Second British Army in HOLLAND toward the middle of November. Withdrawn from line early in December the Div was believed to be held in immediate reserve in HOLLAND until the middle of Dec, when it was believed to have become part of the 6 SS Pz Army, forming at that time, but the fact that this Army was committed during the first days of the German counter offensive without 10 SS Panzer Div might indicate that Div, in fact, was no part of 6 SS Panzer Army. The exact location of Div was never definitely established since its withdrawal from HOLLAND, though various reports placed the Div first in the KARLSRUHE area, in the center of the German salient on First US Army front and in the COLOGNE area.

Present effective combat strength of Div is estimated to be 6000 plus about 80 tanks. The Div is composed of 21 and 22 PGR, both having 3 Bns each plus a 13th (Inf How) and a 14th (AT Co) Cos. The 10 SS Pz Regt is believed to have 3 Bns. 10 SS Arty Regt, according to all available evidence, is also composed of 3 Bns. When last contacted, the Div was supported by 2 Fortress MG Bns. In addition to the 2 PGRs, the Pz Regt and the Arty Regt, the organic units of the Div are: 10 AA Bn, 10 AT Bn, 10 Sig Bn, 10 Ren Bn, 10 Engr Bn, 10 Assault Gun Bn, 10 Field Repl Bn, 10 Med Bn, Div Services. According to latest information, Div commander is Col (OBERFUEHRER) HARMEL.



S E C R E T

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Small attack vic V-7351 repulsed. Friendly patrols encountered strong resistance vic V-6147, V-6248, V-6647.

XV Corps. 100th Div: Marked increase in arty fire between 60 and 61 Easting reported at end of period. Remainder of Corps sector quiet.

XXI Corps. 50 to 75 enemy observed unloading vehicles vic Q-3271 at 2100A, fired on by arty with unknown results.

(Source: Seventh Army Isum No 311 as of 162400A)

VI Corps. The enemy continued his aggressive defense in the nose of the BITCHE Salient and in the RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) -- HATTEN (R-1733) area, while moderate resistance was offered to our attack in the GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) bridgehead area. From the enemy action during the period, it is evident that he intends to hold his present gains and the resistance encountered in the GAMBSHEIM area indicates that this sector has been well organized and reinforced during the past several days of inactivity. Increasing enemy activity in the corridor between the HAGUENAU Forest and the RHINE River was also apparent from the day's action, and the identification of the Bn THOMAS in the DALHUNDEN (R-1819) area is further proof that the enemy continues to reinforce his units W of the RHINE. The enemy's apparent intention is to link up his forces S of WISSEMBOURG with his forces in the GAMBSHEIM area and thus form a solid line along the W of the RHINE. Enemy arty was moderately active during the period, placing the bulk of its fire in the HOFFEN (R-1536) area.


b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Armored activity was generally light since the only armor reported was in the bridgehead sector where three white tanks were seen vic R-137157 at 1500A and an unknown number of tanks reported vic R-1210 moving towards STAINWALD Woods at 1745A. Recent inactivity in this sector is possibly explained by a PW who stated that in the enemy attack on 7 Jan against DRUSENHEIM, the enemy employed 15 tanks and SPs but suffered hvy. losses including 10 tanks destroyed and that the enemy was forced to revert to a holding mission. Having had time to repair or replace some of these tanks during the recent period of inactivity in that sector, it is believed that the enemy is now operating there with approx 10 tanks.

(2) Arty. Light harassing fire was placed on forward elements and in the village of WIMMENAU (Q-7734) during the morning. Moderate concentrations were placed on forward positions NE of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) shortly after the enemy's attack in this area at noon. The HOFFEN -- KAHLENDORF area was the principal target during the day for enemy arty opposite the central position of the Corps zone. The shelling in HOFFEN was heaviest at mid-day when 300 rds of light and medium caliber shells fell in 30 minutes. The supply routes to HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN were moderately harassed and interdicted during the night. Early in the period, guns E of the RHINE River vic HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) reacted to our preparation with a moderate counter-preparation. During the day, shelling varied from light to moderate on troops advancing SE of ROHRWILLER (R-1217) and DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) while nightly harassing fire in this area was very light.

(3) Aviation. Two Me-109s, apparently on rcn, were reported flying from BISCHWILLER (R-0818) to N of HAGUENAU (R-0828) at 0830A. These planes were engaged by LAA which ceased firing when friendly a/c engaged the hostile planes. At 1350A, an Me-109 attacked a friendly B-24 vic WIMMENAU (Q-7635) causing the B-24 to crash. The hostile plane was engaged by AA until two

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S E C R E T

friendly P-51s attacked the Me-109. At 1543A, LAA engaged one Me-262 flying vic R-0832 to vic R-1333 and then to R-2543. Two Me-262s were reported over the area bombing and strafing about 1614A. Bombs were reported dropped vic R-1235 and bombing and strafing was reported vic R-1034. LAA engaged with hits observed on one of the planes, but with no apparent damage.

(4) Inf.


45th Inf Div. There was little enemy activity in the LEMBACH (R-0344) -- BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) area during the period and there was no apparent change in the enemy's disposition or attitude in this sector. Across the nose of the BITCHE Salient, however, the enemy showed every indication of maintaining his present lines and close contact continued throughout the period. Our attack NE of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) was countered by a strong enemy attack of an estimated Bn vic Q-811395 just after noon. This attack was coupled with hvy arty and mortar concentrations and some enemy succeeded in infiltrating to take up positions along the 39 Northing. However, at the close of the period the attack was reported contained. PWs taken in this action identified the I Bn of the 11 SS Regt. After dark, an estimated 25 enemy attacked our road block vic Q-763390, but were repulsed.

79th Inf Div. The only enemy activity reported in the northern sector was two small enemy patrols observed during the morning and long range MG fire received from INGOLSHEIM (R-1441) during the afternoon. In the corridor between the HAGUENAU Forest and the RHINE River, an estimated 50-60 enemy moved from DAIHUNDEN (R-1819) to DENGOLSHEIM (R-1821) where they were engaged by our troops late in the morning. PWs taken in this action were from a Bn THOMAS which has an estimated strength of 350 and which according to PWs had the mission of defending the DAIHUNDEN area. The identification of this unit in this area indicates that the corridor held by the enemy along the W bank of the RHINE continues to be reinforced. Throughout the day, hvy mortar fire was reported falling in HOFFEN, ROHRWILLER (R-1217) and DRUSENHEIM (R-1518). After dark, the enemy became increasingly active, with aggressive patrolling reported in the woods W of FORSTFELD (R-2229). Our OP at R-204307 was forced to withdraw about 1800A, and a 10-15 enemy patrol infiltrated vic R-180301 about 1830A. A fire fight occurred vic R-181317 at 2345A when an enemy patrol reached that point while considerable mortar and SA fire was reported vic ROESCHWOOG (R-2225) at 2330A.

14th Armd Div. The enemy continued his stubborn defense of HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN where house to house fighting raged throughout the period. About 1710A, the enemy launched a counterattack of an estimated Bn supported by SPs from the N and NE of HATTEN. This action forced our forward elements to withdraw slightly but at 2215A the attack was reported contained.

12th Armd Div. Moderate enemy resistance was offered throughout the period to our attacks SE from the ROHRWILLER (R-1217) area and E from the WEYERSHEIM (R-0512) area where the enemy succeeded in stopping our advance. Stubborn enemy resistance was encountered from the STAINWALD Woods from R-100108 and from the woods E of HERRLISHEIM (R-1314) with the enemy employing considerable SA, MG and mortar fire. Also the enemy was reported using very accurate AT fire against our armor from well camouflaged positions. An enemy counterattack reported forming up vic R-1416 during the morning was broken up by our arty fire before it could be launched.

(5) Motor movements. Tac/R observed very little traffic in rear areas during the period although some scattered MT were seen in the SAAK-BRUCKEN (Q-4571) -- NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-6083) -- ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q-7272) areas. In the enemy forward areas, no outstanding vehicular activity was observed during the period, however our air OPs reported a steady infiltration of assorted vehicles and small groups of personnel moving S towards REIPERTSWILLER area in vic Q-8040 throughout the day. Likewise, the hvy traffic movement that has been heard for the past several nights in the RITTERSHOFFEN



S E C R E T

-- HATTEN area and in the FORSTFELD (R-2229) -- LEUTENHEIM (R-2027) area was again reported. The enemy is apparently doing all of his supply, maintenance relief and reinforcement in this area at night.

For a recent German Administrative Order affecting the routing of motor traffic in rear areas, see Incl No 1.

(6) Rail movement. More activity than usual was observed by Tac/R on the OFFENBURG (W-1686) -- RASTATT (R-3530) line where four trains totaling about 205 cars were seen. This traffic may be associated with a build-up in the GAMBSHEIM (R-1110) area, although it may concern the COLMAR pocket.

4. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

2 fr II Bn 118 GR	18 fr I Bn 476 GR
13 fr Hq Co 165 GR	4 fr II Bn 476 GR
1 fr 36 Fus Co	1 fr II Bn 481 GR
1 fr I Bn 952 GR	6 fr 51 GAF Bn
2 fr 361 Engr Bn	1 unidentified
	<u>49</u>

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,246

79th Inf Div

1 fr II Bn 192 PGR
27 deserters
28

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,841

14th Armd Div

3 fr I Bn 20 Para Regt
1 fr II Bn 20 Para Regt
4

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,040

12th Armd Div

42 fr I Bn 2 SS Police Regt
59 fr II Bn 2 SS Police Regt
1 fr 405 AT Bn
102

Total PWs captured by 12th Armd Div in FRANCE: 342

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 162400A: 183

Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 2,811

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 60,999

b. Enemy supply and equipment. For location of enemy ammunition and gasoline dumps and other administrative installations, see Incl No 1.


4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 153.

Dixon
DIXON
Asst G-2

2 Incls

- 1 - Translation of Captured Document
- 2 - Counterintelligence Notes



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46
US ARMY

INCLOSURE NO 1
TO
REPORT NO 155

17 January 1945.

TRANSLATION.

S E C R E T

256 Volks Gren Div
G - 4
Jour No 63/44 secret


Div OP, 11 Jan 45

Administrative Order No 22

I.) General:

- 1.) The administrative order dated 8 Jan 45 (distributed to Regt and independent Bns) has been given the number 21.
- 2.) Traffic control through KAISERSLAUTERN
Effective immediately, the traffic through KAISERSLAUTERN will be redirected.
 - a. During the night using super highway from point 1.5 km west of ESELSFUERTH to VOGELWEH.
 - b. During the day in fog as in a.
in clear weather:
 - aa. vehicles up to 5 tons
Mannheimer- or Mainzer- Ludwig-Lauter-
muehl- Forellen- Woerth road
 - bb. vehicles over 5 tons:
Mannheimer- or Mainzer- Ludwig-Langemarck-
Schlageter road.
 - c. From direction FIRMASENS on road SN 5 from WEILER-BREITENAU and through HOHENECKENERMUEHLE, HOHENECKEN, VOGELWEH and from there on see a. and b.
- 3.) Securing of construction material:
Air Force Command West requests that if enemy airports are occupied, important construction material will be secured. Special Air Force salvage detachments can be made available. Oral or teletyped reports will be submitted to the Air Liaison Officer at LXXXIX Corps.
- 4.) Convoy bookings. There is a ban on transportation. No convoys can be booked.
- 5.) Experience with the Alsatian population:
Due to the conflicting reports concerning the behavior of the Alsatian civilian population toward our troops, the Civil Affairs Officer in Alsace requests the following: Troops who were stationed in Alsace are to send in reports which give information concerning the attitude of the Alsatian civilian population (great cooperation or unfriendly attitude). It is especially important that the reports be verified by statements of witnesses.
These reports will be submitted in duplicate to Div G-4 before 14 Jan 45.

S E C R E T



SECRET

6.) Supply Installations:

In the annex is a list of supply dumps upon which the division may draw.

II.) Ammunition:

1.) Ammo belts:

Due to the shortage of ammo belts, special care should be taken to collect these when firing belted ammo so that they can be used with loose cartridges as belted ammo again.

2.) Salvage of empty containers:

Attention is again drawn to the fact that all empty containers must be returned to the nearest ammo dump.

3.) Ammo Reports:

Ammo reports must be correct and prompt. This is absolutely necessary for efficient ammo supply.

III.) Administrative:

1.) Rations:

a.) additional rations on medical certificate:

There has been an increase of cases where additional rations have been allowed on medical certificates. It is our duty to issue such rations with economy because of the sufficiency of the normal ration and the critical foodstuff situation. Genuine coffee, black tea, cocoa and chocolate are only issued to hospital patients due to the supply shortage. Only the following may be issued:

1.) For healthy persons:

Bread 100 grams daily

Jam or artificial honey 150 grams weekly

2.) a. for convalescents considerably underweight or anaemic as a result of loss of blood and

b. in case of chronic sicknesses which cause considerable loss of weight and which require a fortification of the body:

Meat	up to a maximum of	280 grs	weekly
butter	"	140 grs	"
Foods	"	560 grs	"
Grade "A" milk	"	3½ litres	"
skimmed milk	"	3½ litres	"
eggs	"	7	"

At the same time no more than three of the above may be given in addition. Meat and eggs as well as butter and Grade "A" milk may not be prescribed at the same time.

c. With the permission of the CO on recommendation of the unit surgeon an additional ration of Grade "A" milk may be given to soldiers suffering from poisoning.

3.) Tobacco supply:

Soldiers of the Field Army who live off the Post for official reasons will be given tobacco stamps in addition to the ration stamps. If, however, smoking supplies cannot be obtained for ration stamps, they may receive two free cigarettes a day instead of the ration cards. In this case the ration money will not be reduced.

2.) Finance:

Volkssturm Pay:

a. The War Department has issued provisional regulations governing the pay of the Volkssturm.

The following has been established as a provisional pay rate for members of the Volkssturm serving in combat under command of the Armed Forces:



S E C R E T

- aa. For the amount of time served under command of the Armed Forces each member of the Volkssturm regardless of rank will receive the uniform base pay of 1 mark per day.
- bb. Volkssturm men are entitled to combat pay at the same rate as the soldiers.
- cc. Volkssturm men will receive free rations and quarters or equivalent allowances when living off the post.
- dd. No compensation will be allowed for wearing their own clothes.

✓ Annex to Supply Order No 22 of 11 Jan 45.

Handwritten: 7.2.45 in the base

List of Supply Installations:

1.) Ammo Dumps

GHQ Ammo Dump	WIELAND	BREIDENBACH	N of BITCHE
"	GU DRUN	DELLFELD	
Army Ammo Dump	SCHILLER	WERSCHWEILER	
"	SCHEFFEL	NIEDERLINXWEILER	
"	KOERNER	KIRKEL	
"	UHLAND	KIRCHHEIMBOLANDEN	
XXIX Pz Corps Ammo Dump	MONIKA	HOCHSTADT	
Ammo Distr Pt	MARGOT (361 VGD)	LUDWIGSWINKEL	
"	MEISE (256 VGD)	LUDWIGSWINKEL	
"	MAX (256 VGD)	1 km East of ERBSENTHAL	
"	MORITZ (36 VGD)	LUDWIGSWINKEL	

2.) Ordnance

643 Army Equipment Park	EKENBACH
643 Workshop Plat	KUSEL
2/10 Ordn Co	ALSENBRONN
Plat for industrial gases	DREBENTALERHOF

3.) Fuel Dumps

GHQ Fuel Dump	BAERBEL	EKENBACH
"	BELLA	DELLFELD
Army Fuel Dump	BABETTE	DELLFELD
"	BUCHFINK	KIRCHHEIMBOLANDEN
"	KUCKUCK	LIMBACH
"	RABE	REHWEILER

4.) Vehicle maintenance installations

675 Army Motor Vehicle Park	BECHHOFEN
227 Motor Maintenance Co	FREISEN
Advanced Maintenance Plat	AUSSEN
187 Motor Maintenance Co	SCHOPP, 12 km East of KAISERSLAUTERN
1 Motor Maintenance Co	KONKEN SW of KUSEL
58 Tire Det	ROSENKOPF
Collecting Pt for damaged tanks	HASSEL, SE of ST INGBERT
55 Motor Maintenance Co	HAUENSTEIN
Tank spare parts Dump "D"	FRANKENSTEIN
55 Tank Salvage Co	ESSINGEN, 7 km NE of LANDAU
64 Motor Maintenance Plat	KONKEN
528 Motor Repair Park	SPEYER
232 " "	HEIDELBERG
526 " "	GRUENSTADT
539 " "	BRUCHSAL

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority 725077
 By [Signature] NANA, Date

S E C R E T

Motor Pool MANNHEIM
 " (branch)
 " "

Motor Pool KARLSRUHE
 554 Motor Maintenance Co
 613 "

Armor Base South
 " Middle

55 Tank Salvage Co

924 Tank Workshop Co

Tank spare parts dump

106 Track Dump

Replacement part dump for armd H/T

206 Central Spare Parts Depot

206 " "

Dump for winter equipment

Vehicle Replacement Pool

SCHRIESHEIM

LANDAU

KAISERSLAUTERN

KARLSRUHE

DEIDESHEIM

BORNHEIM

PFORZHEIM

OTTERBERG near KAISERSLAUTERN

HILST, 12 km NE of BITCHE

SIEGELBACH, 8 km SE of KAISERSLAUTERN

HAHN near WIESBADEN

SALMUNSTER

BERG GLADBACH and ST GEORGEN,

SCHWARZWALD

FRIEDENBERG (German sp. parts)

GEINHAUSEN (French sp. parts)

SCHLUECHTERN

BENSHEIM (Bergstrasse)

6. Administrative troops and installations

590 Army Administration Office

Army Ration Dump

"

"

LEITERSWEILER

OFFENBACH, 6 km E of LANDAU

WEILLERBACH


MUENCHWIES NE of HOMBURG

with distr Pt in FIRMASENS and

ZWEIBRUECKEN

(Document captured by 45 Div vic Q-816394)

S E C R E T



ENCLOSURE NO 2
TO
G-2 REPORT NO 155

S E C R E T

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NOTES

1. Use of Non-Combatant Identification Credentials by German Intelligence Service

a. Operating with the US Armies on the field today are a number of non-combatant personnel (War Correspondents, American Red Cross Workers and Technical Observers) who possess certain credentials different from those possessed by officers and enlisted men of the US Army. It is entirely plausible that the German Intelligence Service will utilize the credentials of non-combatants who are captured to infiltrate agents into our lines. This is a natural as far as the enemy is concerned and he will not pass up the opportunity to use non-combatant credentials as a means of identification if only for the reason that US troops might be unfamiliar with these types of credentials.

b. The best counter-measure for this contingency is for all troops to be particularly suspicious of anyone who falls into the non-combatant category, by referring to CIC any individuals who cannot be positively identified as such.

c. The following information has been made available regarding War Correspondents attached to the Third US Army and are now German Prisoners of War:

(1) The following named War Correspondents are now German prisoners of War:

(a) BEATTIE, Edward W. Jr.
United Press
SHAEF Registry No. 090

(b) BRYAN, Wright
Atlanta Journal
SHAEF Registry No. 212

(2) The following named War Correspondents have been German prisoners of war, and it is presumed that copies of their original credentials are now in the possession of the enemy:

(a) GOSSET, Pierre
Agence Francaise
SHAEF Registry No. 505


(b) MAILLAUD, Pierre
Agence Francaise Presse
SHAEF Registry No. 474

(c) MCGOWAN, Gault
New York Sun
SHAEF Registry No. (not known)

(d) MECKLIN, John
Chicago Sun
SHAEF Registry No. 199

(e) RABACHE, ANDRE
Agence Francaise Presse
SHAEF Registry No. (not known)

d. CIC Detachments should disseminate the above information to all agents so as to have this information available in the event an enemy agent is picked-up masquerading as a non-combatant and using any of the above names or credentials.



S E C R E T

2. Security of Countersigns.

a. First US Army reports that German patrols dressed in American uniforms are securing U.S. countersigns on a daily basis.

b. The importance of maintaining the security of countersigns cannot be over-emphasized. Upon being challenged for the password, the person so challenged should demand the reply if the slightest question exists regarding the identity of the challenger.

(Source: Third US Army G-2 Report No 217)

3. Explanations and Alibis Furnished by the Enemy Agents.

Since the landing, the explanations or alibis furnished by captured enemy agents are extremely simple. Enemy agents have avoided complicated stories and have followed the theory that the simpler an explanation is, the more likely it is to be accepted.

Complicated stories are subject to a detailed interrogation and the enemy agent is apt to betray himself.

Following are examples of explanations offered:

- (1) Search for parents in liberated territory.
- (2) Search for supplies to be carried to a location where the supply is very difficult.
- (3) Former worker in the Organization TODT.
- (4) Escape from forced labor.
- (5) Desire to surrender to the Allies.

Errors committed by enemy agents:

- (1) Several among them, operating singly, were captured carrying identical objects, for example, butter in jars.
- (2) An agent was carrying a falsified identity card dated January 1943. Unfortunately for him, he had in his possession other copies of the identification photograph dated March 1944.
- (3) The identity cards were filled in with German handwriting.

(Source: 1st French Air Corps, Information Bulletin 8 Jan)



SECRET

Copy No

59

- G-2 PERIODIC REPORT -

SECRET
:Auth: CG VI Corps:
:Initials: JKL:
:Date: 18 Jan 1945:
:

No 156

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 170001A
TO : 172400A
HQ VI CORPS
180800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change, see G-2 Report 153.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

7 Para Div. The identification of I and II Bns and the trains of the III Bn of the 20 Para Regt and the II Bn of the 19 and 21 Para Regts seems to establish the presence of the bulk of that Div on our front. Testimony of a PW from the trains of the III Bn, 20 Para Regt (said to be in position in the RITTERSHOFFEN -- HATTEN area) giving many circumstantial details of his unit, lends weight to earlier indications that these Para Regts each have three Bns although several PWs insist that they have only two Bns. According to PWs from the II Bn, 21 Para Regt, that Regt has a 15 (Engr) Co, suggesting that the Para Regts have three Regtl Cos each. Early interrogations point to an otherwise standard Inf organization and strength, the Inf Bns being reported with a strength of about 350 on initial contact. In view of the recent activation of this Div, it is entirely probable that many of its organic components may still be incomplete or even entirely lacking. Similarly, it is doubtful to what extent the Div possesses the usual auxiliary units, an officer PW from its 21 Para Regt, for example, having stated that his Regt was supported in HOLLAND by the 389 Hvy AA Bn for lack of organic divisional arty.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Arty and mortar fire on EBERMUNSTER (V-8468), BENNWIHR (V-6949), SIGOLSHEIM (V-6748) and AMMERSCHWIHR (V-6647). Hvy enemy traffic, both E and W vic V-4741, interdicted by friendly arty.


XV Corps. Activity limited to small scale patrolling and light harassing mortar fire.

XXI Corps. Corps front remained quiet.

(Source: Seventh Army Isum 313 as of 172400A)

VI Corps. Fierce fighting continued in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area and hvy pressure was exerted on our positions along the nose of the BITCHE salient. The enemy increased his activity on the Corps E flank and launched an offensive vic SESSENHEIM (R-1822) while continuing to resist our advance in the GAMBSHEIM -- DRUSENHEIM area from well prepared positions. A considerable number of PWs were taken vic HERRLISHEIM and an enemy counterattack launched during the afternoon to regain lost ground in this action was stopped by arty fire. However, during the night Inf and tanks were reported infiltrating into the town in strength and the situation at the close of the period was obscure. The identification of elements of the 19 and 21 Para Regts in the SESSENHEIM area, coupled with the offensive attitude of these units, may indicate that the enemy is not satisfied with the progress vic HATTEN and may shortly attempt to effect a breakthrough in this area. The enemy continued his determined defense of HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN with fire of all weapons and launched two unsuccessful Inf-tank counterattacks on HATTEN in the morning. On the Corps W flank, the enemy probed our lines and attempted to infiltrate our positions in the Q-8139 -- Q-8239 grid squares throughout the period. Shelling increased in the 45th Div zone but decreased in the late afternoon and evening in the HATTEN -- HOFFEN area.

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b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Approx 40 tanks, SPs and assault guns operated on the E flank of the Corps zone, supporting attacks and counterattacks in the HATTEN (R-1733), SESSENHEIM and HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) areas. In HATTEN, approx 10 tanks supported two separate counterattacks at 0730A and 1130A, with 3 tanks reported destroyed. During the afternoon, hvy tank fire fell on HATTEN, indicating the employment of these tanks in the supporting role of indirect fire. At 1210A, 3 tanks were observed covered with white cloth in vic of R-170347. Another movement of armor, in this sector, was observed at 1530A moving N from forests in vic R-198325, some painted with white and black diagonal lines, were taken under fire with 3 reported destroyed and indicating the presence of approx 20 tanks operating in the HATTEN area. Eight tanks supported an attack against SESSENHEIM at 1100A. This attack was repulsed with loss of two tanks, the remainder being seen retreating to DENGOLSHHEIM (R-1821) at 1115A. In the HERRLISHEIM area, 6 to 8 tanks and SPs counterattacked at 1605A along the road S of HERRLISHEIM, 2 tanks being destroyed in this action. Three tanks and three SPs were also observed SE of OFFENDORF. In the zone of the 45th Div, one tank was observed at Q-795425 at 1600A. Tanks destroyed during period - 10; damaged or disabled - 2; tanks destroyed since 1 Jan - 83; damaged or disabled - 38. *mmms*

(2) Arty. The 157th Inf received the bulk of an estimated 1000 rds of mixed caliber placed in the 45th Div zone during the day. Communications routes vic LICHTENBERG (Q-8135), WIMMENAU (Q-7734) and REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) were moderately harassed at mid-day. Shelling was light during the morning in the HATTEN -- HOFFEN area while a brisk period of activity occurred as 300 rds fell vic LEITERSWILLER (R-1536) between 1500A and 1630A. Light harassing fire was placed in the towns of SOULTZ (R-1037), KUHLUNDORF (R-1335), NIEDERBETSCHDORF (R-1233) during the afternoon. During the remainder of the period, considerable decrease in this area was noted in light arty and no reports of medium shelling were received which may indicate some shifting of the enemy's arty was taking place. Two horse-drawn light arty pieces were observed NW of AUEHEIM (R-2023) during the afternoon. A delayed report of the previous period identifies 170mm from fragments received as being employed for counterbattery mission in the INGWILLER (Q-8130) -- ZINSWILLER (Q-8935) area. 280mm RR guns were active just before daylight firing four rds into REICHSHOFFEN (Q-9536) and from E of the RHINE River firing into the HAGUENAU -- BISCHWILLER area.

(3) CWS. At 1445A, the enemy laid a large smoke screen between R-183347 and R-167346 in an apparent effort to conceal movement N of HATTEN.

(4) Inf

45th Inf Div. The enemy remained alert and aggressive on the nose of the BITCHE salient and maintained pressure in that area throughout the period. Continuous efforts were made to infiltrate our lines in the -8139 grid square and during the afternoon small groups were contacted vic -810389 and vic Q-818383. The enemy was also active in the Q-8239 grid square and made numerous probing efforts in an apparent attempt to locate a weak spot in our line. The enemy strongly opposed our efforts to advance toward the high ground vic Q-802390, however, the remainder of the Div zone was relatively inactive and our patrol reported CLIMBACH (R-0846) unoccupied but observed an estimated Co digging in along the edge of the woods N of town. After dark, the enemy continued to infiltrate vic Q-818388 and several fire fights developed in this area.

79th Inf Div. Newly arrived elements of the 7 Para Div went on the offensive in the area between the southern edge of the HAGUENAU Forest and the RHINE River. Shortly after dawn, an estimated two Cos supported by 6 to 8 tanks crossed the MODER River vic DALHUNDEN (R-1819) and attacked NE toward SESSENHEIM. This attack was coordinated with a Co size



SECRET

attack on STATTMATTEN (R-1921) and other enemy who also crossed the MODER and dug in along the RR vic R-178208. At 1100A, the enemy had captured DENGOLSHEIM, STATTMATTEN and part of SESSENHEIM. However, our counter-attack had retaken SESSENHEIM at 1500A but was encountering hvy opposition vic DENGOLSHEIM. During the afternoon, enemy activity increased vic DIESCHWOOG (R-2225) and the enemy occupied that town after forcing our out-post to withdraw. At the same time, movement and general activity was also observed vic AUENHEIM and several large patrols were seen leaving the town. One of these patrols was ambushed and 10 PWs were captured. On the northern flank of the Div, an estimated platoon was observed digging in between R-108463 and R-112460 at 1630A. After dark, the enemy remained inactive.

14th Armd Div. The enemy continued to defend HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN with determination and supplemented this resistance with limited aggressive action. Bitter house to house fighting continued in the latter town throughout the period and although the enemy made some withdrawals under pressure he continued to hold his strong points in the church, cemetery and at the CR vic R-158338. Hvy fighting also continued in HATTEN and during the morning the enemy launched two counterattacks on the town. The first attack was launched from the E at 0730A and the second approached from the SE at 1130A. Both attacks were supported by a total of 10 tanks but were contained after hvy fighting. Activity decreased after dark but a 12-man enemy patrol infiltrated to vic R-160328 where it fired 4 bazooka rds into the RR station S of RITTERSHOFFEN.

12th Armd Div. The enemy continued to offer strong resistance from the woods N of GAMBSHEIM and from dug in and camouflaged positions along the RR track between R-135155 and R-145165. However, low caliber troops were responsible for defending vic HERRLISHEIM, and our attack made good progress in this area capturing an estimated 220 PWs in the morning. The enemy's first reaction was initiated at approx 1400A when an estimated 200 Inf supported by 6 to 8 tanks and SPs launched a counterattack on HERRLISHEIM from OFFENDORF (R-1513). This attack was stopped by our arty along a line R-122137 -- R-128138 before contact was established. Stiff fighting continued in HERRLISHEIM during the remainder of the period and after dark the enemy infiltrated tanks and Inf behind our positions in this area and the status of the situation in HERRLISHEIM was obscure.

(5) Motor Movement. During the morning, vehicular activity vic BREENTHAL was taken under arty fire and two trucks were immobilized. After dark, hvy traffic was reported moving from HATTEN toward BUHL (R-1835) at 2020A and some traffic was observed between RITTERSHOFFEN and HATTEN at 2130A.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div	2 fr I Bn 11 SS Mtn Regt
	2 fr 51 GAF Bn
	4

Total PWs captured by 45th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,250

79th Inf Div

1 fr I Bn 192 PGR	3 deserters
7 fr Bn THOMAS	11

Total PWs captured by 79th Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,852



S E C R E T

14th Armd Div

2 fr I Bn 119 PGR
2 fr 125 Ren Bn

2 fr I Bn 125 PGR
23 deserters and unidentified
29

Total PWs captured by 14 AD in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,069

12th Armd Div

18 fr I Bn 2 SS Police Regt
92 fr II Bn 2 SS Police Regt
12 fr 14 Co 2 SS Police Regt
4 fr 405 AT Bn

73 fr Bn ZIERES (I Bn Regt E/V ?)
3 fr 13 Co Regt E/V
7 fr 14 Co Regt E/V
5 unidentified
214

Total PWs captured by 12 AD in FRANCE: 556

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 172400A: 258
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 3,069
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,257

b. Pyrotechnics. At 2145A, the enemy discharged three white parachute flares and this was immediately followed by a TOT on HUNSPACH (R-1539).

c. A wounded enemy soldier was captured vic HATTEN dressed in a US field jacket and steel helmet.

d. Translation of captured document:

38 Inf Div
G-2

Div Hq
1 Jan 45

The following proclamation, issued on 1 Jan by the Reich SS Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the Upper RHINE, is to be brought to the attention of all soldiers as soon as possible, in the form of public announcement.

New Years Proclamation by the Reich SS Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the Upper RHINE:

"Soldiers and men of the Volkssturm and of the Group of Armies in the Upper RHINE.

"A difficult year of war is over; for you soldiers of the Group of Armies of the Upper RHINE, the past four months have been particularly difficult.

"Let us approach the New Year with the grim and indomitable resolution to reconquer the bits of German territory which we have lost. We form, all of us, whatever our rank may be, a great warrior community of Germans, who have but one ambition: To be worthy of the heroism of the women, children and of aged people of our Fatherland.

"With an unshakable faith in our Fuehrer and in the glorious future of the Reich, we, soldiers on the Upper RHINE front, wish to offer our contribution to the great German victory."


Hq in the field, 31 Dec 1944

signed: HIMMLER

By order of the CG of the Div

Official: POTRAZ, Capt

(Source: II Fr Corps Bulletin de Renseignements 128, 15 Jan 45)



S E C R E T

e. Statements of a PW concerning HIMMLER:

A PW from I Bn 758 GR, a 2d Lt newly assigned to the Inf, left the Officers' Training Bn at WILDFLECKEN early in Dec with 50 other officers, and was sent to TRIBERG. There they were divided into groups of 5 or 6 among the hotels and were strictly forbidden to wander around town. The PW went out nevertheless. The town was packed with SS troops. Certain hotels were heavily guarded. There were numerous cars of higher ranking officers and of generals. Everyone said that TRIBERG was the Hq of HIMMLER. According to the PW, HIMMLER has been charged with the Command of the Army Group of the Upper RHINE because he had assured the Fuehrer that the Alsatian bridgehead would be maintained, and even that all of ALSACE would be retaken. The reasons for that were:

A question of security, since at no price must the Allies reach and cross the RHINE.

A question of prestige, since ALSACE is considered as German territory.

According to the same PW, a special order from HIMMLER was communicated to all the officers and read to all the men. This order states that any soldier who, taken prisoner, gives information to the enemy will see his entire family (not only his parents, his wife and his children but all those who bear his name) exterminated under the name of reprisals.

(Source: R.Q. 2 DIM, 11 Jan 1945)

f. Enemy's knowledge of our situation. "From incomplete reports of headquarters safes, unit safes and unit papers captured by the enemy in the ARDENNES breakthrough, it is highly probable that the enemy has a very complete knowledge of the organization, administration and order of battle of the First US Army. From the contents of captured administrative instructions, intelligence instructions, signal instructions, etc, he also has a comprehensive knowledge of our methods. He is, therefore, capable of preparing fraudulent documents and of infiltrating well-schooled and well-informed agents throughout our forces. The probability of his exercising this capability is viewed as very high." (Source: First US Army G-2 Estimate No 61).

g. Search wounded PW. An Evac Hospital reports admitting an injured PW who had been evacuated through normal Medical channels. Upon arriving at hospital PW was found to have a live German hand grenade in his pocket. (Source: XIII US Corps).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No Change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 153.

Langewin
 LANGEVIN
 G-2

1 INCL

1 - The BETTENDORF Raid
 Spy Report

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

INCLOSURE No 1
to
G-2 REPORT No 156

18 January 1945

TWO LESSONSTHE BETTENDORF RAID

During the first days of Jan 1945, Div patrols had repeatedly crossed the SAUER R and made contact with the enemy despite adverse weather and terrain conditions. However, they had been unable to capture any prisoners and it became imperative to identify the units on our front, as the enemy was, at that time, known to be shifting his dispositions in the salient. On 7 Jan 45, 4 civilians from the town of BETTENDORF (P-9143) crossed the River into the Div area with information about the town and its garrison. It was decided that the information that they brought was sufficient to insure the success of a strong raiding party with the mission of entering BETTENDORF, capturing prisoners and testing enemy defenses.

A detailed air photo study of the town and its surroundings was made by the Div PI Team, and an accurate and up-to-date town plan of BETTENDORF, scale 1/3300, was drawn up and reproduced in sufficient quantity to furnish copies to all concerned in the raid. The civilians from BETTENDORF were subjected to a very detailed interrogation by the Div MII Team and with the use of the town plans, the pin-point location of the enemy's CP, defensive positions, and lines of communication were located in addition to valuable terrain information. The results of these intelligence studies were forwarded to the 10th Inf on 8 Jan and a personal terrain reconnaissance was made during the daylight hours on 9 Jan by the CO and staff of the 3d Bn, 10th Inf and the patrol leader, 1st Lt Wilfred Longpree, Co 'L', 10th Inf. It was decided that the composition of the raiding party should consist of the 1st Plat of Co 'L' and a mortar observer with a SCR 300 radio. In addition to TE equipment the patrol was to be equipped with tommy gun and snow suits. The patrol was briefed on the afternoon of 9 Jan by the Bn CO, Lt Col Shipley, and each man's mission was thoroughly explained, rehearsed, and illustrated on the plans and charts available.

At approx 0200 hrs 10 Jan the raiding party crossed the SAUER R in assault boats vic P-908424, then circled to the W of town to reach the telephone lines which they cut, thereby isolating the town's garrison. The patrol split into 2 groups, each with its assigned mission to attack all houses that had been reported as occupied by the enemy. One patrol attacked the CP and after wiping out all resistance around the building, threw fragmentation and concussion grenades into the cellar, resulting in shouts and screams from the occupants. They then proceeded to the S of town where they posted themselves to secure the right flank of the other group. The other group had, in the meantime, subjected a large enemy installation to the grenade treatment and had captured two prisoners. The raiding party had reassembled by 0420 hrs when they crossed the River over a partially demolished bridge. Several TOTs were laid on BETTENDORF by Div Arty as soon as the raiding party had cleared the town.

During this action the raiding party sustained no casualties and inflicted losses of an estimated 20 killed, capturing 3 PWs from the 3 Co, 91st VG Regt, 352 VG Div. One of these prisoners was bearing the critique of defensive positions by the Regtl CO who had made an inspection of the defenses of BETTENDORF the preceding day. Members of the raiding party were in complete accord with the Regtl Cndr's criticisms and further pointers and suggestions were delivered to the BETTENDORF garrison through Field Arty channels on 13 Jan 45, 2 rds loaded with attached leaflets being dropped on all enemy CP installations revealed by PW interrogation.

Lesson No 1:

The success of this raid was greatly enhanced by thorough preparation on the part of all echelons. Particular emphasis was placed on pin-pointing the enemy installations, securing necessary equipment, thorough ground reconnaissance and detailed briefing of patrol members. Similar preparation



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for future patrols should insure comparable results and minimum casualties.

IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT ENEMY, PARTICULARLY THE 915 VG REGT WHICH WE HAVE NEEDLED TWICE IN THE LAST 48 HOURS, MAY ALSO PREPARE SUCCESSFUL RAIDS. OUTPOST CONSISTING OF 4 OFFICERS and 17 EM OF THE 4TH US INF DIV WAS WIPE OUT VIC L-1235 BY ENEMY RAIDING PARTY NIGHT OF 12/13 JAN 45. SMALL OUTPOSTS SHOULD NOT REMAIN IN SAME BUILDING, CELLAR, OR LOCALITY BUT SHOULD BE SHIFTED PERIODICALLY TO AVOID SIMILAR AMBUSH. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IF OUTPOST POSITIONS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

(Source: 5th US Inf Div Periodic Report 153, 13 Jan 45)

SPY REPORT

Many reports similar to the one described below are received at this Hq and much valuable time is wasted in investigating them and attempting to apprehend the suspect:

SUBJECT: Investigation of Alleged Espionage Agent in American Uniform.

An investigation was made of a report submitted by Captain _____, CO of _____ Co, concerning a person in American Uniform who allegedly sought the strength of units and type of work done by American soldiers in KIRCHBERG, central-eastern suburb of LUXEMBOURG City.

Cpl _____ of _____ Co was contacted and stated that the local barber's 12 year old son was the person who saw and talked to the suspect. The conversation of 5 to 10 minutes duration took place about 1700A, 11 Jan 45. The barber's son on being questioned revealed that suspect spoke perfect German, would not respond in English to English remarks, wore GI Field Jacket, with no insignia, leggings and shoes, GI trousers and helmet and carried a telephone in a brown canvas case. Suspect was unarmed. Description: 5'5" tall, 165 pounds, wore glasses, and is of medium stout build. Boy stated suspect asked number of troops in KIRCHBERG and type of work troops do. Then subject allegedly went down road leading into nearby woods.

Woods were explored by myself and Pvt _____ without more pertinent evidence resulting. Members of AAA crews on duty on 11 Jan between 1700A and 1900A and stationed in positions where roads leading to woods could be easily seen were questioned but all stated no one had gone by their positions between 1700 and 1900 hrs on 11 Jan. It would have been necessary for any one going into woods on the road designated as the one taken by the suspect to have passed the gun positions.


AGENTS NOTE:

CASE CLOSED. It is extremely difficult to obtain results in cases like the one above where doubtful evidence is given and the suspect permitted to escape.

Lesson No 2

All individuals or units having knowledge of or receiving reports of acts of the above nature are charged with the duty of making an immediate investigation. It is not sufficient to simply report these matters to Higher Headquarters. Security is a community matter and it is therefore the duty of every officer and enlisted man to investigate all suspicious acts and persons coming to their attention. Apprehension of the suspect in the above case might have been possible had the unit reporting the case made an immediate investigation upon receiving the report at 1730 hrs 11 Jan well within an hour of the reported act.

(Source: XII US Corps G-2 Report 152, 13 Jan 45)



S E C R E T

Copy No 59

.....
: S E C R E T :
:Auth: CG VI Corps:
:Initials: *JH* :
:Date: 19 Jan 1945:
:.....

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 157

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 180001A
TO : 182400A
HQ VI CORPS
190800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change. See G-2 Report No 153.

b. Enemy defensive organization. The area immediately in front of the 103d Div and on the left flank of the 79th Div does not appear to be well organized by the enemy since our patrols have been able to penetrate several km without contact. No wire or mine fields have been reported. N and NE of KLIMBACH (R-0846) however, log covered dugouts, trenches and MG positions were encountered.

c. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

553 VG Div. Interrogation of PWs and examination of captured documents greatly clarify the seeming potpourri of Battle Groups operating in the southeastern corner of the VI Corps front. It appears that until about 25 December the 405 Admin Div controlled a sector extending to just N of RAMBSHEIM (R-1110) but that the 405 Admin Div units in the latter area came under control of the 553 VG Div on or about that date. Just how far S from RAMBSHEIM the 553 VG Div sector extends is impossible to determine. The 553 VG Div seems to be operating with 3 Regts, each having under it a considerable miscellany of smaller units. These 3 Regts are known as the Battle Group MARBACH (known as Grenadier Regt 3 OBERRHEIN and also referred to as 35 Repl and Tng Regt, according to one PW), Battle Group HOELSCHER and the Battle Group VON LUETTICHAU. The Battle Group MARBACH seems to embrace the Bns SCHMIDT (NCO candidates), TREUTLER (also NCO candidates from the NCO School in ETTLINGEN and possibly merged with Bn SCHMIDT), ZIERES (V Bn OBERRHEIN, formerly - before 25 Dec - I Bn, E/V), MORG (VI Bn OBERRHEIN), a 13 (SCHMUDE) and 14 (WALTHER) Co, the II Bn, 2 SS Police Regt, a mortar Co KRESSIN, a 4 AA Co CEIGER, a SCHMIDT Engr Co, an SS Nebelwerfer Btry OBERRHEIN and the 20 Mortar Bn. The Battle Group (Regt?) HOELSCHER evidently controls the Bns KAPPES (I/1119), MEYER and MOELLER, the I and III Bns, 2 SS Police Regt and the Police School HEIDENHEIM. The Battle Group (Regt?) VON LUETTICHAU appears to command the REICHSFUEHRER SS Escort (BEGLEIT) Bn and the Bn WIMMER (see Bn HOPPE). Total strength of the above conglomerate is difficult to evaluate but inf strength is estimated to be approx 3500.

Auxiliary units. The 553 VG Div code list (undated but to go into effect 15 Jan) also mentions many auxiliary formations. Among them is the ARKO (GHQ Arty CO) XIV SS Army Corps (confirmation that this is an SS Corps) evidently commanding the II Bn, 1553 Arty Regt, the 1514 Arty Regt (Bn?), 68 AA Regt, 442, 705, 721 and 939 AA Bns (probably controlled by the 68 AA Regt). Also mentioned is the Corps Engr CO commanding the 405 Engr Bn and the GRAUELSBAUM, SCHERZHEIM, HEIMLINGEN, FREISTETT, Middle and South Ferries, the Tank Ferry and the FREISTETT debarkation point. Finally is mentioned the 1553 Signal Bn and the 2710 and 2854 switchboards.

d. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention. Elements of the 11 SS Pz Div (110 PGR) were identified 18 January on the XX Corps front vic BUTZDORF (L-0403) which probably removes one more mobile Div from the unlocated lists.

- 1 -

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OSS reports on 16 Jan under the date of 6/11 January that a Bn of the 302 Inf Regt has been identified in TULLINGEN (A-9289). This Regt is believed to be a component unit of the 231 Inf Div which is known to have been disbanded in 1940. It may very well be that the Div has been reorganized recently, probably as a VG Div.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Front generally quiet. Harassing arty on SELESTAT (V-7761), DAMBACH (V-7769), KLENTZHEIM (V-6648), SIGOLSHEIM (V-6748).

XV Corps. Generally quiet.

XXI Corps. Attempted infiltration at four points vic GRAND ROSELLE (Q-3467) at 1940A broken up by arty.


(Source: Seventh Army Lsum No 315 as of 182400A)

VI Corps. Hvy pressure continued in the nose of the BITCHE Salient where the enemy remained aggressive throughout the period. In the center of the Corps zone, house to house fighting continued in the HATTEN -- RITTERS-HOFFEN area, however, enemy resistance slackened somewhat indicating that the enemy may be withdrawing in that area. On the Corps E flank, the enemy resumed his offensive action in the SESSENHEIM (R-1822) area, succeeding in making some gains. Further S in the HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) area, the enemy forced our troops to withdraw from the town and later in the period he attacked our troops in the vic of ROHRWILLER (R-1217). There was a marked decrease in enemy arty activity in the HOFFEN (R-1536) -- HATTEN area but shelling was moderate NE of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037). The 10 SS Pz Div, which had been expected to appear on the Corps front finally was identified in the vic of ROHRWILLER by PWs from the 1 Co, 22 PGR and it is believed the entire Div is in this area, since considerable bridging activity and river traffic was observed during the period, indicating that the enemy was reinforcing his units W of the RHINE.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. The same general disposition of armor was noted in HATTEN and HERRLISHEIM, with a build up reported in the SESSENHEIM area, indicating a possible shift of armor to this sector. The appearance of the 10 SS Pz Div, in the bridgehead, is suggestive of a pending build-up of armor there. This Div is estimated to have approx 80 to 90 tanks, with a high percentage of Mk V and VI's. In the HATTEN area, approx 15 tanks were displaced in forward camouflaged positions. These were taken under arty fire with eight tanks reported destroyed and four damaged. The effect of our arty is apparently forcing the enemy to employ countermeasures of smoke and camouflage to cover the movement of his armor and conceal his positions. In the SESSENHEIM area, two tanks were active throughout the period, six enemy tanks were observed moving N from DENGOLSHEIM at 1030A and four tanks were observed in ROESCHWOOG (R-2225), during the afternoon. In the bridgehead sector, a movement from OFFENDORF towards HERRLISHEIM was supported by tanks and six tanks were observed N of HERRLISHEIM, two of which were burned out. Two PWs taken from the 405 Pz Jaeger Bn indicate a possibility that the enemy is employing some of these TDs in this sector. Similar units have been previously active on the VI Corps zone and have recently been contacted in the zone of the BITCHE Salient. Eight tanks were destroyed during the period plus four damaged. Total destroyed since 1 Jan - 91. Damaged or disabled - 42.

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(2) Arty. Shelling was moderate during the day on forward elements NE of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) with some roads and towns in rear areas receiving attention. In this zone any movement quickly brought accurate fire indicating that the enemy is making maximum use of forward observers. A btry of six Nebelwerfers was active shelling forward elements vic Q-810380 with 72 rds at 1405A. During the night counterbattery fire was placed in ROTHBACH (Q-8434) -- MUHLHAUSEN (Q-8631) area. Guns in the OBERSEEBACH -- TRIMBACH area previously shelling vic HOFFEN and HATTEN continued to be only slightly active indicating some regrouping of arty may be taking place. Principal shelling reported occurred at mid-afternoon when 60 rds fell in RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533). Early in the period, ROHRWILLER (R-1217) was target for 100 rds from light guns while just prior to daylight SP guns harassed SCHIRRHOFEN (R-1322). Arty and SP guns shelling from vic ROESCHWOOG (R-2225) placed harassing fire in AUENHEIM (R-2023).

(3) Aviation. About 1502A, several enemy planes were over the Corps E flank. Three Me-109s flying from DALHUNDEN (R-1818) to vic BISCHWILLER (R-0818) were engaged by LAA. These planes evidently split up and one was reported strafing vic R-070119 and two vic BISCHWILLER. About the same time, five FV-190s were reported flying W vic R-0515 and one Me-109 also flying W vic Q-9313.

(4) CWS. The enemy laid a smoke screen vic R-175346 at 0935A attempting to cover the movement of some tanks, a half track and some Inf in that area. Likewise, at 1645A, OBERROEDERN (R-1735) was smoked apparently to conceal movement in that area.

(5) Engr. The bridge at R-185202 is serviceable and appeared to be in use by the enemy. The enemy is apparently attempting to bridge the REINE since considerable activity was noted. Tac/R reported dismantled pontoon bridges vic R-105065, R-162108, R-170173, R-233213, R-275272. All dismantled pontoon bridges had landings each side of the River and one pontoon section attached along E bank. These may be now used as ferry sites by the enemy. Vehicular and personnel activity was reported at the site vic R-170173. The permanent bridge at SELTZ (R-2828) is out but a pontoon bridge appeared to be under construction there. PWs report that the bridges in NIEDERROEDERN (R-2334), ASCHBACH (R-1837) and RIEDSELTZ (R-1543) were knocked out by our arty but have been repaired since 16-17 January. The Germans are reported using excellent methods of camouflaging their tanks in snow covered terrain making their armor very difficult to see. (See Enemy methods, Par 3b)

(6) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The principal action was again in the nose of the BITCHE Salient in the vic Q-8139 and Q-8239 where during the night the enemy improved positions gained during the previous period and renewed his attack early in the morning. This offensive action apparently involved the 1st Bn and elements of the 1st Bn, 11 SS Mtn Regt, and it was supported by almost continuous mortar and arty fire on our forward elements. The enemy maintained hvy pressure on our forward units while he attacked against the flanks of our positions from the NE and NW, and he succeeded in infiltrating some forces to Q-824387 -- Q-815389. The enemy offered stubborn opposition to our counterattacks in this area and our attack from the E developed a well organized defense line Q-835401 -- Q-835398. Scattered patrol activity was reported on the W flank of the salient while the BAERENTHAL area continued relatively quiet.

103d Inf Div. The enemy was generally quiet throughout the period except on the left half of the front where occasional SA and mortar fire was reported. An enemy group of undetermined size was observed N of PHILIPPSBOURG (Q-8742) and a small patrol was also observed in vic of DAMBACH (Q-9244).



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14th Armd Div. Activity in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area decreased during the period, however, fighting in both towns continued. An enemy MG nest in vic of the church in RITTERSHOFFEN was knocked out, but the enemy continued to hold a strongpoint in the rear of the church with SA and AW. There was some indication from movements and attitude that the enemy was attempting to withdraw in this area, either to regroup for further aggressive action or to support his attacks launched in the SESSENHEIM area.

79th Inf Div. At 1700A, the enemy resumed his aggressive action in the SESSENHEIM area where an estimated two Cos supported by two or three tanks attacked and captured the town. Two pillboxes further S, vic R-179209 were also captured. About 1030A, an estimated six tanks and 60-70 men were taken under arty fire as they moved N from DENGOLSHEIM (R-1821). Also during the morning, a small enemy patrol which contacted our OP in KAUFFENHEIM (R-2128) was captured and PWs identified the Bn HOPPE which was reported to have a total of 150 men in ROPPENHEIM (R-2327). During the afternoon, the enemy attacked from SESSENHEIM and succeeded in capturing most of the woods vic R-1720, while our counterattack to retake this area was stopped by the hostile forces. Late in the afternoon, an estimated three Cos of enemy were observed crossing the river vic R-178203 and considerable enemy activity was noted in ROESCHWOOG (R-2125). Throughout the afternoon patrol activity increased in the KAUFFENHEIM -- LEUTENHEIM (R-2127) area. A PW taken in the action S of SESSENHEIM identified the I Bn of the 19 Para Regt which with previous identification would indicate that the entire 19 Regt is operating in this area along with elements of the 21 Para Regt. About 2240A, an estimated two platoons raided ROHRWILLER (R-1217) but were reported repulsed after a fire fight. However, just prior to midnight an estimated three Cos of enemy attacked the town from the SW having infiltrated behind our right flank positions. Hvy pressure continued in this area at the close of the period and PWs taken identified the 1 Co, 22 PGR, of the 10 SS Pz Div.

12th Armd Div. Early in the period, the enemy who had begun to infiltrate our positions in HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) launched an aggressive action with what appeared to be about 500 troops consisting of elements of 2 SS Police Regt and miscellaneous groups under command of the 553 Div and 405 Div. This force employed considerable fire from all Inf weapons and succeeded in forcing our troops to withdraw from the estimated third of the town they held. Later in the morning, an enemy force of Inf and tanks moving towards HERRLISHEIM from OFFENDORF (R-1212) was broken up by arty forcing the enemy to withdraw. Throughout the period, the enemy in HERRLISHEIM employed hvy SA, mortar and AT fire against our troops.

(7) Motor Movement. The principal enemy traffic was again after dark in the area S of WISSENBURG. Some traffic was reported moving between BUEL (R-1935) and HATTEN and considerable movement was seen on the road OBERSENBACH (R-1841) -- ASCHBACH (R-1837) -- STUNDWILLER (R-1836). The vehicles were using headlights and moving from N to S. This unusual action may have been to attract our attention in order to carry out other movements elsewhere.

(8) River Traffic. Considerable barge traffic was picked up by air CP indicating the enemy forces N of the RHINE are being constantly reinforced. During the afternoon, barge movements from E to W were observed vic R-152119, R-170143 and R-152170, each movement consisting of from 5 to 10 barges. One barge was seen at R-214206 and at R-204180.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties


45th Inf Div

1 fr II Bn 476 GR
1 fr I Bn 477 GR

1 fr II Bn 11 SS Mtn Regt
3 deserters

6

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,256



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103d Inf Div 2 deserters

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,324

79th Inf Div

14 fr II Bn 19 Para Regt	2 fr I Bn 2 SS Police Regt
1 fr III Bn 20 Para Regt	7 fr Bn HOPPE
30 fr II Bn 21 Para Regt	4 deserters and unidentified
3 fr 15 Co 21 Para Regt	61

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,913

14th Armd Div 1 fr 20 Para Regt

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,070

12th Armd Div

14 fr I Bn 2 SS Police Regt	12 fr Bn ZIERES (V Bn 3 Regt
15 fr II Bn 2 SS Police Regt	Oberrhein)
5 fr Hq 2 SS Police Regt	1 fr Bn MORG (VI Bn 3 Regt
2 fr III Bn 2 SS Police Regt	Oberrhein)
2 fr 20 Mortar Bn	2 fr 14 Co BG MARBACH (3 Regt
2 fr 405 AT Bn	2 unidentified Oberrhein)
	57

Total PWs captured by 12th Armd Div in FRANCE: 613

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 182400A: 127

Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001 January 1945: 3,196

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,384

b. Enemy methods. How effectively some German tanks and half-tracks have been camouflaged for winter fighting may be discerned from the following report of a 14th Armd Div reconnaissance officer:


"On 15 January I was given the mission of occupying an observation pill box between our lines and the enemy lines, N of RITTERSHOFFEN at R 160342. The Germans held the woods and the N edge of RITTERSHOFFEN. I reached the observation post at 0705A on the 16th and observed the enemy activity in the vicinity. About noon the next day one of my men noticed a German half-track moving down from the main portion of town to the curve in the road at 159341. It was completely white except for the inner sides of the suspension system, and although it was only 200 yards away I had great difficulty in seeing it.

Shortly after this I noticed a dark circle against the white background. On very close observation I discovered it to be a German Mark IV tank which was also completely white. The dark circle I had seen was the inside of the muzzle. The tank was not over 150 yards from my position. Yet it was necessary for me to use field glasses to determine that it was a tank in front of me. I believe the tank had been in that same position all the time that I was in the pill box with my men.

As to what is being used to cover the vehicles I am not sure. It could be paint, white cloth or whitewash."

c. Security. Examination of recently captured documents shows an increasing security consciousness among German prisoners. There has been a sharp jump in the number of cases of soldbuch with pages torn out. It should be brought to the attention of MPs guarding prisoners that the German soldier has been instructed in case of capture to tear out and destroy certain pages of the soldbuch and so neutralize its intelligence value. PWs must be guarded against such attempts.

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S E C R E T

d. Flak in the ARDENNES Offensive. It is now possible to examine briefly the role played by flak in the recent enemy offensive into the ARDENNES. In planning this attack it was apparent to the enemy that the greatest threat to his success would be the combination of flyable weather and Allied aircraft. As a consequence the proportion of flak protection to troops and area involved was higher than in any previous operation in this war's history. Flak units were apparently given the highest priorities in supply of fuel and ammunition. They must also have been given a great degree of freedom in moving over roads always taxed to capacity. Otherwise the gigantic task confronting the flak staff would never have been accomplished so well. In addition to the tremendous quantities of mobile flak assigned to this offensive, it would appear from PW reports and an analysis of developments that at least two large self-propelled flak task forces had been organized. It was the mission of these self-propelled units to protect the most important forward communication centers immediately upon their capture. Probably these units were to be relieved as soon as possible by mobile flak units and were to "leapfrog" one another in movement toward the west. At the time of the enemy's farthest advance toward the west, when the attack bogged down, there were 545 light flak guns and 198 heavy flak guns (exclusive of self-propelled units) in the 450-square-mile area of the pocket from HOUFFALIZE westward. So efficient was the enemy flak organization that at this time there was no communication center in the "bulge" without an adequate flak defense.

(Source: XIX TAC Daily Intel Summary No 153)

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. To attack in the direction:


- (1) BITCHE -- INGWILLER
- (2) LAUTERBOURG -- HAGUENAU
- (3) HERRLISHEIM -- HAGUENAU
- (4) GAMBSHEIM -- STRASBOURG.

b. To attack in two or more of the above directions simultaneously.

Discussion

Increased barge activity on the RHINE, the identification of two Regts of the 7 Para Div in the SESSENHEIM area and the 10 SS Pz Div in the HERRLISHEIM area, together with the aggressive attitude displayed along the E flank during the past few days, all are strong indications that the enemy has shifted his 'Schwerpunkt' from the HATTEN area to the E flank. The decrease of arty fire in the HATTEN area is a further indication in that it suggests that the enemy may be displacing his arty to the SE to be in better position to support his main effort. The build up on the E flank in the GAMBSHEIM -- DRUSENHEIM area has been progressing steadily since his initial crossing on 4-5 January and it is believed that the bulk of the 553 Div is now W of the RHINE with the exception of services and arty which is currently supporting the attack from positions E of the river. Substantial armored elements, including a number of Tiger tanks, are also operating in the GAMBSHEIM -- DRUSENHEIM area and the identification of the 10 SS Pz Div may explain the presence of this armor (hitherto unaccounted for). Just how much additional strength is available to support an operation on the E flank is unknown but the 30 SS Inf Div, which was withdrawn from the COIMAR Pocket late in November, is a strong candidate to join in this operation, as well as one or more additional Inf Divs (35 Inf Div and 216 Inf Div) which frequently have been reported organizing in the Black Forest. Other divisions also may be made available by the withdrawal from the ARDENNES salient.

S E C R E T




S E C R E T

It has been definitely confirmed by captured documents that HIMMLER is in charge of over-all operations in the RHINE Valley and it is very likely that he will make every effort to realize a tangible gain from the enemy's winter counteroffensive by launching a full scale offensive to retake ALSACE. The first step in such an operation may be an attempt to destroy VI Corps by simultaneous drives from the E and W converging SW of the MAGUENAU Forest.

In view of the above considerations, capability b is favored. Capability a (3) appears to be currently in progress. Capabilities a (1) and (2) have been temporarily nullified by our stubborn defense but may be re-initiated at any time with fresh reinforcements from the N. Capability a (4) is likely in the event that the attack to the W is blocked and may be supported by a drive N on STRASBOURG from the COLMAR pocket.

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LANGEVIN
G-2

S E C R E T



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SECRET
:Auth: CG VI Corps:
:Initials: JH:
:Date: 20 Jan 1945:

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 158

FROM: 190001A

TO : 192400A

HQ VI CORPS

200800A JAN 45

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change from overlay to G-2 Report No 153, except on Corps E flank where front line now runs generally: SESSENHEIM (R-1822) -- BOIS de SESSENHEIM (R-1720) -- DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) -- Woods (R-0914) -- GAMBSHEIM (R-1110).

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

10 SS Panzer Div FRUNDSBERG. Both the I Bn (vic ROHRWILLER (R-1217)) and III Bn (OFFENDORF (R-1212)) of the 22 SS PGR have been contacted by PWs captured by VI Corps troops. Preliminary interrogation reveals that the entire 22 PGR may be on the W side of the RHINE, the I Bn having crossed the river on 16 January via the HEIMLINGEN (R-1612) ferry. PWs from 10 Co, 22 SS PGR claim that the 21 SS PGR left KAISERSLAUTERN on 13 or 14 January, that is, several days before the 10 Co, 22 SS PGR. One PW stated that the mission of the Div was to advance and take an objective about 18 km from the RHINE, after which they were to be relieved by a Volksgrenadier Div in the 240 (245 Inf Div?) series. There is every reason to assume, therefore, that both PGRs are in the area and that other components of the Div will be contacted in the very near future. Preliminary interrogation indicates that, with Inf Bns 400-500 strong, the Div has enjoyed a considerable refitting. Troops of the 10 SS Panzer Div are represented as preponderantly young REICHS-DEUTSCHE, the bulk of whom were former members of the GAF and were induced to volunteer for the armed SS through the exercise of various forms of duress.

Bn SCHINDLER. Capture of a PW at R-128453 from the 1 Co, Bn SCHINDLER (937 GR, 245 Inf Div) once more re-establishes the presence of the 245 Inf Div within the VI Corps zone. Captain SCHINDLER was recently reported as CO of the III Bn, 935 GR. This identification, therefore, may indicate, as pointed out by a PW a short time ago, that the various elements of the 245 Inf Div have been brought together into the 937 GR. The status of this division remains obscure, however, in view of the conflicting statements of several recently interrogated PWs on its strength and refitting.

c. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention. PW deserter of Convalescent Co, 317 GR, 211 Inf Div stated that the Div had been badly mauled on the East PRUSSIAN front and is now being reorganized in West PRUSSIA into a Volksgrenadier Div.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First French Army. Infiltration attempts vic ILE NAPOLEON (V-7408) repulsed. Harassing arty BITSCHWILLER (V-5115).

XV and XXI Corps. Zones remained quiet.

(Source: Seventh Army Lsum No. 317 as of 192400A).

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VI Corps. Hvy enemy pressure continued unabated in the BITCHE salient and in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area and enemy aggressiveness increased considerably along the Corps E flank. Elements of the 10 SS Pz Div increased the intensity of their offensive vic HERRLISHEIM throughout daylight hours and after several unsuccessful attempts finally established a bridgehead W of the ZORN Canal and were in contact with our troops vic R-0914. Para units defended SESSENHEIM (R-1822) and the BOIS DE SESSENHEIM (R-1720) with determination while a large force was built up in the southern part of DRUSENHEIM (R-1517). Shortly after dark, an estimated two Bns supported by armor attacked DRUSENHEIM and by the end of the period had virtually surrounded our troops in the northern part of town. Two strong attacks were also launched in HATTEN during the morning. Both attacks were contained although the second effort did gain some ground. Two attacks in the morning were also stopped after hvy fighting by our troops NE of REIPERTSWILLER. However, the enemy continued to maintain hvy pressure and strengthened his units which have our troops cut off by infiltration. Armor played an increasingly important role in the HERRLISHEIM offensive. Enemy arty was extremely active in the BITCHE salient while shelling was light in the HATTEN and HERRLISHEIM areas. From all indications, the enemy's main attack is now in progress and extremely hvy pressure is anticipated from the DRUSENHEIM -- GAMBSHEIM area with increasing pressure in the HATTEN area and the BITCHE salient to prevent the shift of troops to counter this attack. The main effort of the enemy is believed directed to HAGUENAU with a view of capturing the vital road center and cutting off our troops to the N. Several hostile a/c were over the Corps area on rcn and bombing missions.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. The 10th SS Pz Div attacked in the bridgehead sector in what appeared to be an all-out offensive action with the likely preliminary objective of BISCHWILLER. At least one Bn of approx 50 tanks, mostly Panther V's, were employed in this attack. Approx 1 Co of 10 tanks with Inf support fought their way over the bridge at R-087120 at 1636A with a second Co of 17 tanks and 400 Inf reported crossing this same bridge at 1715A. At the same time a third Co of 17 tanks crossed the ZORN Canal at HERRLISHEIM and proceeded towards BISCHWILLER. At 1830A, six tanks supported a strong Inf attack on DRUSENHEIM. These attacks ran into well prepared AT defenses and one tank Co strategically located between the two bridge sites, destroyed 16 enemy tanks, two of which were captured US M4's. Arty and other units destroyed 12 more tanks and damaged five. It is estimated that these losses, the heaviest inflicted on the enemy since his present offensive against the VI Corps zone, neutralized approx 25% of his armor located in the bridgehead sector and temporarily blunted the enemy's efforts in this area. In SESSENHEIM, six Mk VI's and three SP's supported the defending Inf and were active throughout the period. During the morning, the enemy attacked HATTEN twice and two of the six tanks supporting this action were destroyed. Fighter bombers were active during the period and reported destroying and damaging some tanks, in close support missions over the bridgehead. (30 tanks were destroyed during the period (air activity NOT included), five damaged. Tanks destroyed since 1 Jan - 121; damaged or disabled - 47. *mm*)

(2) Arty. Guns in the MOUTERHOUSE (Q-7942) -- BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) continue to support ground troops with very hvy harassing fires on forward positions NE of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) and hvy interdiction of roads and trails during the entire period. All calibers were employed including an estimated 300 rds of rocket fire. The enemy's attack on HATTEN at 0800A was supported by arty and SP fire which continued light during the day but shelling reports received during the period do not indicate a shift of the enemy's arty from the OBERSEEBACH (R-1842) -- TRIMBACH (R-2138) area. Further to the S, troops defending SESSENHEIM (R-1822) were supported by flat trajectory fire and the enemy's attack across the ZORN Canal vic R-078110 was preceded by a 10-minute preparation. WEYERSHEIM (R-0513) was harassed during the



S E C R E T

day. Nightly harassing fire was moderate in the REIPERTSWILLER area and light in the ROHRWILLER (R-1217) -- WEYERSHEIM area. The enemy continues to rely on guns E of the RHINE River for support of operations in the ROHRWILLER -- GAMBESHEIM area but can be expected to so employ guns on the W side of the river if his forces continue to advance.

(3) Aviation. Although flying conditions were favorable, enemy air did not support the offensive on the Corps E flank. However, three Me-109s were over the GAMBESHEIM area at midafternoon on rcn missions. At 1827A, a single hostile a/c flying SW vic SELTZ dropped one bomb SW of HAGUENAU vic R-032232 and strafed vic R-036243. Hostile a/c turned and left the Corps area vic SELTZ.

(4) Engr. The RJ at R-180225 was mined by the enemy.


(5) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy continued to maintain hvy pressure on the nose of the BITCHE salient throughout the period and in the BAERENTHAL area offered strong opposition to our advance. The enemy resisted all efforts to contact our troops virtually surrounded NE of REIPERTSWILLER vic Q-8140 and continued to strengthen his positions in this area by infiltration. During the morning the enemy launched two attacks employing an estimated two Cos in each offensive. The first attack vic Q-814394 began at 0800A and the second was launched at 1125A vic Q-816394. Both these attacks were contained after hvy fighting, however, the enemy attitude remained aggressive during the afternoon and even small groups usually with hvy mortar and arty preparations continued to attack our positions. During the morning our advance to vic Q-838406 developed a fire fight with enemy in position on the high ground. Stiff resistance was also offered by enemy in position on the E slopes of Hill 364 (Q-8339). A PW was captured from the 1 Co, 506 SS Bn who stated that the 80 men in his unit had the mission of holding Hill 403 (Q-835404) and protecting the flank of the SS Div attacking SW. After dark the enemy was relatively inactive and our patrol sent to investigate two pink flares set off vic Q-835308 at 2045A could not find any enemy. Another friendly patrol encountered enemy in dug-in positions vic Q-795387.

103d Inf Div. Enemy activity was limited to a few scattered patrols with the apparent mission of capturing PWs. At 0725A, a fire fight developed vic Q-892432 and at 0750A an enemy patrol captured three of our men at Q-898343 but while withdrawing set off trip wire and one of our men escaped in the confusion. Another patrol moved vic Q-889435 was taken under arty fire and later in the day a seven man enemy patrol was observed vic DISTELDORF (Q-005455).

14th Armd Div. The enemy maintained hvy pressure on our troops in HATTEN but was generally quiet in RITTERSHOFFEN. At 0800A, a three-pronged attack was launched on HATTEN from the NE, E and SE. This attack was supported by arty and tank fire but was repulsed at 0900A without loss of ground. Another strong attack employing Inf and tanks started at approx noon and succeeded in capturing some ground in HATTEN, however this effort died down at 1530A except for several snipers who continued active in the eastern part of town. The enemy attitude was defensive in RITTERSHOFFEN throughout the period and although the enemy withdrew from his strongpoint in the church he retained another in adjacent buildings. Enemy night patrols were very active in the HATTEN area up to the close of the period.

79th Inf Div. Strong resistance was encountered in the SESSENHEIM (R-1822) area and late in the period the enemy became aggressive vic DRUSENHEIM (R-1517). Elements of the 19 Para Regt supported by some armor and arty offered very determined resistance from the eastern edge of SESSENHEIM and the BOIS DE SESSENHEIM (R-172Q) and succeeded in holding these positions without



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loss of ground. During the day, the enemy was observed building up a large force in the southern part of DRUSENHEIM and at 1830A, two Bns of Inf and 6 tanks attacked the northern part of town from the NE, S and SW. At the end of the period, the enemy had the town virtually surrounded, however approx 60 of our troops had managed to infiltrate through enemy lines. Elsewhere on the Div front, enemy activity was limited to patrolling. Seven PWs were captured from the 21 Pz Rcn Bn N of RITTERSHOFFEN during the morning and later in the day a 5-man patrol vic R-205309 and a 50-man patrol at R-200310 were both forced to withdraw by our outposts.

12th Armd Div. The enemy was very aggressive and increased the intensity of his offensive until dusk at which time activity decreased and the Div zone remained comparatively quiet until the end of the period. Shortly after midnight, the I Bn 22 PGR launched an attack on ROHRWILLER (R-1217) from the SE. Hvy fighting continued in this area until 0700A when the enemy withdrew back across the ZORN Canal leaving an estimated 60 dead. At midmorning, an estimated Co of Inf crossed the ZORN S of HERRLISHEIM in rubber boats and after hvy fighting they too were forced to retire. An undetermined number of Inf supported by tanks assaulted the bridge vic R-087120 at noon and after considerable fighting were able to secure this crossing. At 1635A, Inf and approx 10 tanks crossed the bridge and were engaged by our arty with good results. At this same time, an estimated 17 tanks and 200 Inf crossed the canal vic HERRLISHEIM and proceeded NW. At 1715A, another 17 tanks and 400 Inf were reported crossing the bridge at R-087120 but this report was not confirmed. Just before dark, some armor with Inf support assaulted our positions in the woods vic R-0914 but this attack was repulsed after a short fight.

(6) Motor movement. During the morning, hvy traffic was reported moving between HERRLISHEIM and DRUSENHEIM as the enemy continued to build-up in the latter town preparatory to his attack launched in that area at 1830A. At the same time moderate traffic was observed between WISSEMBOURG and RIED-SCHULTZ (R-1543) or WISSEMBOURG and OBERSEEBAACH (R-1840). This was probably the movement of supplies to the HATTEN area, although the possibility of a limited number of reinforcements arriving on our front cannot be overlooked. At 1930A, vehicular traffic was heard on the N trail between HATTEN and RITTERSHOFFEN. Traffic between BUHL (R-2035) and HATTEN was very hvy from 2000A to 2100A. This traffic may have been a relief as a PW captured later vic R-185323 stated that the paratroops in HATTEN had been relieved by SS troops between 2000A and 2200A.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

1 fr 506 SS PG Bn	1 fr 476 GR
1 fr II Bn 457 GR	1 fr II Bn 481 GR
	<u>4</u>

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,260

103d Inf Div

3 deserters

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,327

79th Inf Div

4 fr II Bn 125 PGR	1 fr BG SCHINDLER (937 GR)
7 fr 21 Rcn Bn	1 deserter
1 fr BG LOEWEN	1 unidentified
	<u>15</u>

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,928



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14th Armd Div

2 fr I Bn 35 PGR

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,072

12th Armd Div

4 fr I Bn 22 SS PGR

1 fr III Bn 22 SS PGR

4 fr Escort Bn REICHSFUEHRER SS
9

Total PWs captured by 12th Armd Div in FRANCE: 622

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 192400A: 33

Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 3,229

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,417

b. Enemy methods. 12th Armd Div reports during current operations vic bridgehead that considerable number of American medium tanks have either been destroyed or captured by the enemy. It is believed that the enemy will make every attempt to recondition these tanks using them either with Allied or German markings in an effort to gain surprise and to create confusion among our troops. All units are warned to be on the alert and incidents of this nature will be reported immediately to this headquarters through intelligence channels.

Major # rows

c. Security of US unit identifications.

(1) It is a well known fact that the German General Staff bases its identifications principally on letters and documents found on PWs and PW interrogation, shoulder patches and vehicle markings. The practice of carrying letters and documents as well as training personnel (particularly reinforcements) is, of course, up to units which should and do constantly harp on this subject.

(2) When the 712th Tk Bn which is attached to the 90th US Inf Div was enroute to the BASTOGNE area, one civilian, who was subsequently detained and turned in to III US Corps CIC, was reported attempting to distinguish and copy down vehicle markings. Agents from special espionage schools, which major in US Army identifications, have been apprehended on special occasions. German soldiers, with the mission of determining US markings, in US uniforms and vehicles, are reported to have been caught in several sectors.


(3) It is therefore believed that in any subsequent major shift of units or commitment of large forces, the removal of all (particularly shoulder patches and helmet markings) unit insignia by all US personnel involved as well as all unit designations from all vehicles would prevent the enemy from ascertaining US unit identifications for a period of up to 48 hours. With security cooperation by individuals of all units, it is believed that the intelligence agencies of the German General Staff would be "thrown into a tail spin" and that any surprise attained would be greatly amplified. Only with the greatest difficulty would the Germans be able to logically determine to what extent to commit reserves or withdraw units from the line. (Source: 90th US Inf Div G-2 Periodic Report No 209, 15 Jan 45).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 157.

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G-2



S E C R E T

Copy No 61

: : : : :
 : S E C R E T :
 : Auth: CG VI Corps:
 : Initials: *JLL* :
 : Date: 21 Jan 1945:
 : : : : :

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 159

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 200001A
 TO : 202400A
 HQ VI CORPS
 210800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change, see G-2 Report No 158.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

256 VG Div. According to a deserter from the 1 Co, 506 SS PG Bn (6 SS Mtn Div) taken at Q-835404, his Bn relieved an army unit in that area the night of 14-15 January. This agrees with the statement of a PW from 5 Co, 481 GR who states that they recently relieved an SS unit. Thus it appears that another shift has been under way in the REIPERTSVILLER Salient, the 6 SS Mtn Div having assumed a sector in the vic of BAERENHILF (Q-8442) and the 256 VG Div having changed places with the former, now occupying an area NE of WILDENGUTH (Q-7837). It remains to be seen what repercussions this may have on adjacent units, but the identification of elements of the 245 Inf Div (BG LOEWEN) at ASCHBACH (R-1837) yesterday might suggest a general eastward shift of all enemy formations. If so, this would agree with statements of PWs from the 21 Pz Div that they are due for relief - it being assumed that the 245 Inf Div is moving eastward - and also with statements of a PW from the 22 SS PGR (10 SS Pz Div) that, after having advanced some 18 km from the RHINE, they were to be relieved by a Volksgrenadier Div in the 240 series.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Advance encountered stiff opposition in I Corps zone. PFASTATT (V-6708) and ILLZAC (V-7109) reported clear despite several counter-attacks. Fighting reported in LUTTERBACH (V-6506) and VIEUX THANN (V-5412). Raid vic V-6749 supported by two tanks dispersed by arty. Vehicular traffic moving NW observed vic V-5542.

XV and XXI Corps. Sectors remained quiet during period.

(Source: Seventh Army Isum No 319 as of 202400A).

VI Corps. Although maintaining his hvy pressure in the nose of the BITCHE Salient, the enemy became unusually quiet on the remainder of the Corps front. This was especially apparent in the HATTEN (R-1733) -- RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) area and on the E flank along the RHINE River where enemy activity has been characterized by aggressive action. The only aggressiveness exhibited was in the area W of WEYERSHEIM (R-0413) and KURTZENHEIM (R-0515) where an enemy attack by 150 men was repulsed before dawn, and another group of 75 were dispersed after dark. It is believed that the suspicious quiet which suddenly developed in the enemy situation was due to the enemy's regrouping and reorganization in preparation for a well coordinated attack, probably directed against the Corps E flank. Generally there was no apparent change in enemy dispositions, however the extremely adverse weather conditions limited visibility and hampered observation. In keeping with relative calm of other enemy activity, hostile arty was likewise considerably reduced over the previous period. No enemy air activity was reported.

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b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. A sharp reduction of armored activity was noted throughout the period, probably due to hvy losses suffered by the enemy during the preceding period and the apparent hostile reorganization. A total of 36 immobile and stationary tanks were observed in the area of the recent large scale tank battle, N, S and W of HERRLISHEIM. 16 of these tanks were reported to be Sherman tanks and are either some of ours destroyed in this area during the tank battle or some of our captured tanks being employed by the enemy. The remainder are probably destroyed and damaged enemy tanks and indicates that the enemy has not, as yet, retrieved his tanks. Some tank movement was noted in this area, with one tank moving N in HERRLISHEIM at 1100A, one tank at R-099150 moving W at 1350A, and six tanks reported in vic of R-099120 at 1500A. Elsewhere on the Corps front, four enemy tanks were observed in HATTEN during the morning. No hostile tanks were destroyed or damaged during the period.

(2) Arty. The decrease in activity of enemy arty after previously active periods is probably due to poor conditions of observation. Shelling was light except in the REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) area where moderate harassing fire was placed on forward elements, and Inf attacking Hill 363 (Q-824386) were subjected to concentrated defensive fires. Road block vic Q-763390 was target for 100 rds of 88mm fire during the afternoon and REIPERTSWILLER was TOT'd with 40 rds from light caliber guns just prior to dusk. The HOFFEN -- HATTEN area was lightly harassed at midday. Nightly harassing fire was light and placed in the REIPERTSWILLER and KURTZENHAUSEN (R-0515) areas.

(3) CWS. About 1400A, the enemy smoked the ridge N of RITTERSHOFFEN (R-1533) which was probably an attempt to prevent the adjustment of our arty on a pillbox.

(4) Engr. A PW taken by the 103d Div claimed that there are 400 mines laid in the valley vic CHAPEL (Q-872429).


(5) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy stubbornly opposed our attack vic Q-8238 with strong MG and mortar fire and succeeded in preventing our troops from making contact with friendly elements which are cut-off in that area vic Q-8140. The enemy likewise stopped the efforts of the surrounded elements to fight their way back to our main positions. The hvy mortar and arty fire which has accompanied the enemy's pressure in this area continued but showed some decrease over the previous period. Our raiding party received hvy fire W of REHBACH (Q-8339) while the enemy remained defensive on the W flank of the salient, maintaining close contact. Some shift in hostile units was apparent in the nose of the salient. The 256 Div is believed to have moved over to the W while the 6 SS Mtn has side slipped to the E thus placing the latter Div (which has spearheaded the enemy's recent attacks in this area) in a better position to renew its attacks in a SE direction rather than due S.

103d Inf Div. Div front continued quiet with no enemy Inf activity reported.

14th Armd Div. Little enemy activity was reported during the period but the enemy continued alert and sensitive in this sector.

79th Inf Div. During the morning, some enemy pressure was reported in the S part of the BOIS DE RUNTZENHEIM (R-1823) and SA fire was reported in DRUSENHEIM (R-1518). In the afternoon, Inf and tank activity was noted in DRUSENHEIM -- SESSENHEIM (R-1822) area giving the appearance of some build-up, but no aggressive action developed. After dark there was no contact or enemy activity reported.



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36th Inf Div. Just before dawn, an estimated 150 enemy launched a half-hearted attack vic R-092144 -- R-087151 which was easily repulsed, with heavy loss to the enemy including a total of nine out of 12 MGs captured. Also during the morning, 25 enemy were observed milling around vic R-099115 and 16 men were seen moving W at R-123145. During the afternoon, increased Inf movements in small groups were observed: 20 men at R-128185, 75 men vic R-118118, 75 men heading SW at R-124125, and one tank and unknown number of Inf were moving W vic R-099150. After dark, an estimated 75 enemy approaching WEYERSHEIM (R-0512) on the GAMBSHEIM road were dispersed by our tank fire. Also a fire fight with 25 enemy vic R-082156 was stopped by the enemy after 3 hours fighting with the enemy moving to vic R-085157.

(6) Motor movements. Very little traffic was observed during the period which was probably due to the adverse weather conditions. About 0930A hvy traffic moving SE out of HATTEN was reported. During the afternoon, an estimated 40 vehicles were reported moving S into CLEEBOURG (R-1144) which could well have been additional troops being moved into that area.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div 2 fr I Bn 257 AR

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,262

103d Inf Div 1 fr I Bn 118 GR
4 unidentified
5

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,332

79th Inf Div 3 fr I Bn 35 PGR

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,931

36th Inf Div 2 fr II Bn 21 SS PGR
2 fr III Bn 22 SS PGR
4

Total PWs captured by 36th Inf Div in FRANCE: 19,880

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 202400A: 14
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 6,243
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,431

b. Enemy methods. At approx 1700A, two of our soldiers who were asleep in their foxholes vic R-1520 were surprised and attacked by two enemy soldiers dressed in American uniforms. The enemy stripped our men down to their underwear and took their clothes. Two more enemy soldiers then came forward and put on the uniforms. Our soldiers were then blindfolded and told not to move or they would be shot. The four Germans moved off to the NE and were last seen heading toward our lines. The above incident in conjunction with the considerable number of American tanks recently believed captured or rehabilitated by the enemy and the large number of American PWs taken by the enemy (from which the enemy could take additional American uniforms) creates a serious threat to our security. It is believed that the enemy may attempt to spearhead his attack with American tanks and German soldiers dressed in American uniforms in order to gain surprise and create confusion among our troops. German soldiers wearing American uniforms likewise create a menace to rear area installations and security. All units must be thoroughly alerted to the above actions by the enemy.



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c. German Foresight. The German Army Regulations require a Co commander to write a letter of condolence to the next of kin of each of his men killed in action. The commander of 1 Co, Regt E/V apparently had considerable foresight regarding this matter since a recently captured document is a form letter of condolence. Leaving blank spaces for the date and the name and address of the bereaved, the letter states that the son or husband died a hero's death in the battle for GAMBSHEIM on 5 January 1945. A bullet through the head is the way each of the Co commander's men died, regardless of circumstances, and the body evacuated to a local cemetery near ACHERN (BADEN) and buried with full military honors. Apparently the Co commander expected to have so many of his men killed in the battle for GAMBSHEIM on 5 January, that a form letter was necessary.

d. A lost Lieutenant? - with a telephone?? This report was received from one of our units. An American wire crew Sgt and his crew of five EM were checking their wires when they came across an American Lieutenant tapped into a Bn wire. The Sgt questioned the Lieutenant who said he was from a unit on the right (he named the unit) and was trying to find his position. The Sgt was satisfied with the explanation and left the Lieutenant still listening on the wire. Subsequently, the wire was found cut at the same location and the unit on the right had no knowledge of any of their officers being in that vic or engaged in that activity. (Source: 103d Inf Div G-2 Periodic Report No 61, 20 Jan 45).

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 157.

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1 Incl - German Night Fighting Tactics

*Enclosure #1
 Translation: German Night
 Fighting tactics taken
 as possible IB material
 301430A Jan*

- 4 -

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S E C R E T

Copy No 59

: : : : :
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG VI Corps:
: Initials: *JH* :
: Date: 22 Jan 1945:
: : : : :

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 160

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 210001A
TO : 212400A
HQ VI CORPS
220800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. Due to the nature of the situation no front line exists on the center of the Corps front and points of contact remain unchanged on the flanks.

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

36 VG Div. The capture of 2 PWs from 1 Co, 165 GR (36 VG Div) at Q-9544 reflects a considerable eastward shift of that regiment, last contacted at Q-8943. It is probable that the entire 36 VG Div may be in process of displacement to the east, thus narrowing the sector of the 245 Inf Div or entailing the latter's movement southeastward. However, only further and more satisfactory contact with the furtive 245 Inf Div will reveal the extent to which these two divisions have undergone a reshuffling within our zone.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. Counterattack N of BOURTZWILLER (V-6908) repulsed. Street fighting in RICHWILLER (V-6609) and VIEUX THANN (V-5412). LUTTERBACH (V-6607) and KINGERSHEIM (V-7010) clear but enemy still holds REININGUE (V-6205). Raid vic ORBEY (V-5747) repulsed.

XV and XXI Corps. Sectors continue quiet.

(Source: Seventh Army Isum No 321 as of 212400A)

VI Corps. Enemy activity was considerably reduced over the entire Corps zone, however, the enemy continued to probe our positions S of BISCHWILLER in an apparent attempt to locate a weak spot in this area. There are some indications that the enemy was not immediately aware of our withdrawals or of their extent and in this respect it is assumed that unfavorable weather conditions severely hampered the enemy's reconnaissance. Armored activity increased over the previous period on the Corps E flank but remained negligible elsewhere on the Corps front. Enemy arty activity was light.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. A heavy increase of armored activity was reported during the period with 3 tank concentrations, totalling approximately 50 tanks, making their appearance in the zone of the 36th Div. Throughout the day 2 groups of tanks were active W and SW of HERRLISHEIM. One group of 12 tanks at R-087120, were deployed to the NW, in the direction of MEYERSHEIM and the second group, totalling 15 tanks with supporting inf made a demonstration by firing and moving between the woods at R-0815 and R-0914. However, they proved to be good targets and 8 tanks were destroyed and 2 others damaged. A third group of 18 tanks were reported moving towards OBERHOFFEN (1020) at 1830A. At dusk, a tank covered by 5 others fired into BISCHWILLER from E of the MODER River. The 50 tanks reported active, throughout the period, are believed to constitute at least 50% of the enemy's total tank strength on our front. Total tanks destroyed since 1 Jan: 129. Total tanks damaged since 1 Jan: 49.

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(2) Arty. The enemy's lack of knowledge of our dispositions in the central zone resulted in very little shelling. In the 45th Div zone shelling was light and scattered on forward elements prior to noon by light calibers. INGWILLER (Q-8130) was harassed by light guns shortly after noon while REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) was intermittently shelled during the afternoon by medium caliber guns firing 3 to 8 round missions. Civilians report the enemy shelled SOULTZ (R-1137) and SURBURG (R-0834) indicating the enemy lacked information of our new positions. During the night very light shelling fell in ROTHBACH (Q-8434), UEBERACH (Q-9228), KURTZENHAUSEN (R-0515) with a few rounds of tank fire placed in HAGUENAU and BISCHWILLER (R-0918).

(3) Engr. A Schu minefield was located at Q-762401 and PWs report a field of Holz mines 20 x 200 yds between Q-763399 and Q-763402.

(4) Inf.

45th Inf Div. Enemy pressure decreased in the area NE of REIPERTSWILLER but contact was maintained by routine patrolling. The enemy remained sensitive to our patrols in the central and western portions of the div front and during the morning fire fight resulted vic Q-767394 and Q-762401. Later in the day a 15-20 man enemy patrol vic Q-771390 was dispersed by mortar fire. After dark an enemy patrol engaged our positions on HALL 415 (Q-829381) with SA fire and at 2030A our troops vic Q-767393 drew long range MG fire.

103rd Inf Div. There was no contact with the enemy during the period. However, unconfirmed reports state that the enemy had patrols in MITSCHDORF (R-0339) at 0800A, WORTH (R-0037) at 0900A, LE HOCHBURG (Q-7739) at 1200A, GOERSDORF (R-0239) and REICHSHOFFEN (Q-9436) by 1350A.

79th Inf Div. There was no contact across the div front but shortly before dark air ops observed small groups of inf with some armor at R-103199 and R-102203.

36th Inf Div. The enemy maintained pressure throughout the period with numerous probing actions apparently designed to find a weak spot in our lines for later large scale exploitation. This is substantiated by PW statements who reported that the 10 SS Div and a VG Div would launch a large scale offensive after they had found a soft spot in our line. The enemy remained in contact with our troops vic R-083154 and considerable activity was observed in the wood vic R-1011 throughout the day. At noon inf riding on 15 tanks and an undetermined number of half-tracks put on a demonstration between the woods at R-0815 and R-0914. At the same time inf and 12 tanks were observed vic the bridge at R-087120. Some of the tanks proceeded NW and made contact with our positions vic R-077135 where they were forced to withdraw before their supporting Inf could join them.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

1 fr I Bn 477 GR
1 fr II Bn 477 GR
2 fr II Bn 457 GR
4

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,266

103d Inf Div

2 fr I Bn 165 GR
3 fr I Bn Fortr Regt XII/1
1 deserter
6

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,338

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<u>79th Inf Div</u>	2 fr 125 Rcn Bn
	<u>2 unidentified</u>
	4

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,935

<u>36th Inf Div</u>	7 fr II Bn 21 SS PGR
	<u>3 unidentified</u>
	10

Total PWs captured by 36th Inf Div in FRANCE: 19,890

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 212400A: 24 ✓
 Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 3,267* ✓ mms
 Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,305* ✓

* Excluding 150 PWs reported turned over to 45th Inf Div by 14th Armd Div on 2 January, and believed to have been reported twice.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 157.

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NO

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps:
Initials: JHK
Date: 23 Jan 1945:

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

NO 161

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 220001A
TO : 222400A
HQ VI CORPS
230800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. Due to the fluid nature of the enemy's follow up, no definite front line exists. On the extreme W flank patrol contact was made along our own lines E of ALTHORN (Q-7540) to N of REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037). Contact was also made vic OFFWILLER (Q-8534) and ZINSWILLER (Q-8935). On the E flank the enemy was active in N part of HAGUENAU, then S along the E side of the MODER River to BISCHWILLER, then S to vic R-070120.

b. Units in contact. For identifications see Par 3a below.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. I Corps: Counterattack at KINGERSHEIM (V-7010) and ILLZAC (V-7109) repulsed. Resistance in LUTZELHOF Farm (V-5809) and OEHLENBERG Convent (V-6005) overcome after strong resistance. Counterattack against Hill vic V-5414 succeeded in gaining high ground. Strong attack, supported by armor, S of CERNAY (V-5812) stopped after slight penetration. II Corps: Several patrols vic V-7049, V-7048 and V-7250 repulsed. Strongpoint remaining from previous attack, 700 yds SE of KILSTETT (R-0909), still holding out.

XV and XXI Corps. Sectors quiet.

(Source: Seventh Army Isum No 323 as of 222400A)


VI Corps. Enemy contact was generally light and consisted principally of probing and rcn patrols. Likewise shelling was very light and scattered. The principal activity was a rapid and heavy follow up of our withdrawal on both flanks of the Corps. As yet there has been no extensive follow up in the center of the Corps front which is probably due to the relative immobility of the troops in that area. The enemy movements observed during the day appeared to be converging in the ZINSWILLER (Q-8937) area and in the BISCHWILLER (R-0918) area, WEYERSHEIM (R-0414) area. The enemy's rapid follow up and the areas of apparent concentrations, indicate that the enemy has every intention of continuing his offensive action.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) AAA. Our air OPs reported receiving considerable AA fire in the BISCHWILLER -- WEYERSHEIM area, indicating the importance the enemy places on this zone.

(2) Armor. Little engagement of enemy armor was reported but much movement noted with a continued concentration of at least 30 tanks in the area W of the ZORN River. Eight to ten tanks operated in the OBERHOFFEN (R-0920) -- BISCHWILLER area, indicating a substantial shift of armor to this sector. A few tanks operated in the area N and W of HAGUENAU with some tank fire reported on the MODER River bridge site in HAGUENAU. The tanks operating in the OBERHOFFEN and HAGUENAU areas are possibly elements of the 21 Pz and 10th SS Pz Divs. On the left flank of the Corps zone, air OP and patrols report heavy movement from the NW and N with many columns spearheaded by armored cars and motorcycles. Civilians report some troops wearing tankers uniforms (black) in ZINSWILLER and GUNDERSHOFFEN. These indications suggest the presence of a Pz unit in this sector with identification presently unknown. One tank was damaged by arty fire during the period.

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(3) Arty. Enemy arty activity was light due to displacements indicated by observation of horse-drawn arty vic SCHIRMEIN (R-1323) and the enemy's lack of information on location of our positions. In the left part of the Corps zone the enemy was reported shelling positions vacated by our Inf while at mid-day a single SP gun located vic REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8237) placed very scattered shelling in forward areas. In the central zone, a few rounds were placed in the towns of BITSCHHOFFEN (Q-9228), WEITERBACH (R-0317) and MENGHOFFEN (Q-8229) with four out of five of the rounds placed in the latter town being duds. In the southern zone harassing fire was very light shelling on BISCHWILLER and WEITBRUCH (R-0317) areas. Nightly fire was light and scattered.

(4) Inf. Enemy contact was generally light on the Corps front with the principal Inf activity being confined to movements. Small patrol contact was evident on the W flank where the enemy continued to follow up our withdrawal and several patrol clashes developed. In the area SE of the VOSGES Mtns contact was likewise light. Enemy troops in ZINSWILLER (reported to be in black uniforms), engaged our rcn patrol forcing it to withdraw at 1630A, while enemy infiltration behind our OPL into OFFWILLER (Q-8534) was successful after dark and one of our OPs was believed captured. About 2400A, an estimated enemy Bn launched an attack vic Q-8533, but it was repulsed by our counterattack. On the E flank, rcn and probing patrols characterized the day's activity, however after dark patrol action increased in vic of HAGUENAU, vic R-1018 and vic R-0917.

(5) Road movements. The principal enemy activity during the period was the considerable movement on both flanks of the Corps. On the W flank, our air OP reported hvy traffic of personnel and vehicles moving SE from vic BAERENTHAL (Q-8442) late in the afternoon. The column of foot troops extended along the road from Q-890360 to Q-859395, while an estimated 100-200 vehicles were seen in column extending from vic BAERENTHAL to vic Q-854395. Another column of unestimated size was observed along the WALDECK (Q-8440) -- BANNSTEIN (Q-8344) road extending to Q-822425. Also during the afternoon, a column of two tanks, horse-drawn vehicles and Inf were reported by air observer moving from OBERBRONN (Q-9138) while several rcn vehicles and patrols were active along the REICHHOFFEN (Q-9436) -- GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q-9434) road. During the night, considerable vehicular activity was heard on E-W road vic Q-803370 to Q-812369 and an unestimated number of vehicles were reported vic Q-850405. About 2330A, an enemy column of troops were reported on both sides of the road running SW from the woods Q-884336. Movement in the center of the Corps front was very light, with only scattered vehicles reported in the HAGUENAU Forest and some rcn vehicles, tanks or SPs and Inf reported on the northern outskirts of HAGUENAU. On the E flank the enemy built up his forces in the OBERHOFFEN -- BISCHWILLER area with movement and activity of Inf, tanks, horse-drawn arty being reported. The largest group was an estimated 200 vehicles in the S part of the woods R-1020. Another group of 38 vehicles was reported to include one US jeep and one US truck. In the HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) -- WEYERSHEIM area observers reported 12-20 men unloaded from each of six personnel carriers vic R-110115 and considerable traffic on the road running between HERRLISHEIM and WEYERSHEIM. Scattered groups of Inf were reported moving in this area throughout the period. In rear areas, fighter bombers reported 40-50 MT or tanks and much activity in the woods E of BITCHE vic Q-8453. Tac/R reported considerable MT movement in all directions in the area BUCHELBURG (R-3247) -- HERZHEIM (R-3561) -- WINTZENBACH (R-2733) -- NIEDERLAUTERBACH (R-2741). These heavy daylight movements are a strong indication that the enemy is following-up our withdrawal with maximum speed and that he will continue his attacks as soon as possible in an attempt to strike before we have time to consolidate our new positions.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div	13 fr Hq 457 GR
	4 fr II Bn 457 GR
	17

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,283



S E C R E T

103d Inf Div

No PWs during period

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,338

79th Inf Div

2 deserters

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,937

36th Inf Div

82 fr II Bn 22 SS PGR
37 fr III Bn 22 SS PGR

33 additional wounded from 22 SS PGR
1 fr III Bn 21 SS PGR (deserter)

153

Total PWs captured by 36th Inf Div in FRANCE: 20,043

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 222400A: 172
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 3,439
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,477


b. Incident at a bridge. About 2030A, an estimated 12 men dressed in civilian clothes, berets, armbands, carrying rifles and generally giving the appearance of FFI members, approached our bridge guard in ROTHBACH (Q-8434). These men were scattered out and one engaged the guard in conversation. Apparently two others then approached, shot and killed two of the guards. Our other two guards opened fire and the "civilians" ran off. It is not known if these twelve were hostile civilians or Germans dressed in civilian clothes. However, it does re-emphasize the fact that the enemy will resort to any kind of subterfuge and that a constant state of alert must exist in all areas.

ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 157.

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S E C R E T



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Copy No 61

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps:
Initials: JKL
Date: 24 Jan 1945:

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 162

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 230001A
TO : 232400A
HQ VI CORPS
240800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. WILDENGUTH (Q-7837) -- REIPERTSWILLER road to ROEBACH River to LA WALCK (Q-9027), then along N bank of MODER River to BISCHWILLER (R-0918) then SW to R-0711.

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

47 Volksgrenadier Div. The capture of 4 PWs from the I and II Bns, 103 GR (47 VG Div) in the vic of MERTZWILLER (Q-9530) yesterday adds another division to the totality of enemy forces committed within the VI Corps zone.

History. The 156 Reserve Div was organized originally as a mobilization and training Div. In the fall of 1942 it was transferred to BELGIUM and the following year to the BOULOGNE area in northwestern FRANCE. Sometime during the late spring or early summer of 1944 it was upgraded to become the 47 Inf Div. Toward the end of August 1944 the Div became embroiled in the northern French campaign and, by the end of September, was estimated to have a residual combat strength of only about 1500. During the following six weeks it underwent a reorganization into the 47 Volksgrenadier Div, reportedly in DENMARK. Next contacted by the US First Army toward the middle of November, the Div evidently remained in line until the end of 1944 in the DUEREN (AACHEN) area, having reportedly effected a consolidation with the 12 VG Div. On 1 Jan, the 47 VG Div was relieved in the vic of DUEREN, its 103 and 104 GRs being marched to a point about 30 km from COLOGNE where they entrained for LANDAU. According to PWs from the 103 GR, troops of the 103 and 104 GRs arrived in LANDAU about 10 Jan, remaining in that area until about 12 Jan when they marched to ASCHBACH (R-1837) arriving there on 14 Jan. From 16-19 Jan, troops of the 103 and 104 GRs were committed in the HATTEN -- RITTERSHOFFEN area where the 103 GR reportedly suffered 112 casualties during one night alone.

Organization. The 47 VG Div embraces the 103, 104 and 115 GRs, each having two Bns. It is thought to have a four-Bn arty Regt, probably numbered 147. The Div's auxiliary units are believed likewise to be numbered 147. Preliminary interrogation of PWs indicate that the 103 GR may have a strength of 500 combat effectives while the total over-all strength of the Div is estimated at 3000.

Mission. PWs stated that the 104 GR relieved Para units in RITTERSHOFFEN and HATTEN on 16 Jan, and that the 103 GR relieved PG units in the same area during the night of 17-18 Jan, the relieved PG units retiring to WISSEMBOURG. The mission of the Div was said to be to attack in a zone bounded by NEUBERG (Q-9526) and HAGUENAU at 240400A.

Units out of contact. The discovery of the bodies of soldiers from I Bn, 476 GR (256 VG Div) in the REIPERTSWILLER area points to the continued presence of the 256 VG Div in its former sector, save for a slight shift southward, while the identification of II Bn, 11 SS Mtn Regt (6 SS Mtn Div) confirms the southeastward displacement of the 6 SS Mtn Div, most of which still remains in reserve, and the fact that it has exchanged positions with the 256 VG Div. Contact with the 87 GR (36 VG Div) in LA WALCK (Q-9027) - the first identification of this Regt by VI Corps - together with the identification of the 118 GR (36 VG Div) in ZINSWILLER two days ago, firmly establishes the commitment of that Div on VI Corps front, in a zone opposite the 103 Inf Div. Meanwhile, the 7 Para, 361 VG and 25 PG Divs remain unlocated, last contacted respectively on the 18, 16 and 21 January.

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c. Enemy defensive organization. An escapee American PW who spent six days behind the enemy's lines on the Corps E flank reports considerable enemy Inf in emplacements along the E bank of the ZORN River between R-090128 and HERRLISHEIM (R-1214). The bridges at R-102134 and R-099132 are intact and in enemy use.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. I Corps: Strong opposition at CR V-6810 and V-7011. Hvy arty fire on KINGERSHEIM (V-7010). Patrols report RICHWILLER (V-6509) clear. II Corps: Friendly patrols contacted one tank and a half-track W of RIEBWIHR (V-7847). Fire from woods vic V-7049 delayed advance of friendly elements. Arty fire hvy on bridge vic V-7650. Some enemy still holding out in southern portion of OSTHEIM (V-7251). Pillboxes along WEISS River (V-6948) occupied and offering strong resistance. Hvy SA and arty fires received vic V-7148. Late in period GUENAR (V-7554) receiving considerable mortar fire. Troop concentrations observed in HOUSSEN (V-7347), two tanks at V-7848 and two tanks at V-7954.

XV and XXI Corps. Sectors remained quiet.


(Source: Seventh Army Isum No 325 as of 232400A).

VI Corps. Ground activity continued light although the enemy increased his patrolling in an apparent attempt to learn our dispositions. The principal actions on the Corps front were a continuation of infiltration tactics which succeeded in capturing ROTHBACH (Q-8434) and a 40 man raid repulsed by our outpost vic R-088166 during the afternoon. Considerable vehicular and personnel movement was observed in rear areas as the enemy continued to build up his forces on the Corps front. Enemy arty activity was very light and consisted of harassing and registration missions. Hostile fighter bombers bombed and strafed road nets on Corps E flank during daylight hours.

b. Operations of component elements.

(1) Armor. On the right flank of the Corps zone, four tanks were observed in stationary positions in vic of HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) and considerable movement of armor and Inf into OBERHOFFEN (R-0920) was noted during the period, indicating a possible shift of armor from HERRLISHEIM to OBERHOFFEN. This is further substantiated by the hvy drop of armored activity vic HERRLISHEIM during the past two days and the corresponding increased activity vic OBERHOFFEN. In vic of HAGUENAU, six tanks were engaged by arty at R-016256 at 0700A and four more, possibly the same tanks, were engaged vic R-077250 at 0800A. These are possibly tanks of the 47th Div, which has been identified in this area and believed to have 15 to 20 tanks attached. In the zone of the 108th Div tracked vehicles were heard moving towards BITSCHOFFEN (Q-9128) at 1825A and armor was heard moving into BITSCHOFFEN at 2200A. This movement probably involves the armor which is usually attached to infantry formations. No tanks were destroyed or damaged during the period. Total tanks destroyed since 1 Jan: 129. Total tanks damaged since 1 Jan: 50.

(2) Arty. Early in the period hvy RR gun firing from vic BUHL (R-2911) placed several rounds in the BRUMATH (Q-9814) -- WEYERSHEIM (R-0513) area. The only shelling reported during the morning was from direct fire weapon attempting to hit the church steeple in MARIENTHAL (R-0620), and 50 rounds, half of which were tank or SP, falling SW of BISCHWILLER (R-0918). Between midday and dusk activity consisted of light interdiction of the road WILDENGUTH (Q-7838) -- REPERTSWILLER (Q-8037), a few rounds of smoke, probably for registrations, vic R-031209 and R-073145, dual purpose guns firing from the GUMBRECHTSHOFFEN (Q-9234) area harassed PFAFFENHOFFEN -- LA WALCK (Q-9027). The enemy continues to displace his arty to support future operations but activity is confined to very light and scattered harassing indicating the desire not to disclose new positions.



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(3) Aviation. A total of 21 hostile a/c were over the Corps E flank between 0925A and 1424A on bombing, strafing and rcn missions. Enemy activity was confined to the triangle formed by BISCHWILLER, WEYERSHEIM (R-0412) and BRUMATH (Q-9814) indicating the importance attached to this area by the enemy. At least half the attacking a/c were Me-262 jet-propelled type and several of these planes glided into the targets with the sun at their back and when engaged were reported to climb almost vertically at great speed. Hits were observed on one Me-262 and plane is claimed probably destroyed as it was observed losing altitude very fast and was last seen falling vic R-040175.

(4) Inf.

45th Inf Div. Enemy activity was light throughout the period. During the afternoon small groups digging in on the nose of the high ground at Q-794377 and an estimated 30 men vic Q-817375 were dispersed by arty fire. After dark, a six to eight man enemy patrol was routed vic Q-757408 and small groups vic Q-763402, Q-772408 and Q-830376 were scattered by mortar and arty fire. Considerable movement continued in the rear area as the enemy built up his forces on the Div front.

103d Inf Div. Considerable movement continued in the rear areas as the enemy built up his forces on the Div front. The enemy also maintained the pressure on the Div W flank and captured ROTHBACH (Q-8434) during the morning. At mid-morning, approx two Cos observed vic Q-905325 were dispersed by our arty fire and some time later were seen digging in at Q-900329. An estimated Bn was observed moving into OFFWILLER (Q-8534) at noon and this movement probably involved the II Bn 11 SS Mtn Bn identified in this area later in the day. Just before noon the enemy attacked our outpost in BITSCHOFFEN (Q-9128) but were repulsed after a sharp fire fight. During the afternoon, approx 60 enemy were encountered vic Q-923280 and 50 enemy and three vehicles vic Q-876352 were dispersed by our arty. Air OPs also observed a column of personnel and vehicles moving SW extended along the road from OBERBRONN (Q-9138) to ZINSWILLER (Q-9135). Troop concentrations were reported in MEITERSHEIM (Q-9331) and vic BITSCHOFFEN. After dark a 13 man enemy patrol engaged our patrol vic Q-937277 in a short fire fight before withdrawing.

79th Inf Div. Enemy patrolling increased somewhat as the enemy continued to probe our positions in an effort to learn our dispositions. An undetermined number of Inf supported by six tanks vic R-016256 were engaged by SA and arty at 0700A and four tanks and Inf were taken under fire vic R-007250 at 0800A. At mid-morning, an estimated Co of Inf vic R-042253 was dispersed by arty and 20 Inf and one armored car retreated to the N from vic R-003251 were taken under fire at 1020A. During the afternoon a short fire fight ensued when small patrols clashed at Q-970272. A 20 man enemy patrol was dispersed by arty fire vic R-004254 at 1405A but by 1730A enemy patrol had reformed and engaged our patrol in a fire fight. Our night patrols drew considerable SA fire vic Q-998251 and Q-994255 and another friendly patrol killed four men of a 12 man outpost vic R-069231. At the same time an undetermined number of enemy were reported digging in at R-052241.

36th Inf Div. Considerable movement continued in the enemy rear but other activity was negligible. During the afternoon, approx 40 enemy launched an attack on our outpost vic R-088166. This attack was broken up at 1650A without loss of ground. After dark, a fire fight developed when a 20 man enemy patrol attempted to probe our position vic R-104183.

(5) Motor movement. Ground observers and air OP reported a continuation of movement in enemy rear areas across Corps front. An air OP observed 15 supply trucks moving toward SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1625) at 1000A and at the same time considerable movement was observed N of the northwestern portion of the HAGUENAU Forest. Movement continued throughout the afternoon and six vehicles were spotted at R-153116 and an armored car and a US jeep were seen at R-10516.



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Vehicles were also sighted moving N on the DRUSENHEIM (R-1618) -- SCHIRRHAIN (R-1222) road and a column of horse-drawn vehicles was observed on road SCHIRRHAIN to OBERHOFFEN (R-0919). Shortly after dark tracked vehicles were heard moving from MIETESHEIM (Q-9331) toward BITSCHOTTEN (Q-9028). At the same time vehicular movement was also heard in UHRWILLER (Q-8830). Large numbers of vehicles and tanks were observed by Tac/R in the HOMBURG (Q-7180) -- ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q-7275) -- KAISERSLAUTERN (R-0294) area where approx 600 vehicles and unknown number of tanks were observed moving generally in the direction of ZWEIBRUCKEN and an additional 100 vehicles were observed moving both ways between ZWEIBRUCKEN and LANDSTUHL (Q-8890). Some light motor movement was observed N of BITCHE (Q-8050). E of BITCHE approx 135 vehicles were observed stationary facing N. These movements indicate a possible build-up in the ZWEIBRUCKEN area and may involve a Panzer or Panzer Grenadier Div.

(6) RR movements. Almost no rail activity was observed during the period though a 25 car train was observed moving S out of HOMBURG and one train was observed in the vic NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-6083) carrying five tanks, 15 MT and five guns. One 60 car train was observed stationary between SCHIFFERSTADT (R-4788) and SPEYER (R-5080).

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div 1 fr I Bn 481 GR
 1 fr 14 Co 481 GR
 2

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,285

103d Inf Div 3 fr I Bn 118 GR

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,341

79th Inf Div 1 fr I Bn 103 GR
 1 fr 13 Security Bn (deserter)
 2

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,939

36th Inf Div No PWs during period

Total PWs captured by 36th Inf Div in FRANCE: 20,043

14th Armd Div 7 deserters

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,079

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 232400A: 14


Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 3,453

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,491

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 157.

1 Incl - The KOCH Shelter



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS VI CORPS
APO 46
US ARMY

INCLOSURE NO 1
TO
G-2 REPORT NO 162

24 JANUARY 1945.

TRANSLATION

The following is a translation of an article in "Nachrichten fuer die Infanterie", Magazine No 4, 1944 of the HQ of the Chief of the German Infantry. It describes a type defensive installation widely used in East Prussia and which may be encountered in the future by VI Corps troops.

THE "KOCH" SHELTER

The "Koch" shelter was designed during the time when the Bolshevik flood first beat against the border land of East Prussia and threatened to engulf it. Those were the weeks when the Reich Defense Commissioner of East Prussia, Gauleiter Koch, created with his men, almost overnight, those defensive positions from which the hard fighting front has since been able to ward off all Bolshevik attempts to break through.

At that time everywhere in the East Prussian border land concrete tubes could be seen waiting to be emplaced in the field fortifications. And everywhere there were soldiers and the men of East Prussia busily at work emplacing these "Koch" shelters in the field fortifications under construction.

What was then an improvisation has since been developed into a fighting compartment which fully satisfies the needs of the troops. It consists of a simple concrete tube, 4 feet in diameter and 5 feet 2 inches in height, with a lateral entrance about 2½ feet high and 2 feet wide. The walls of the tube are 4 - 6 inches thick and the tubes weigh between 1800 and 2400 lbs. The shelter is covered with a lid, which can be either closed or open making possible its employment as a dual purpose shelter and strongpoint. When used as a strongpoint there is an opening on top 32 inches in diameter. (Sketch 1, Page 3)

The main advantage of the "Koch" shelter over the conventional dug-in field installations is its weather resistance. Moreover, it can be produced simply and rapidly in large quantities by unskilled labor. It can be produced in factories in the area to be fortified or right at the emplacements by pouring the concrete into built-in containers. Thus under adequate expert guidance a long range program of construction of field type fortifications can be undertaken with the aid of civilian labor. The tactical commander of the area or the officer of the troops who will occupy the installations must decide how and where the constructions are to be set up, taking into consideration the weapons at his disposal. These installations can be emplaced in rear areas only and not in areas under enemy observation or fire.

The "Koch" shelter may be used as a strongpoint, OP or dug-out. Without the lid or with the lid open it can be used as a rifle pit for infantrymen with rifles or tommy guns or as a strongpoint with a light or heavy MG.

When emplaced without the lid the concrete tube is inserted into the ground until the upper edge of the tube is flush with the ground surface. Inside the tube an improvised table serves as an arm support. Emplaced in this manner the shelter can be used as a rifle pit for two men or as an LMG position (forward and medium support). If the shelter is emplaced specifically as an LMG or EMG position the concrete tube is inserted in such a manner that its upper edge will be about 8 inches below the ground surface. On the side facing the enemy the ground will then be dug out like a normal MG emplacement. According to the size of the gunner a platform must then be erected inside the tube enabling

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 By LS HANA, Date

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the man to use the edge of the tube as an arm support. (See sketch No 2)

When emplacing the tube with lid open, it must be done in such a manner that the upper edge of the lid is flush with the gently graded embankment. The shelter can then be used like the open tube as rifle pit and MG emplacement. (See sketch No 3) The emplacement with the open lid has the advantage of a smaller opening, thus affording greater protection against shell fragments. On the other hand, it will accommodate only one man. When emplaced in the shelter with open lid both the MG 34 and the MG 42 may be used as HMG with the mount below the lid. (See sketch No 4)

When firing the Bazooka or Panzerfaust from the "Koch" shelter special care must be exercised, the gunner being sure of an unobstructed path for the flame jet at the rear end only if he emerges quite far from the shelter. Even if all the safety rules are observed it takes a very skillful gunner to fire the equipment in this manner. Because of the narrow opening of the lid the Bazooka can be fired only from the lidless tube. In any case it is more practicable to construct a normal field emplacement and connect it to a "Koch" shelter, using the shelter only for a dugout. (See sketch No 5)

By connecting it with other concrete tubes with and without lid the emplacement can be enlarged to include a dugout or enlarged dugout. (See sketch No. 6)

When used as an OP the tube is emplaced in the same manner as when used as a rifle pit.

If the "Koch" shelter is to be used as a pillbox (only for flanking fire behind the MLR) blocks of concrete or other suitable material (e.g. wood) must be propped between tube and lid, leaving open only the necessary slits to serve as embrasures.

Apart from the above described uses the "Koch" shelter can also be dug in vertically with closed lid to serve as one-man dugout (e.g. during arty barrages or bombing attacks, not as permanent shelter!). Or emplaced horizontally in sufficient depth without lid it can be used as shellproof shelter for weapons, equipment and ammunition. (See sketch No 7)

All these emplacements must be carefully camouflaged against observation from air and ground. It is especially important to conceal the circular outline of the shelter. To facilitate this, wire loops to which the camouflage can be fastened are built into the edges of the open tubes. Open emplacements must be camouflaged by covering them with a lid of two wooden boards (or similar material) which can be easily removed.



SECRET

Copy No 61

SECRET
Auth: CG VI Corps
Initials: JPK
Date: 25 Jan 1945

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

N 163

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 240001A
TO : 242400A
HQ VI CORPS
250800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. See Overlay, Incl No 1.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below

21 Pz Div. Although out of formal contact since 21 Jan, there were many indications that the 21 Pz Div remained within the VI Corps zone and would probably figure in a new offensive venture. The capture of three PWS from the I Bn, 125 PGR (21 Pz Div) yesterday at R-0713, men who had been part of a patrol of eight, clearly confirms the presence of that Div within our zone and shows that it has shifted far to the SE. Notwithstanding the disillusioning experiences of 10 SS Pz Div in that area during the past week, it is not improbable that the 21 Pz Div may have definite aggressive designs in its new sector, especially as the bulk of it has been out of line long enough to rest and undertake some reorganization. This shift in the 21 Pz Div clearly raises some question as to the whereabouts of the 7 Para and 10 SS Pz Divs, both of which were committed S of the HAGUENAU Forest. It can be presumed, however, that both of these Divs are farther N in the HAGUENAU -- RICHWILLER area with the 10 SS held in immediate reserve prepared to exploit any success which the enemy may hope to realize from his current massing of troops in that area.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. I Corps: Counterattack in direction of RICHWILLER (V-6609) repulsed after some initial penetration. Attack vic V-6710 supported by armor beaten off. A second attack against RICHWILLER resulted in heavy fighting throughout period. II Corps: Strong resistance vic CHALET DE SCHOPPEN-WEHR vic V-7248, in southern portion of woods V-7348, BRAUNWALD Woods (V-7448) and in area between bridge site vic V-7750 and BOIS DE RINDWIHR (V-7748). Hvy counterattack supported by armor vic V-7848 repulsed.

XV and XXI Corps: Sectors quiet.

(Source: Seventh Army Isum No 327 as of 242400A)

VI Corps. During the day, enemy activity followed the same general pattern of the previous period with several probing actions particularly on the western half of the Corps front. After dark, however, the enemy became increasingly aggressive, especially on the western half of the 79th Div sector where he launched three attacks across the MODER River supported by hvy fire, one of which succeeded and penetrated into the woods N of OHLUNGEN (Q-9723). Enemy arty increased over the Corps sector but still continued to be light. Post period reports show further aggressive action by the enemy. About 0430A, an estimated 200 enemy attacked vic MUIHAUSEN (Q-8631) and succeeded in penetrating our positions to SCHILLERSDORF (Q-8430) where they were contained. Further E in the area N of HAGUENAU, the enemy staged a demonstration with arty, mortar and SA fires at 0200A and approx 100 enemy troops crossed the MODER River vic R-065230. From the character of the enemy's activity it would appear that the enemy has finally completed following up our withdrawal and has begun his anticipated offensive.

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b. Operations of component elements.

(1) Armor. Enemy armor dispositions were reported along the whole of the Corps front with concentrations noted in the ROTHBACH (Q-8434) and HEERLISHEIM (R-1214) areas. In the ROTHBACH area 10 to 12 tanks were observed and taken under fire with arty destroying two and AT guns claiming three more. It is possible that these tanks are standing by to exploit any enemy success to the S after crossing of the ROTHBACH River has been made and a ford found or a bridge constructed. In the zone of the 103d Inf Div some tanks were heard during the night, moving along road between MIETESHEIM (Q-9230) and BITSCH-HOEFEN (Q-9128); also one tank was heard during night vic Q-9527. These tanks probably belong to the 25 PG Div which was identified in this sector and indicates a possible build up of tanks, since this unit has had ample opportunity to repair a number of its damaged tanks and receive replacements for destroyed tanks. On the right flank of the Corps zone, elements of the 21 Pz Div were identified and approx 10 tanks operating in this sector probably belong to this unit. The armor of the 10 SS Pz Div is probably in reserve under the camouflage protection of the HAGUENAU Forest, awaiting to exploit the first breakthrough of our defensive positions. Five tanks were destroyed during period. Tanks destroyed since 1 Jan: 134. Damaged or disabled: 50. 5

(2) Arty. There was little change in the pattern of shelling from that of previous period which consisted of light harassing of forward elements and interdiction of communications in rear of forward areas. In the mountainous terrain of 45th Inf Div sector, harassing fire fell on forward elements and sporadic interdiction was placed on the WIMMENAU (Q-7734) -- INGWILLER (Q-8130) road. In the 103d Inf Div sector, 10 to 12 tanks defiladed in the ROTHBACH (Q-8434) area harassed forward positions. 79th Inf Div positions along southern edges of HAGUENAU Forest were lightly shelled during the day and shortly after dark. A direct fire weapon succeeded in disrupting an OP in a building in HAGUENAU and harassing fire was placed on height 259 (Q-9326) in an effort to neutralize observation. Hvy guns believed 210mm shelled HAGUENAU from the E shortly after noon and at the close of the period demonstration by fire including arty was in progress N of the town. The heaviest shelling reported was in the 36th Inf Div sector, 60 rds from 105mm guns falling in wooded area E of KIRTZENHAUSEN (R-0515). Nightly harassing fire was light, falling vic WEYERSHEIM (R-0513) and GRIES (R-0517).

(3) Aviation. 36th Inf Div reported one FW-190 observed flying W, high over HAGUENAU at 1600A.

(4) Inf.

45th Inf Div. Enemy continued strong patrol action throughout the period, apparently designed to occupy new positions and determine the extent of our withdrawals. The enemy action was principally in the REIPERTS-WILLER (Q-8037) area with the patrols having a strength of 15-25 men. After dark, an estimated 50-75 enemy moved S from Hill 501 vic Q-806375 and after engaging our OP in a fire fight, forced it to withdraw. However, at 2330A, our troops entered SATZMUHL (Q-7937) without contact.

103d Inf Div. During the morning, the enemy probed the Div front with attacks of small force. An estimated 50 Inf supported by mortar fire attacked vic BISCHOLTZ (Q-8532) were repulsed at 0830A. At 0800A, an estimated 100 Inf attacked vic MULHAUSEN (Q-8631) and were repulsed but contact continued. In the woods vic Q-9327 an estimated Co was seen forming up for an attack at 0915A and was broken up by arty fire, but these remnants again reformed and were again broken up by arty fire. During the afternoon, the enemy continued small probing actions along the front while some groups of Co strength were seen moving vic ZINSWILLER (Q-8634), UHRWILLER (Q-9227) and MULHAUSEN. After dark groups of 2-3 enemy were reported sifting into MULHAUSEN where a build-up is apparently in progress.



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79th Inf Div. Throughout the day enemy activity was of a minor nature with small groups of men and patrol clashes being reported. At 2020A, however, the enemy began to place heavy arty, SA, and AW fire on the area between NEUBOURG (Q-9526) and SCHWEIGHAUSEN (R-0025). Under cover of this fire the enemy attempted to cross the MODER River at three points. The ones at Q-959269 and Q-990257 were repulsed, but the attempt vic Q-976263 by strong enemy forces estimated at least in regimental strength, succeeded and the enemy penetrated into the woods vic Q-975245. Apparently elements of both the 25 PG Div and 47 VG Div were involved in this attack since the I Bn 35 PGR was identified vic SCHWEIGHAUSEN and the I Bn 103 VGR was identified vic NEUBOURG.

36th Inf Div. The enemy continued to be generally quiet on the Div front with very little contact reported. In the morning, a nine man patrol from 1st Co 125 PGR (21 Pz Div) was wiped out E of WEYERSHEIM (R-0513) while after dusk our patrols drew MG fire from 400 yds NE of R-087123 and MG, SA fire from R-095125. Small groups of enemy were observed vic R-0912 and R-0913.

(5) Motor movement. Principal enemy traffic on the immediate front was between SCHIRRHAIN (R-1222), SCHIRRHOFEN (R-1322) and BOIS DE SOUFFLENHEIM (R-1420). Considerable vehicular activity was also reported vic R-1419. However, the enemy traffic was generally light which may have been due both to the poor weather which hampered our observation and also to the probability that the enemy has virtually completed following up our withdrawal. In rear areas Tac/R reported a column moving S from PIRMASENS towards BITCHE late in the afternoon. The column was estimated at 50 plus vehicles consisting of both MT and horse-drawn vehicles, however, the entire length of the column could not be seen.

8. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

3 fr II Bn 457 GR
3 fr II Bn 477 GR

1 fr I Bn 456 GR
7

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,292

103d Inf Div

5 fr II Bn 87 GR
3 fr I Bn 165 GR
1 fr II Bn 11 SS Mtn Regt

1 fr 13 Co 104 GR (straggler)
4 unidentified wounded
14

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,355

79th Inf Div

3 fr II Bn 103 GR

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 21,942

36th Inf Div


3 fr I Bn 125 PGR
1 deserter
4

Total PWs captured by 36th Inf Div in FRANCE: 20,047

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 242400A: 28

Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 3,481

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,519



S E C R E T

b. List of German Passwords and Replies. (Captured by 75th US Inf Div)

I Bn, 753 GR

Bn CP, 12 Jan 1945

25.1.45	Gesetz	-	Blut
26.1.45	Ausdauer	-	Sieg
27.1.45	Volk	-	Erhebung
28.1.45	Ehr	-	Gewissen
29.1.45	Ausdauer	-	Bewahrung
30.1.45	Gedanke	-	Deutschland
31.1.45	Fessel	-	Freiheit

(Source: XVIII Corps (AB) G-2 Periodic Report No 32, 19 January 1945)

c. Security measures used before offensive.

Interrogation of NCOs and officers of units participating in the German attack of 16 Dec brought out the following points in regard to security measures taken by the enemy prior to attack.

1. Signal security. Prior to an attack, all code names, call signs and code keys are changed. From jumping off point to a depth of 3 km all telephone lines have to be strung double. This precaution makes it extremely difficult to tap a wire. The use of authenticators between telephone stations is stringently enforced. Only a small number of picked signal men are allowed to use telephones, in order to cut calls to a minimum and in order to insure that only a few men have knowledge of new call signs, coordinate codes, etc. The use of walkie-talkie is forbidden. Whenever possible, messengers are used for communication, accompanied by a liaison officer if message is very important.

2. Violation of blackout regulations before an attack will result in severe disciplinary action. All troop movements, usually of no greater than Co strength, take place at night. Both men and vehicles stay under cover in daytime. If time permits, the heavy equipment such as tanks and arty pieces are brought to the marshalling area piecemeal, in order not to arouse the suspicion of Allied night reconnaissance.

3. Troops are usually given security lectures. They are warned not to talk about military things, not even to neighboring units. Some unit commanders are known to have collected Soldbuchs before attacks, others told troops in case of capture to destroy them or tear out page 4 and 17 respectively.

4. Roadsigns with unit code names are used as sparingly as possible. Unit insignias and vehicle markings, however, are not removed. The disadvantage of removing the latter proved to outweigh the advantage obtained by a greater degree of security. It was found, for instance, that troop and vehicular traffic was slowed down in the absence of identifying markings, and that it was hard to apprehend stragglers and deserters.

5. Orientation of officers as to mission is given at last possible moment. Even then, they are given exact information only about the sector and unit with which they are directly connected.


6. H-hour is usually set between 0200 and 0400 in order to achieve a greater element of surprise.

7. Summarizing the enemy's security preparations, it may be said he is not employing any new or unusual means to insure greater secrecy. His main strength in this respect lies in his rigid enforcement of above mentioned security program. (Source: First US Army IPW Report)

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 157.

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: Initials: DW :
: Date: 26 Jan 1945 :
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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 164

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 250001A
TO : 252400A
HQ VI CORPS
260800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change, see Overlay to G-2 Periodic Report No 163.

b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

SCHWEIGHAUSEN - NEUBOURG Action. The capture and interrogation of PWs taken during the recent attack in the center of the Corps zone sheds much light both on the disposition and roles of the various enemy units involved. The 25 Pz Div, occupying a sector roughly from the eastern edge of NEUBOURG (Q-9526) to about 1500 yds W of SCHWEIGHAUSEN (Q-9924), evidently had the mission of clearing out part of the woods S of the MODER River and attacked with the I Bn 25 PGR on the W and the I Co plus the II Bn, 119 PGR on the E. The attack on NEUBOURG was evidently made by the 47 VG Div, the I Bn of the 103 GR driving from the N and NE, the 104 GR attacking from the NW, the divisional sector extending to a short distance on either side of NEUBOURG. Meanwhile SCHWEIGHAUSEN was the objective of another attack, made by the III Bn, 21 Para Regt in conjunction with the 7 Para divisional bicycle Co. Although only the III Bn, 21 Para Regt and the 7 Para Bicycle Co were contacted, it is believed that the 20 Para Regt also participated in the action and that the 7 Para Div controls a sector in that area, probably extending from 1500 yds W of SCHWEIGHAUSEN to HAGUENAU. The massing of these three Divs in a narrow sector W of HAGUENAU clearly indicates the area of the enemy's main effort. However, the attacks were extremely costly to the enemy, the three participating Divs suffering hvy casualties.

10 SS Pz Div. E of HAGUENAU the 10 SS Pz Div undertook an aggressive action centering around KALTENHAUSEN (R-0721) spearheaded by the II and III Bns, 21 SS PGR and the I and II Bns, 22 SS PGR, with the mission of taking the high ground vic of Hill 150 (R-060222). In this action the II and III Bns, 21 SS PGR suffered especially hvy losses. Although it is difficult to define very precisely, it appears that the 10 SS Pz Div now holds a sector between HAGUENAU and OBERHOFFEN, the sector from OBERHOFFEN to WEYERSHEIM being held by the 21 Pz Div.

361 VG Div. PWs from 2 Co, 481 GR (256 VG Div) state that they were recently arrived drafts from the 953 GR (361 VG Div) and that the 361 VG Div sent at least 150 men as replacements to the 256 VG Div recently, the staff of the 361 VG Div having reportedly departed for GERMANY where the Div is to be reorganized.

256 VG Div. Aside from the 150 replacements recently drafted from the 361 VG Div, the 256 VG Div also received an undetermined number of replacements from a March Bn which arrived in the divisional area about 21 Jan. Hence, it is clear that the 256 VG Div has recently undergone a limited re-fitting.

36 VG Div. PWs from the I Bn, 165 GR (36 VG Div) confirm the long suspected non-existence of the II Bn but state that the II Bn, 87 GR (36 VG Div) is attached to the 165 GR. PWs further state that the II Bn, 165 GR is now refitting in BAUMHOLDER, GERMANY and is expected to arrive in the divisional area soon. However, the German replacement system already greatly overstrained, it is doubtful whether the Div will ever again operate with its full Inf components.

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S E C R E T

8. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. I Corps: Hvy opposition vic CITE AMELIE (V-6310) where two Tiger tanks are reported. II Corps: Strong resistance in OHNEN-HEIM Woods (V-8054). Counterattack supported by armor repulsed vic V-7949.

XV US Corps. 100th Div: Increased vehicle activity vic BITCHE (Q-7850). 44th Div: Estimated Bn attack vic Q-6055 repulsed. SARRAILB (Q-4845) accurately shelled by estimated 380mm guns. 106th Cav Gp: Trains heard vic GEISLAUTERN (Q-3471) from 251715A to 252010A.

(Source: Seventh Army Isum No 329 as of 252400A).

VI Corps. Three enemy attacks maintained hvy pressure on the center of the Corps front until mid-morning at which time our counterattacks forced the enemy on the defensive in an attempt to protect his gains made earlier in the period. The main effort was made vic SCHWEIGHAUSEN (R-0024) and in the wood just W of town and a total of five enemy Bns from three different Divs were identified in this area. At the end of the period the enemy still held a bridgehead W of SCHWEIGHAUSEN but our pressure had reduced his original holdings considerably. The enemy offensive SE of HAGUENAU was contained early in the period and by late afternoon the enemy had been forced back across the MODER. Elements of the 6 SS Mtn Div which attacked and seized SCHILLERSDORF (Q-8530) early in the morning were also forced on the defensive and bitter house to house fighting continued with an estimated enemy Bn surrounded in the SE part of town. Enemy activity on both flanks of the Corps was negligible. Shelling continued light but an increase in volume was noted.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Armored activity was negligible and confined to movements across the Corps front. Due to the river obstacles, enemy armored activity will be tentatively limited to the missions of roving arty. On the left flank of the Corps zone, one tank was observed moving NW from ROTHBACH (Q-8434) at 1940A and some tanks were heard at Q-880291 at 1845A. In the center of the Corps zone, five tanks were observed moving SW vic Q-888290 at 1830A. Three tanks were observed late in the afternoon vic Q-985261 and an unknown number of tanks were reported operating in the HAGUENAU area. PW states that a Bn of 75mm SPs were attached to the 6 SS Mtn Div after arriving from PRAGUE around 1 Jan 45, and this would account for the armor operating on the Corps left flank. Although the PW referred to these as "75mm SPs", they are probably the Pz Jaeger 38 (t) (TDs), previously encountered on the Corps zone. (No tanks were destroyed during period. Tanks destroyed since 1 Jan: 134; damaged since 1 Jan: 50.

(2) Arty. Continued light shelling in the left part of Corps zone is probably due to the shifting of the 6 SS Mtn Div with its organic arty to the S. Forward elements along the REIPERTSWILLER (Q-8037) -- ROTHBACH (Q-8434) road were harassed while 170mm guns believed to be in the DAMBACH (Q-9244) and LEMBACH (R-0445) valleys interdicted the communications town of INGWILLER (Q-8130). In the left central sector, enemy Inf attack on SCHILLERSDORF (Q-8430) early in the period was preceded by short arty preparation. ZUT-ZENDORF (Q-8628) was target for 88mm DP guns firing from vic ZINSWILLER (Q-8935) at midday. In the southern sector, forward elements vic NEUBOURG (Q-9526) and SCHWEIGHAUSEN were harassed intermittently during the day. Very little shelling occurred in the right flank of the Corps sector, a few rds of harassing fire being placed in BISCHWILLER (R-0918) during the morning. Sound locations obtained during the period indicate enemy arty position areas each estimated at a Bn strength vic ESCHBACH (R-0030), ENGWILLER (Q-9131) and ZINSWILLER.

- 2 -

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(3) Engr. A PW of the 10 SS Pz Div reported a bridge across the RHINE E of DRUSENHEIM (R-1618) capable of carrying vehicles and tanks.

(4) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The enemy remained relatively quiet and confined his activity to patrolling. Shortly after the start of the period, an undetermined number of enemy launched a counterattack and forced the withdrawal of our troops which had entered SAEGMUHL (Q-7987) unopposed a few hours before. At 0410A, a 14-man patrol was dispersed as it attempted to probe our outpost line vic Q-824373. During the morning, patrols were active at scattered points across the Div front and some enemy were observed digging-in on the high ground in the Q-8336 and Q-8435 grid squares. Activity in the afternoon was confined to harassing mortar fire and after dark a small patrol contacted our outpost vic WILDENGUTH (Q-7837).

103d Inf Div. During the first part of the period the enemy became aggressive and maintained hvy pressure on the northwestern portion of the Div front. However, later in the day the enemy was forced on the defensive and offered stubborn resistance to hold his gains made during the morning. At 0430A, the III Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt supported by two tanks launched an attack on the MULHAUSEN (Q-8631) -- SCHILLERSDORF (Q-8430) axis. An estimated 200 enemy succeeded in reaching the latter town where they held out against our counterattacks. Bitter house to house fighting continued but by the end of the period the enemy was surrounded in the southeastern portion of the town. Later in the day, another Bn of the 12 SS Mtn Regt seized the high ground W of MULHAUSEN vic Q-806315 and stubbornly resisted our attempts to regain this ground. At 0830A, approx 100 enemy launched an attack vic NIEFFERN (Q-8730). The majority of the enemy were forced to withdraw with hvy losses but some troops remained in town and harassed our forward positions with SA fire until the town was destroyed by hvy arty. The enemy maintained increasing pressure on our outpost in KINDWILLER (Q-9029) and forced our troops to withdraw late in the afternoon.

79th Inf Div. The enemy continued to exert hvy pressure from the bridgehead established in the OHLUNGEN Woods late in the preceding period and five Bns were identified in this area during the period. However, our counterattacks which started at midmorning forced the enemy on the defensive and just before dark our troops had regained approx half of SCHWEIGHAUSEN and the enemy was making withdrawals in the BOIS DE OHLUNGEN while offering stiff resistance. At approx 0200A, the enemy demonstrated with SA, mortar and arty fire in the area vic HAGUENAU and at the same time elements of both PGRs of the 10 SS Pz Div crossed the MODER vic R-065250. Hvy fighting continued in this area until late in the afternoon at which time the enemy had been forced back across the river. Over 100 PWs were taken in this action and hvy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. Patrols report the enemy dug-in along the N bank of the MODER from CAMP DE OBERHOFFEN (R-0821) to OBERHOFFEN.

36th Inf Div. Enemy activity was negligible except for a ten-man enemy patrol observed vic R-098193 at 0900A.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div

1 fr I Bn 476 GR

13 fr I Bn 481 GR

14

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,306

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103d Inf Div

1 fr Hq Co 165 GR
6 fr I Bn 165 GR

4 unidentified wounded
11

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,366

79th Inf Div

57 fr I Bn 103 GR
1 fr II Bn 103 GR
2 fr I Bn 104 GR
11 fr I Bn 35 PGR
16 fr II Bn 119 PGR
1 fr I Bn 25 AR
5 unidentified wounded

1 fr III Bn 21 Para Regt
6 fr 7 Para Bicycle Co
1 fr II Bn 21 SS PGR
61 fr III Bn 21 SS PGR
5 fr I Bn 22 SS PGR
4 fr II Bn 22 SS PGR
171

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 22,113

36th Inf Div

2 fr I Bn 192 PGR

Total PWs captured by 36th Inf Div in FRANCE: 20,049

14th Armd Div

5 deserters

Total PWs captured by 14th Armd Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 1,084

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 252400A: 203
Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 3,684
Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,722

b. Enemy methods. A wounded PW of 13th Co, 12 SS Mtn Regt said his Co was issued assorted US clothing on 22 Jan.


c. Supreme Headquarters AEF Special Identification Card (Blue Pass) has been cancelled and will not be honored after 15 Jan 45.

d. Studied Insult. Prisoner from 18 VG Div states that his unit answers daily roll call by giving the current First US Army passwords. (1st Div)

ENEMY CAPABILITIES

No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 157.

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: Initials: *JK*
: Date: 27 Jan 1945:
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G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

No 165

Maps: GSGS 4471, 1/50,000

FROM: 260001A
TO : 262400A
HQ VI CORPS
270800A JAN 45

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. Enemy front lines. Generally no change, see G-2 Periodic Report No 163.
- b. Units in contact. For identifications, see Par 3a below.

A document dated 20 January captured by the 14th Armd Div vic SCHWEIGH-
HAUSEN (R-0024) indicates that 7 Para Div is under command of XIV SS Corps.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. General Summary

First Fr Army. I Corps: Counterattacks on CITE GRASSAEGGERSTE (V-6210) repulsed at 252200A. II Corps: Hvy pressure vic V-7948 forced slight withdrawal of friendly elements. Two counterattacks by one Co supported by two tanks each vic V-7647 and V-7746 repulsed. Counterattacks vic V-7448 by estimated Co and three tanks repulsed.

XV Corps. Enemy remained generally quiet.

(Source: Seventh Army Isum No 331 as of 262400A)

VI Corps. Enemy activity on the Corps front was on a minor scale. The principal action took place vic SCHILLERSDORF (Q-8430) where final enemy resistance was overcome before noon. The enemy withdrew from his MODER bridgehead W of SCHWEIGHAUSEN (R-0024) and our troops reoccupied the MLR virtually unopposed. Considerable vehicular movement was observed on the Corps front, the heaviest involving 150 MT moving S from SELTZ (R-2732) during the afternoon. Enemy arty fire was negligible.

b. Operations of component elements

(1) Armor. Armored activity was light throughout the period and consisted of some tank movements at scattered points across the Corps front. Two tanks and an SP were observed in ROTHBACH (Q-8434), one Mk VI and some Inf were fired on vic Q-968268. On the Corps right flank, two movements, one of four tanks moving towards DRUSENHEIM (R-1518) from HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) and two tanks, one towing the other, moving towards OFFENDORF (R-1312) from HERRLISHEIM, were fired on at 1635A and 1640A respectively. The movement of one tank towing another, towards OFFENDORF suggests the possibility of a tank repair shop in that vicinity. No tanks were destroyed or damaged during period. Tanks destroyed since 1 Jan: 134; damaged: 50. *mmj*

(2) Arty. Poor conditions of observation and lack of enemy Inf activity are believed responsible for the lack of shelling. During the early morning hours, UHLWILLER (Q-9524) received 12 rds from medium guns which was repeated again at 0940A by 88mm guns. Small missions were placed in MORSCHWILLER (Q-9224) and SCHWEIGHAUSEN (R-0024) at midday while BISCHWILLER (R-0918) was target for eight rds of medium and 15 rds of light caliber just before dusk. A battery of arty was observed proceeding N on the HERRLISHEIM (R-1214) -- DRUSENHEIM (R-1618) road at 1635A indicating that some regrouping is taking place in this area.

(3) Engr. The enemy placed five Teller-mines at the CR vic Q-97382600 before withdrawing back across the MODER River.

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(4) Inf.

45th Inf Div. The Div zone was very quiet during the period and enemy activity was limited to light harassing mortar fire on forward elements. Our night patrols contacted an undetermined number of enemy in position vic Q-786383, Q-789379 and Q-794377 but found our old positions vic Q-803375 unoccupied. REIPERTSWILLER was also found clear of the enemy although the four houses on the knoll at S edge of town were not searched. Later in the period a 15-man enemy patrol moving SE was contacted vic Q-843366.

103d Inf Div. Enemy activity was limited to harassing SA fire after resistance in SCHILLERSDORF (Q-8430) was overcome at noon. Elements of the 12 SS Mtn Regt continued to resist in SCHILLERSDORF until 1115A at which time the remaining 41 enemy in town were captured. An estimated 25-30 enemy in BISCHHOLTZ (Q-8532) constantly sniped our positions and other enemy riflemen and MG's harassed our troops vic MULHAUSEN (Q-8631) and NEIFFERN (Q-8729) throughout the day. At 2400A, a small enemy patrol was observed moving towards LA WALCK (Q-9127).

79th Inf Div. Enemy activity was limited to scattered patrolling and some movement in rear areas. Under cover of darkness at the start of the period the enemy broke contact on the MODER River bridgehead front and our troops were able to re-establish the MLR against only light MG fire from N of the river. During the afternoon, moderate activity was observed in the rear areas. A 20-man patrol vic R-010246 and an estimated Co of Inf vic R-024248 were both dispersed by arty fire. Inf and vehicular movement vic MERTZWILLER (Q-9629) was attacked by friendly air and hit by our arty. At 2230A, a 20 to 30 man enemy patrol vic R-041247 was dispersed by effective arty fire and at the same time our patrol reached the factory at R-064-289 and found it abandoned.

36th Inf Div. Enemy activity was negligible across the entire Div front. Just after the start of the period, our raiding patrol crossed the ice over the MODER and after a short fire fight captured eight enemy vic R-087120. A five man enemy patrol was observed at R-099194 during the morning and later in the day five enemy were seen digging-in at R-093120. Our night patrols reached R-115188, R-126186, and R-125178 without contact.

(5) Motor movement. Ground observers and air OPs reported considerable MT movement in the enemy's immediate rear areas. Tracked vehicular movement was heard vic OBERHOFFEN (R-0920) at 0045A and at 0500A vehicular movement was reported in UHRWILLER (Q-8831). Considerable traffic moving from OBERHOFFEN toward SCHIRRHOFEN (R-1222) was taken under arty fire at 0715A and during the afternoon friendly air bombed and strafed train and vehicle concentration in OFFWILLER (Q-8634), UHRWILLER (Q-8831) and KINDWILLER (Q-9029). At the same time, hvy two-way traffic between OBERHOFFEN and SCHIRRHOFEN (R-1322) and from CAMP DE OBERHOFFEN (R-0821) to SCHIRRHOFEN was taken under arty fire. After dark, intermittent and light vehicular traffic was reported moving NE to SW vic Q-985262. MT movement was also heard in KINDWILLER (Q-9029) at 2200A and at midnight tracked vehicular movement was reported in the same area. Tac/R reports 150 plus vehicles, some stationary, some moving, south-bound from SELTZ (R-2733) to DRUSENHEIM (R-1618) and fighter bombers indicate many small groups of Inf moving S from LAUTERBOURG (R-3242) and WISSEMBOURG (R-1542).

(6) RR movements. Third Army Tac/R reports 20 trains of 50 to 100 boxcars each between LANDSTUHL (Q-8991) and KAISERSLAUTERN (R-0294) at 1530A of which two had steam up facing W. 1000 mixed cars on sidings in same area.



S E C R E T

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Estimated enemy casualties

45th Inf Div 1 fr I Bn 476 GR

Total PWs captured by 45th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 16,307

103d Inf Div

1 fr II Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	5 fr 20 Co 12 SS Mtn Regt
19 fr III Bn 12 SS Mtn Regt	4 unidentified wounded
	<u>29</u>

Total PWs captured by 103d Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 3,395

79th Inf Div

10 fr I Bn 20 Para Regt	37 fr I Bn 22 SS PGR
8 fr III Bn 20 Para Regt	2 fr I Bn 103 GR
31 fr III Bn 21 Para Regt	<u>24</u> unidentified wounded
22 fr 7 Para Bicycle Co	134

Total PWs captured by 79th Inf Div in FRANCE and GERMANY: 22,247

36th Inf Div

2 fr II Bn 2 SS Police Regt	2 deserters
8 fr III Bn 2 SS Police Regt	4 unidentified wounded
	<u>16</u>

Total PWs captured by 36th Inf Div in FRANCE: 20,065

Total PWs captured by VI Corps during period ending 262400A: 180

Total PWs captured by VI Corps since 010001A January 1945: 3,864

Total PWs captured by VI Corps in FRANCE and GERMANY: 61,902

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. No change. See G-2 Periodic Report No 157.

b. Discussion. The enemy's inactivity and the considerable movement observed in the rear areas during the period indicate that some regrouping is in progress.

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S E C R E T